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TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM 
WORLDWIDE AND NEW ZE.ALAND INITIATIVES 
IN OVERCOMING THE PROBL~1 
BY: JoGo PRYDE 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH UNIT 
LINCOLN COLLEGE 
CANTERBURY 

TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM WORLDWIDE 
AND NEW ZEALAND INITIATIVES IN OVERCmrrNG 
THE PROBLEM 
This Paper attempts to deal with the subject in two parts. The 
first section is a summary of some of the important developments in 
agricultural protectionism while the second section endeavours to list 
New Zealand initiatives in attacking the problem in so far as it affects 
it. 
A. TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
In a recent pUblication the G.A.T.T. Secretariat summarised trends 
in international trade. They are set out in Appendix A. The figures 
show that in value terms, world exports over the period 1960-1976 
increased almost 800 percent; yet in the same period exports of 
agricultural products rose by only 400 percent. The greatest gains were 
achieved by 'manufactures' (almost 900 percent) and minerals (over 1100 
percent). These statistics confirm the reason for the concern over the 
failure of international trade in agricultural products to keep pace with 
the developments of the two other major sectors. 
In a post-war world where there has undeniably been a reduction in 
tariff barriers to international trade, the query must be posed, 'What 
has happened to agriculture?' Its terms of trade have not been as 
favourable as for manufactures and minerals. The other major reason is 
that barriers to international trade have become increasingly influential. 
Annually the non-tariff measures have proliferated and G.A.T.T. has 
disclosedl that an inventory of over 900 types of non-tariff barriers has 
been compiled as examples of measures which member governments believe 
have either hampered their exports or provided unfair advantage to their 
competitors. Some of the measures have been subjected to scrutiny by the 
negotiating committees involved in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. 
1 
'GATT Activities in 1977' - GATT, Geneva, p.17. 
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THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
One of the major developments for New Zealand was undoubtedly the 
United Kingdom's joining of the E.E.C. No other country could have been 
so affected as New Zealand and none made such a strenuous effort to 
protect its interests. Although in the years leading up to E.E.C. 
membership, the U.K. had modified some of its open-entry arrangements 
for New Zealand produce, the community represented a significant change 
for both the U.K. and New Zealand. A form of agricultural protectionism 
in which the cost of protection was imposed on the consumer took the 
place of the previous U.K. system where the main burden was met by the 
Exchequer. Not only was the E.E.C.'s 20 percent levy a new hurdle for 
New Zealand produce on top of rapidly escalating shipping freight rates, 
but in the case of beef a virtually complete ban was imposed as from 19742 . 
In addition, the Common Agricultural Policy's system of subsidising exports 
gave an advantage to the sale of stockpiled produce disposed of in other 
markets around the world. Fortunately, when some of it arrived on the U.S. 
market the U.S. Government took or threatened to take, some countervailing 
measures; but in most other markets the export-subsidised produce is give~ 
s.tatus equal to that accorded non-subsidised produce. 
New Zealand was apprehensive at the prospect of the United Kingdom 
adopting what it regarded as a most undesirable and harmful form of 
agricultural protectionism. The Japanese Economist, Haruko Fukuda, summed 
up New Zealand's views when she stated:-3 
"The present problem of supporting farmers indirectly through 
raising the prices of farm products, which is the basis of 
the C.A.P. is inefficient and has undesirable side effects. 
It has been shown that this policy does least good for the 
poorest and the least productive farmers. Secondly, it 
raises the cost of food to the consumer, and the burden of 
supporting the rural poor has to be borne considerably by 
the urban poor and finally, it generates surplus production 
of food if heavy price supports are giv~n with no quantitative 
limit on production (as is the case in the C.A.P.). This 
obliges the government concerned, if it is a net importer 
2 Appendix B. 
3 
"Japan and World Trade - The Years Ahead", Haruko Fukuda, 1973, p.126. 
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to reinforce the subsidy to domestic production by excluding 
imports from lower cost foreign sources of supply, or if it 
is a net exporter, to choose from the unattractive options 
of storing the surplus to no purpose, dumping it on world 
markets at subsidised prices, or controlling the right of 
farmers to produce in the first place." 
GATT AND THE DEVELOPIAENT OF REGIONALISM 
Regional trading arrangements in which a group of countries a~ree to 
abolish barriers against imports from one another, have been established in 
many parts of the world in recent years. The GATT recognised, by article 
XXIV, the value of closer integration of national economies through freer 
trade. It has given its approval to such groupings asex;ceptions to the 
general rule of most-favoured-nation treatment, provided that certain strict 
rules are met. The rules are intended to ensure that the arrangements 
facilitate trade among the countries concerned, without raising barriers to 
trade with the outside world.4 
This quotation from an official GATT publication could only be 
greeted with derision by New Zealand when it reflects how its dairy products 
have fared in the E.E.C. The formation and certainly the enlargement of the 
E.E.C. have caused new trade barriers to be erected against New Zealand and 
it would be hypocritical to pretend otherwise. In 1972 Grogan asserted that5 
"E.E.C. agriculture is the most highly protected in the world with a level 
about three times what it was eight or nine years ago". In the period s~nce 
then there are no signs of any liberalisation of the C.A.P., despite the 
hoped-for liberal influence of the U.K. and Denmark. 
Transitional arrangements for the U.K. have enabled the provision of 
consumer subsidies to be paid on butter. But these have only marginally 
relieved the upward pressure on prices and events have turned out very much 
as New Zealand predicted - substantially increased butter prices and lower 
per capita consumption of butter. The main sector to gain has been the 
margarine industry. There has been a scramble amongst the E.E.C. members 
for the U.K. butter and cheese market from which New Zealand l}as been forced 
4 
5 
GATT Activities in 1977 - GATT Geneva, p.60. 
'International Trade in Temperate Zone Products' - An Agricultural 
Adjustment Unit Symposium, Edited by F.O. Grogan, 1972 - p.46. 
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to retreat - markedly in the case of butter and virtually completely in 
6 
the case of cheese. 
AUSTRALIA 
World wide there has been little evidence that governments intend 
seriously to reduce the level of protection accorded their agricultural 
sectors. A notable exception could perhaps be the Australian Government 
which has been pressing on resolutely with its task of reviewing the 
assistance accorded its dairy industry. The achievements to date are 
certainly not insignificant and there do appear to be real prospects of a 
reduction in the price supports that this sector of the Australian economy 
has enjoyed in recent years. 
THE PERSUASIVE POWERS OF THE FARIvI SECTOR 
Governments, influenced strongly by their farm organisations, have 
been pressed to intensify the level of protection given to their farm 
sector. This has been done in the name of 'protection of the family farm' 
and the need to ensure incomes for farming comparable with those ruling in 
the industrial sector. Emotional pleas have been successful in continuing 
to persuade politicians that agriculture is 'a special case' - it involves 
human and social issues and 'the very fabric of society', yet most of the 
population are engaged in the non-farm sectors. For those people who are 
employed say in the industrial sectors in these industrial countries, human 
values do not appear to count nearly as much - or is it because industrialists 
do not possess the art of influencing politicans as well as farming leaders do? 
PARLIM.!JENTARY REPRESENTATION OF RURAL ELECTORATES 
Recent trends in agricultural protection have not disclosed any 
significant reduction in the influence of rural electorates on the import 
policy decisions of governments. Within the E.E.C. and in Japan for example, 
the extraord1nary dominance of governments by rural politicians, despite the 
exit of many of their constituents to the urban areas, makes the Pocket and 
Rotten boroughs of England look relatively harmless. The decisions of the 
5 yearly Boundaries Commission in New Zealand do not always please electors, 
but at least they give democratic recognition to demographic changes. Does 
6 Appendix C. 
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the matter of electoral boundaries appear as one of the 900 N.T.B.'s in 
the GATT list or would such a query be considered as intrusion into the 
domestic affairs of a member government? 
RISE OF CONSUMERISM 
There is a detectable rise of protest in some E.E.C. countries from 
consumer groups against their being forced to pay well above world prices 
for their food. These consumers are mainly in the urban areas where living 
costs have escalated rapidly in recent years. It is of interest to note 
that during a recent visit to Europe the writer learned from one of the 
University researchers that some of the protests against high food prices 
are coming from ex-farming people who now reside in the urban areas! Many 
have experienced a fall in real incomes and are especially conscious of 
the high food prices they encounter in their new urban existence. 
EFFECTS OF STATE TRADING NATIONS 
One of the reasons why GATT has failed to be as effective in 
agricultural protectionism is that its membership does not contain important 
trading nations such as China, the U.S.S.R. and East Germany. These and 
several member countries of GATT (e.g. Japan in respect of most meat and 
dairy imports) have state trading organisations responsible for their 
lmports. GATT has approved such practices (subject to certain conditions) 
on the grounds that it makes for stability; on the other hand it places 
great authority in the hands of governments and GATT has had little 
influence over the conduct of such negotiations. In New Zealand's 
experience, state trading arrangements usually mean sporadic purchases 
unduly influenced by political considerations. 
VETERINARY REGULATIONS 
Another trend in agricultural protectionism that has intensified in 
recent years has been the use of indirect non-tariff barriers such as 
veterinary regulations. Whereas international trade negotiations are 
traditionally undertaken by government-elected Ministers and their 
diplomatic and trade staff, in the case of verterinary barriers the professional 
veterinarians are not only 'on tap', they appear to be 'on top'. They have 
banded together to practise a game of 'veterinary one-upmanship' to the 
8. 
detriment of consumers in importing countries and producers in exporting 
countries such as New Zealand. As the European Director of the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board has stated7 " ... proponents of increasingly 
strict hygiene measures still appear to be able to twist governments in 
importing countries around their little fingers". When professional 
veterinarians are brought together to prescribe and monitor hygiene 
regulations they appear to interpret their task as a challenge as to who 
can think up a new regulation. 
VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS OR 'GENTLEMEN'S AGREDAENTS' 
In 1963 the United Kingdom Government and the countries supplying 
bacon to it instituted a series of 'gentlemen's agreements' with a view 
to relating bacon supplies to market needs and maintaining prices 
satisfactory to both producers and consumers. New Zealand was not involved 
but it was affected by somewhat similar arrangements made in 1964 to limit 
U.S. imports of beef, veal, mutton and goat meat. Under the legislation 
contingency quotas can be applied to imports when they exceed 110 percent 
of an adjusted base quantity. The system places an important responsibility 
on the governments of the supplying countries to ensure that exports do not 
exceed the limitations prescribed by the U.S. Government. 
The U.S. beef producers are proud of the fact that their industry 
is an unsubsidised one (llfree from the bureaucratic hand of government and 
Treasury"), but they are quite uninhibited about asking their government 
to protect their product from the effects of imports. Despite the heavy 
decline in beef cattle in the U.S. from around 140m in 1974 to 116m in 1978, 
pressure from U.S. cattle producers for protective legislation has persisted. 
The decline in supplies caused prices to rise substantially and in an effort 
to restrain price rises the U.S. President approved of additional imports. 
He rejected legislation whose effect would have been to prohibit imports of 
beef when U.S. cattle numbers rise, but he has promised to consider in 
1979 legislation whose effect could be similar. 
The GATT Agreement on milk powder prices was another example of 
voluntary international co-operation in maintaining minimum prices. Its 
7 
Report by ~fi.r A.E. Frazer, European Director, N.Z. Meat Producers i Board, 
to the Mid Year Meeting of the Electoral Committee, August 17, 1978, 
p.l. 
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operation helped prevent complete chaos in our over-supplied world milk 
powder markets, although it did not avoid big falls in world prices of 
this product. 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
A trend already referred to in part has been the increasing 
government and public awareness of changes in the so-called consumer price 
index in most developed countries. The increased sensitivity to this 
index has probably caused governments, consumer groups, trade unions and 
others to examine some of the factors that have caused large rises in 
living costs. I believe that as a result the consequences of agricultural 
protection have been spotlighted. Instances of this have been the U.S. 
beef prices and the decision to increase imports; the expressed determina-
tion of the U.K. Government to maintain open-entry to imports of New 
Zealand sheep meats. In both instances it was the concern of the two 
governments to avoid any undue rises in the cost of living of the 
community rather than concern for the economic welfare of New Zealand 
producers that dictated the policy decisions that were taken. When 
statisticians compiled consumer price indices for their governments it is 
unlikely they anticipated that such indices would come to be of such 
political and economic importance in government fiscal policy. It may be 
that the significance of such indices could be a factor that makes 
governments in those areas where agricultural support derives mainly from 
reliance on consumer prices (e.g. the E.E.C.) turn to income supports or 
grants as a less harmful and less sensitive form of support. 
EXPLAINING THE BENEFITS OF INTERl~ATIONAL TRADE 
There has also been an effort in some countries to make people more 
aware of the importance of international trade in agricultural products. 
The United States is an example of a country to whom agricultural exports 
have become of increasing importance to its balance of payments situation. 
This has made the producer organisations more conscious of the need to 
reduce barriers to agricultural trade. It has not, however, stopped 
individual commodity groups (e.g. milk producers - whose market is mainly 
local) from opposing any liberalisation or the cattlemen from agitating 
for more restrictions. However, exercises such as the one carried out by 
the Agricultural Economics Department of the University of ~lichigan amongst 
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rural people have demonstrated that rural people are not generally aware 
of the importance and benefits of international trade in agricultural 
products. While many see the advantage of being able to dispose of 
their produce on international markets, until it is explained to them 
they do not appreciate the importance of two-way trade. After the 
University's campaign, surveyed views registered a significant difference 
and a much more tolerant attitude to reciprocal trade. 
INCREASED BUREAUCRATIC POWER 
The increasing power of the bureaucracy is associated with recent 
trends in agricultural protectionism. The massive concentration of civil 
servants dealing with agricultural protection in the E.E.C. Headquarter's 
building in Brussels is a testimony to the power of bureaucrats, many of 
whom maintain close relations with the E.E.C. (influential farm 
organisations). As Hillman has commented " ... agricultural protectionism 
has been associated for at least two centuries with social and philosophical 
issues related to agrarian life and its values. In addition to this, 
non-tariff barriers touch not only on economic policies, but in many cases 
relate to vast administrative bureaucracies in which public employment is 
an issue. Here the outcome of trade negotiation could, ex ante, be affected 
by some perceived effect it might have on the authoritarian mechanism. In 
sum, non-tariff and other agricultural trade barriers are tied up in all 
kinds of domestic laws, rules and regulations managed by many different 
parts of each government. In the United States, for example, there is much 
congressional resistance to giving "the executive branch a blank checkj yet 
the executive branch cannot effectively negotiate without some kind of 
mandate. Within the executive branch there is competition among the 
departments as to who will wield the power; hence the administrative 
bureaucracies within the departments vie keenly with each other for that 
power.8 
TREND TOWARDS INCREASED COMPLEXITY OF BEASURES 
Parallel to the increased bureaucracies associated with agricultural 
protectionism has been the trend towards increasing complexity of the methods 
8 Hillman, J.S., Non-Tariff Barriers: I\fujor Problem in Agricultural Trade, 
Am. Jnl. of Ag. Econ., Aug. 1978, pp.49l-50l. 
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for achieving the aim of agricultural economic nationalism. These measures 
have become not only more complex, as witness the Common Agricultural Policy 
of the E.E.C., but also they have become much more influential as the 
tariff has declined in influence. Thus they have become more and more 
difficult to negotiate - a fact which is doubtless welcomed by protectionist 
groups opposed to any liberalising of agricultural trade. 
The GATT Secretariat in 1974 summed up the situation regarding this 
increasing complexity as follows: 
"Today, the problem of trade in agricultural products remains 
among the most difficult in international economic relations. 
There is first of all, the vast and formidable panoply of 
measures and devices to which governments subject agricultural 
trade. Their variety and complexity render negotiations aimed 
at a balanced reduction particularly difficult. Serious as 
these difficulties might be, they are technical in nature and 
were it but for this, could be overcome by appropriate 
negotiating techniques. The added complications stem from the 
fact that in general the measures employed reflect and are 
linked to the policies with which governments try to protect 
their farmers The last two decades have been frequently 
marked by problems of surpluses, price wars in which exporters 
tried to undercut one another in world markets, and by rising 
economic and social costs of governmental farm policies. In 
the very recent past, the problems have been those of shortages 
in a number of major agricultural commodities.,,9 
9 'GATT Activities in 1973'. GATT, Geneva, 1974, p.3l. 
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B. N~¥ ZEALAND'S INITIATIVES 
GATT 
Since GATT's establishment in 1947 New Zealand has taken a prominent 
part in its negotiations. It has striven to ensure that agriculture is 
part of any multilateral negotiations aimed at liberalising trade. The 
Kennedy Round which began in 1963 aimed at creating acceptable conditions 
of access to markets and the conclusion of some general arrangements for 
grains, meat and dairy products. Some bilateral agreements were concluded 
with respect to meat, but the negotiations yielded only meagre results in 
regard to dairy products. 
DAIRY PRODUCTS 
New Zealand then took the initiative in requesting the establishment 
of a Working Party in December 1967 to conduct consultations on the urgent 
problems that had arisen in international trade in dairy products. In Hay 
1970 the principal participants in international trade in dairy products 
reached an arrangement in GATT to fix minimum export prices for skimmed 
milk powder, in order to restore stability to the world market for ~his 
product. In 1973 they reached agreement upon and brought into effect a 
Protocol which made similar arrangements for milk fats such as butter oil. 
In addition a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' under the aegis of the OECD provided 
for a minimum price for whole-milk powder. 
Success was not achieved in negotiations on any arrangements to 
stabilise the international butter situation, mainly due to opposition from 
some of the EEC member countries. One of the Protocol 18 clauses relating 
to New Zealand and the U.K. membership of the enlarged EEC includes a 
statement that parties will strive for an international dairy agreement. 
So far the prospect of success in this area has not appeared even remotely 
likely. 
THE TOKYO DECLARATION 
The Tokyo Declaration of 1973 laid down the terms of reference for a 
new series of GATT negotiations. It stated that "negotiations should aim, 
inter alia, to (e) include as regards agriculture, an approach to negotiations 
which, while in line with the general objectives of the negotiations, should 
13. 
take account of the special characteristics and problems in this sector. fllO 
New Zealand has supported the Tokyo Declaration in its call for the 
negotiations to reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or where this is 
not appropriate to reduce or eliminate their trade-restricting or 
distorting effects, and to bring such measures under more effective 
international discipline. It has taken part in Sector councils' 
negotiations and the New Zealand Government has expressed the hope that 
from the Tokyo Round there will be improved access for New Zealand's 
d "t . k t 11 pro uce In l s maJor mar e s. 
UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION AND AGENCIES 
In international organisations and agencies of the United Nations, 
New Zealand has, with unremitting persistence, taken the opportunity to 
put its case for reduced agricultural protection. In many instances it 
has been virtually 'a dialogue between the deaf'. Being a small economy 
New Zealand has little bargaining power and on numerous occasions it 
concentrated on supporting efforts by major agricultural trading countries 
such as the United States on occasions such as when the U.S. was pleading 
for a more liberal common agricultural policy. 
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS 
In bilateral negotiations New Zealand has made agreements with some 
importing countries whose agricultural imports are governed by quotas. 
For example, with the world's largest agricultural importer, West Germany, 
it has a small quota of sheep meat. With the United States, New Zealand has 
small quotas for butter, cheese and frozen cream. It continually takes the 
opportunity to press for greater access into these and other markets such 
as Japan. In addition New Zealand has negotiated a number of bilateral 
agreements - notably with Japan (1958), 1fulaya (1961), South Korea (1967), 
Romania (1968), USSR, Poland and the People's Republic of China. These have 
been of some assistance in improving prospects for increased exports of 
agricultural produce. They did not involve departure from GATT principles. 
In 1973 New Zealand achieved formal accession to OECD - a move which was 
motivated by hopes for reduced barriers to agricultural trade through lower 
levels of agricultural protectionism amongst member countries of OECD. 
10 GATT Activities in 1977. GATT, Geneva, 1978, p.12. 
11 See footnote at conclusion of this article. 
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INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF NEW ZEALAND'S POSITION 
To foster an understanding amongst the major industrial nations 
of its heavy dependence on agricultural trade, New Zealand has brought to 
New Zealand prominent leaders of these economies. \Vhilst one might 
criticise the fact that the guests included too few representatives of 
consumers, the effort has assisted in making known New Zealand's case 
with foreign governments and prominent leaders in the non-government 
sectors of these countries. 
NEVIJ ZEAI..PJm AGRICULTURE 
As a symbolic gesture New Zealand in 1959 removed meat and dairy 
produce from import licensing. The only barriers to the import of dairy 
produce and meat are tariffs and a hygiene regulation. Since then the 
farming sector has been accorded support from government in various forms, 
mainly in input subsidies, direct livestock grants and more recently income 
support by way of price support for major commodities. To what extent 
these policies have weakened New Zealand's case for less protection of 
agriculture in its overseas markets is a matter of conjecture. Frazer has, 
however, asserteJ2 that he views with some concern the increasing financial 
involvement of government in the agricui tural industry. "\Vhile there does 
appear to be some change in international thinking in regard to subsidisa-
tion of agricultural products, which means that today we are less likely to 
be told that our claims for access on grounds of efficiency of production 
and lack of subsidy are not valid, such views are already being propagated 
in relation to the support measures announced in the last Budget. Farmers, 
bbth in the United Kingdom and in Ireland, have already claimed that our 
ca:se for access has been weakened by these measures." 
CO-OPEEATION WITH LOCAL PRODUCERS 
Some years ago the U.S. sheep industry whose flock numbers have been 
declining rapidly became strongly protectionist and sought government 
support for a restriction on imports of sheep meat. It claimed that imports 
of New Zealand and Australian frozen lamb were injuring their industry by 
undermining their markets, especially in the long-established sheep eating 
12 Op. Cit. p.2. 
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areas on the West and East Coasts of U.S.A. Fortunately for New Zealand 
the U.S. Goverrunent took no action and tariffs plus hygiene regulations 
rematn the only barriers to the entry of lambs to that market. In recent 
years the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board has joined with the American 
Sheep Producers' Council in an effort to promote jointly lamb as a 
consumer meat for the U.S. market. The Council is no longer hostile to 
the New Zealand lamb imports and is optimistic over prospects of reversing 
the decline of the U.S. sheep industry. The Board has also linked with the 
French Sheep Producers' Organisation in a move to promote lamb and to 
persuade local producers that the importation of frozen lamb would not be 
injurious to their industry. 
Through some eyes these gestures appear naive. Time alone will 
confirm or refute this view. But if such actions have the effect of 
promoting sales of both the imported and the local product or reducing 
some of the pressures that local producers place on their goverrunents for 
increased protectionism, the efforts and expenditures involved will have 
been justified. 
In some developing markets the dairy industry has established or 
helped to do so, local reconstituting plants partly as a means of over-
coming barriers to the entry of their product and/or reducing the cost of 
transporting water over long distances. 
USE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS 
In efforts to persuade the non-farm sectors of importing countries 
of the need for a reduction in non-tariff barriers to the entry of New 
Zealand farm products, some of the New Zealand primary producer bodies 
have joined organisations such as the Pacific Basin Economic Co-operation 
Committee (PBEC). PBEC is essentially a non-government organisation 
comprising businessmen and financiers from the United States, Canada, 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Its aim is to promote trade, investment 
and economic development in the five member countries and in developing 
countries in the Pacific area. The New Zealand farm industry representatives 
have utilised every opportunity at annual conferences of PBEC to draw to 
the attention of the influential business and financial leaders from 
countries such as Japan that New Zealand's ability to increase its imports 
of industrial raw materials, capital and consumer goods is dependent largely 
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on it securing greater access for its primary produce in Japan. Here 
again the strategy may appear naive, but for a mini economy such as New 
Zealand the view is taken that every possible opportunity to improve 
access for our farm produce must be exploited. 
NAFTA 
In 1965 the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement was 
negotiated. It made provision, inter alia, for the sale annually of some 
!Jew Zealand cheese and lamb in the Australian market. Since then there 
have been some years in which the full amount of cheese has not been 
shipped to Australia, while in respect of lamb, shipments have been more 
the exception that the rule; it is understood that by an understanding 
between the two statutory producer meat boards, the lamb quota would not 
be taken up. \~ile the importation of New Zealand butter into the 
A~stralian market was quota free and subject only to a tariff, the message 
appears to have been made clear by a former Australian Minister of Trade, 
the Rt Hon John McEwen, that if New Zealand did take the initiative in 
moving to take advantage of open entry for its butter, immediate action 
would be taken by the Australian Government to impose import controls. 
It is interesting to speculate whether this implied threat still exists. 
H1PORTANCE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC SELF INTEREST 
Kojima makes the point that it is not only important that liberalisa-
tion of international trade in agricultural products should be implemented 
in the interests of agricultural exporting economies. It is in the interests 
of the industrialised nations themselves and in the final analysis this is 
the only really effective motivating force~J 
13 
"Unless the mistaken philosophy that exports are gains and 
imports losses is abandoned and a shift is made to a 
philosophy that the removal of non~tariff barriers works 
for national interest in order to optimise resource 
allocation, to eliminate deviation between social and 
private costs and to maximise social gross product, there 
will be no solution to the non-tariff barrier problem. 
Kiyoshi Kojima - Non-Tariff Barriers to Japan's Trade - The Japan 
Economic Research Centre, 1971 - pp.80-81. 
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Japan, which has ample surplus of international payments, 
should set such an example." 
The most effective New Zealand initiatives in reducing levels of 
agricultural protectionism in the future could be in convincing both 
farm and non-farm sectors of important agricultural importing countries 
that an adjustment is in their own long-term interest. Such a policy, 
while a protracted process, could be, in the long-run, effective if New 
Zealand takes further initiatives in co-operation with local interests 
in the countries concerned. New Zealand's small size, the agricultural 
~xpertise and standing it has build up and its ability to be vocal amongst 
the large trading countries could assist it in such an operation. 
1$. 
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the period 1960-1976 international trade in agricultural 
products has lagged behind the other two major groups (minerals and 
manufactures) in both value and volume. Agricultural protectionism has 
been an important cause of this failure to expand as rapidly as other 
products. Vfuilst the GATT has been responsible for significant 
reductions in tariff levels it has so far failed to bring about any 
reductions in the non-tariff barriers behind which the agricultural 
products of industrial nations shelter. 
The E.E.C. 's common agriculture policy is from New Zealand's view-
point one of the most restrictionist forms of protection. It is a type 
of regionalism that has harsh effects on agricultural exporters such as 
New Zealand. The influence of farm blocs on Government import policies 
is, despite the decline in numbers engaged in agriculture, very strong 
indeed their power appears to be inversely proportional to their 
declining numbers. Failure to adjust electoral boundaries is in several 
countries the reason for the continued potent influence of the agricultural 
sector. There are however signs that the consumer groups are protesting 
at the unjustifiably high food prices that result from the excessive 
levels of agricultural protection. Some of these protests are coming 
from former farming families now residing in urban areas. Other concerns 
are from Governments charged with maintaining reasonable price stability 
as measured by the consumer price index. 
Non-tariff barriers are becoming increasingly complex and will 
consequently be more difficult to dismantle. Veterinary regulations 
appear to be in the complete control of veterinarians whose aim is to 
multiply the existing rules of entry. Bureaucracies such as the E.E.C. 
Headquarters have a vested interest in the perpetuation of barriers to 
international trade in agricultural products. 
New Zealand has been responsible for many initiatives in GATT and 
other international forums in an endeavour to achieve a liberalisation of 
entry for agricultural produce. There are no prospects of International 
Dairy Agreements as envisaged in Protocol 1$ of the U.K.'s access to the 
E.E.C. 
The Tokyo Round of Trade negotiations promises to produce some 
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reductions in N.T.B. IS to agricultural trade but success is still in doubt.14 
Through its own initiatives New Zealand has tried to acquaint leaders in 
the important industrial nations with its dependence on agricultural 
exports. It has also exploited opportunities in non-government 
organisations such as P.B.E.C. to emphasise the necessity for better 
international access for farm products. It has entered into a series of 
bilateral agreements with numerous trading nations and achieved a limited 
improvement in the prospects for its agricultural exports. In some cases 
(NAFTA) it has not always exploited fully the 9Pportunities it secured. 
Its own agricultural industry, as a result largely of excessive internal 
inflation and as a compensation for the increased production costs due to 
industrial protection in New Zealand has been given considerably expanded 
financial support from Government. In the view of some this could 
compromise its position as an advocate for reduced levels of agricultural 
protection in the major trading countries. 
New Zealand has embarked on some schemes aimed at assisting local 
producers in importing countries. These are achieving success and have 
helped modify protectionist pressures. Finally, it is the contention of 
this paper that although negotiations are important, satisfactory solutions 
to the serious problems that result from present excessive levels of 
agricultural protection in industrial economies will only really be 
achieved if important groups such as consumers, industrialists and producers 
realise that a moderation of protectionist policies will be to their o~m 
advantage. New Zealand, in respect to countries such as Japan, should 
shape its policies with this ultimate aim in view. 
14 Note: The G.A.T.T. Tokyo Round finally yielded in April 1979 for New 
Zealand some minimal gains for its agricultural exporting industry. 
These included a cheese quota of 9,000 tonnes in the previously 
blocked United Kingdom cheese market, some small additional quotas 
for its dairy product in the United States market and the promise to 
establish an International Agricultural Trade Committee to undertake 
functions which are supposed to be carried out by existing instjtutions. 
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APPENDIX A 
WORLD EXPORTS 1960-1976 
A. Value (billion dollars f. 0 • b. ) 
Total 
Agricultural Products 
:Minera1s (a) 
Manufactures 
B. Volume (1960 = 100) 
Total 
Agricultural Products 
Minerals (a) 
rvIanufactures 
1960 
128 
40 
21 
64 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1970 
312 
64 
51 
190 
213 
149 
198 
254 
(a) Includes fuels and non-ferrous metals. 
1973 
576 
121 
96 
347 
280 
152 
230 
347 
1974 
836 
148 
215 
459 
295 
149 
209 
370 
SOurce: International Trade 1976-77: GATT, Geneva 1977, p.2. 
1975 
878 
150 
208 
500 
283 
165 
199 
360 
1976 
(992 ) 
(167 ) 
(240) 
(562 ) 
(314 ) 
(179 ) 
(221 ) 
(403 ) 
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TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO NEW ZEALAND 
MEAT EXPORTS 
COUNTRY TARIFF NON-TARIFF 
~~~~--------~~.~--------------------------
AU,STRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
f)ARBADOS 
CANADA 
CHILE 
CYPRUS 
EEC COllNTRIES 
Benelux 
Donmerk 
None 
Veal and other bOVine carcases, sides or 
qUo'rters (bone-In): 3.85 schillings per kilo. 
Other meats of bOVines (including boneless and 
cuts}: 32% with a minimum of 2.65 schillings 
per kilo. 
Sheep and lamb carcases, sides or quarters: 
1.25 schillings per kilo. 
Other meats of sheep and lamb: 20%. 
Fancy meats (sheep and goats only): 10%. 
Other fancy meats: 24%. 
Chilled, fresh or frozen meat: Duty-free. 
Canned corned beer: 15%. 
Canned other beef: 5 %. 
Beef and veal: 3 Canadian cents per lb. 
Mutton and lamb: liz Canadian cent per lb. 
Pork and fancy meats: liz Canadian cent per lb. 
At present an F.O.L. ban on shipping to Chile 
affects all New Zealand meat exports. 
Free of duty. 
N/A 
8 % import turnover tax on all meats. 
All items subject to import control. 
Package tax: 25 cents per 56 Ibs on each 
package. 
Import licences reqUired. 
Individual import permits are reqUIred f6t 
imports of fresh and frozen beef and veal irom 
New Zealand. import permits for beef frem 
New Zealand are tied to specific shipments 
autl~orised for export by the New Zealand Meat 
Producers Board in line with aoreed ir~vels in 
understandinQs reached under~ voluntary 
restraint agreements. 
Imports of mea; require a special permit issued 
by the Director of Veterinary Services. 
GENERAL NOTE: Under the new EEC import regime (which comlT'enced April '. 1977). beef and veal 
from third countries will be aHowed entry u[lder three different in-',pol t arran£ements: 
(1) Live cattle. 21so fre~h. chi:ied and frozen beef and veal wii! be subject \(1 <l variable import levy 
calculated monthly and will be (ldjusted weekly to reflect fluctuation in the avenge Community 
market price in relation to the guide price. 
(2) A "Balance Sheet" arrangement provides for the importation of 75.000 tonnes of beef for 
manufacturing, viz: 
(a) 25,000 tonnes may be imported levy-free for use in certain preserved food products. 
(b) 50,000 tonnes may be imported for other manuiacturing purposes at 55 per cent of the levy 
applicable on day of importation. 
(3) The annui11 levy-free quota as set by GA n. 
Except where s;:JecificaUy stated. duty rates apply in addition to levy. 
·Sheepmoats are now subject to a tariff rate set by GATT not exceeding 20 per cent, and also to 
8 safeguard clause which, if used, will control the importing of sheepmeats into the EEC. 
Beof and veal, fresh, chilled or frozen: 20% plus Import licences required. 
variable levy, Added Value Tax of 4% calculated on import 
Mutton and lamb: 20%. value plus duty. 
Fancy meats: Beef livers 11 %, other beef fancy 
meat5, 7~~. 
Sheep fancy moats: 4 %. 
Boof "nd v('al. fr'.~sh. chiiled ["ld frozon: 20%, 
ph; vpri'iblr. I·;vy ilCCOidilig to Cl'mmon 
/\(lricultul.JI Pf))iC;' of [rC, 
Mutton, l<Jrnb ,wd fiO:lt: 2G%. 
Fancy 1112ilt:;: (l.:)(\f'livnr!i 11 %, other boof foncy 
meats 7%, 
Fancy mOots of mutton, liHnb and goat: 2.4 %. 
Irnpo:tl!l-:nnccs toqui::.'d. 
A(J~!.-;d Vr:un lax llt Ei;''; cDlculated C'fl irnpnrt 
villufJ plus duty. 
'Shebp:ricats S'Juje-r.t to quota, 
--------------------------_._--
COUNTRY 
':ranco 
':odoral Ropublic of 
West Gormany 
Italy 
Notherlands 
United ~ngdom 
EGYPT. ARAB 
REPUBLIC OF 
FIJI 
FINLAND 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 
GIBRALTAR 
GREECE 
HONG KONG 
IRAN 
ISRAEL 
JAMAICA 
JAPAN 
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TARIFF 
S<lme as for Benelux el\cept sheep fancy meats 
3%. 
Same as Benelux. 
Same as Benelux. 
Beef and veal: Same as Benelux. . 
20% EEC Common Customs Tariff on all 
sheepmeats.· 
Sheep f<lflCY mtlats: 4 %. 
Beef and veal. fresh, chilled and frozen. subject 
to a system of fixed import duties and variable . 
levies as laid down by the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the EEC. Duty r.ate 20%. 
Dutyof 20 % applicable to ali mutton and lamb 
imports. 
Fancy meats: 4 %. 
Meat and fancy meats, except pig meats: No 
import duty. 
Marine .duty calculated at 0.2% ·of c and f 
value. 
Free. 
No duty. 
All fresh, chilled or frozen meat and fancy 
meats: free. 
Canned meats: 1 %. 
Free. 
Frozen bone"in and boneless beef. veal. mutton 
and lamb are subject to basic import duty of 
20.% of c.i.f. Other ch<lrges amount to 
approximately 4 %. 
Fancy meats prohibited. 
Imports of fresh meat have been banned as 
from June 30, 1976. 
None. 
·Beef. buffalo. veal. sheep. Iamb. goat: exempt. 
Fancy meats: 5 %. 
All beef, chilled or frozen: 1.05 Israeli pounds 
per kilo. 
Lamb and sheepnieat. chilled or frozen, with 
bones: 6.50 Israeli pound5 per kilo. 
Liver and ton\ll1e: 4.50 Isrne!i pounds per kilo. 
Meat and fallcy meats. fresh. chilled or frozen: 
No duty. 
Boef nnd ve~l: 25% plus variable levy. 
Mutton (lnd lamb: 7.5%. 
Pigm')at: 10%. 
NON-TARIFF 
Import controls and licensing. plus Addud Value 
Tax of 7 % of duty paid value. 
Sanitary tax on fresh, chilled or frozen meat: 
0.03·francs per kilo. 
Shee~)meats subject-to quota. 
Import licences fo"r frozen beef and veal are 
subject to both Common Market approval and 
Germ~n marketing laws. Import of lamb 
carCBses up to 44 kg. now liberBlised s'Jbjectto 
importer reporting shipment to Ministry in 
Frankfurt together with a certified copy of Bill 
of Lading within a specified time. 
An import equalisation tax of 5.5 % of duty paid 
value is also levied. 
Suggest importers first contact Trade 
Commissioner. 
Import licences required. 
,Added Value Tax 6% 
Sanitary tax' on frozen beef: 5 lire for retail and 
3 lire for industry per kilo. Other meats 10 lire 
per kilo. 
Value Added Tax 6%. 
There are no import licences required exc~pta 
registration form to be completed by the 
importer. 
Import licences required for beef only. and must 
be obtained from the Intervention Board fOr 
Agricultural Produce. Imports must be 
accOmpanied by hygiene certificate. 
Imports subject to open general licence (O.G.L.). 
N/A. 
Variable import levies. 
Turnover tax at 12.4 % assessed on dutiable 
value plus duty. 
Global quotas apply. 
Mutton, beef, veal: import tax 7%. 
Pork: import tax 22 %. 
Statistic tax: 40 Pacific francs/ 100 kilo. 
Import controls: Nil. 
Frozen meats subject to import licence. 
Import licence required. 
Import licences are.automatically available. 
Importers are required to obtain an import 
permit from Ministry of Health on 
recommendation of the Iranian Meat 
Organisation. 
Import licence issued by Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. Frozen and chilled meat is subject 
to special requirements concerning packing. 
marking. refrigoration and transport. 
Specific import licences required subject to 
quota restrictions. 
BOE,r imports. including cerWin fancy meats. are 
subjoct to quota allociltions based on the GATT 
formula. Mutton and lamb can be imported 
freoly. 
COUNTRY 
JOFlDAN 
MALAYSIA 
MALTA 
NIGERIA 
NORWAY 
PANAMA 
PHILIPPINES 
SINGAPORE 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TBiNiDAD 
USA 
USSR 
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TARIFF 
Fancy meats and meats of bovine and ovme 
animals: free of duty. 
Pigmeat: 14%. 
None on bovine, sheep, goat or pig meat. 
All meat and fancy mevts: 2 Maltese pounds 
per 100 kilos. 
All meat and fancy meats (including salted): 
25% duty. 
Beef, veal, lamb and mutton: 1.20 kroner per 
kilo. 
Fancy meats: 1.20 kroner (except tongues, 3.00 
kroner per kilo). 
Meat, fresh, chilled or frozen: 
Beef 0.50 BDiooas per kilo. 
Sheep and IGmb: 0.35 Balboas per kilo. 
Pigs: 0.50 Balboas per kilo. 
Meat preparations in airtight containers: 0.40 
Balboas per kilo. 
Fresh, chilled or frozen meat and fancy meat-
beef and vec;I, mutton and lamb, pork, goat and 
horse: 10%. 
No duty. 
Free. 
Official duty on frozen beef, veal, mutton and 
lamb is 40 Swiss francs per 100 kilos, but since 
December 1959 this has been prpvisionally 
reduced to 10 francs. 
Frozen fancy meats: 40 Swiss francs per. 100 
kilos. 
Meat and fancy meats, fresh, chilled or frozen: 
free. 
Canned corned beef: 5 %. 
Other canned meat: 15 %. 
Beef and veal: 3 US cents per lb. 
Beef prepared (portion control) 10%. 
Mutton and go~t: 2.5 US cents per. lb. 
Lamb: 1.7 US cents per lb. 
'Fancy meats valued not over 20 cents per Ib: 
0.5 cents per lb. 
Fancy meats values at over 20 cents per Ib: 
2.5%. 
Beef and veal, prepared or preserved (except 
sausage) and beef in aiitight containers: 7.5%. 
Other thi1n picUcd, cured, or in airtiGht 
containers Dnd v,liued not over 30 cents per Ib: 
3 cents por lb. 
VJluud oVen 3D e •. !nts ["lor II;: 10;0. 
Othor In,;"t~ "nd fancy ll1eiH~, ,vld ["lrpparud or 
prescrvoil i()\iJ!;r rl1illl frO\ll, v,;!ut,d ilt not over 
30 cents per II>: 1.5 cents per lb. 
Valued OVl~1 30 conts per Ib: 5 ~·u. 
N/ A - Stato trading. 
-----_._---_._-----_. 
~ON-TARIFF 
Import licences are required, issued by MllJistry 
of National Economy. 
Import Fees: 
Import licence: 4 %. 
Veterinary tax: 20 fils p,Or kilo. 
Municipal tJX: 3 %. 
Imports subject to open general licence. 
5 % surtax is levied on c,i.f. values. 
Import licences necessary but may be freely 
obtClined. 
All meat is subject to government price 
controls, except rump and tenderloin when for 
catering, and fancy mODts. 
Import licences required. 
flII.~at. fancy meat and products thereof 2re 
subject to licensing restrictions Ddmll1Jstercd by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, which will permit 
imports during periods of shortQge in IceD I 
supplies. 
Sales tax applicable. 
No import controls. 
Surcharge 5 % of f.o.b. value. 
All meat and fancy meats importable under 
letter of credit terms. Foed Terminal Inc. has 
sole authority to import briskets and approve 
importations of other beef items priced below 
50 US cents per Ib c.i.f. A uniform revenue duty 
of 10% is also imposed. 
import licences required. 
Veterinary fee: 1.50 Singapore dollars per 50 
kilos. • 
Variable import levies. 
Added Value Tax: 20.63 %. 
Importers of food should be registered at 
National Food Administration. 
Veterinary inspection tax is 13 Swiss francs per 
100 kilos. 
Prior import permits are required from Federal 
Department of Public Economy. 
Quotas depending on domestic production. 
Import licences not reqUired. 
Import taxes are variable - no specific details. 
Most goods require import licences. 
No import licences required. 
Global quota on beef, veal, mutton and goat. 
NVA - State trading. 
The New Zealand Meat Producer, May 1978. 
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APPENDIX C 
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AGAINST NEW ZEALAND DAIRY EXPORTS 
Australia 
Butter 
Canada 
E.E.C. 
India 
Japan 
Korea 
Cheddar Cheese 
Butter 
Cheese 
Buttermilk Powder 
Skim }Ailk Powder 
Wholemilk Powder 
Dairy Products 
All Imports 
Milk Powder 
Skim Milk Powder 
Butter 
Butter 
Milk Powder 
11alaysia 
Butter 
Peru 
Butter 
Portugal 
Dairy Products 
Spain 
Dairy Products 
U.S.A. 
Dairy Products 
* 
Informal Ban 
Quota 
Import Permits only Issued during 
Periods of Domestic Shortage 
Quota 
Quota 
Embargo 
Embargo 
Protocol 18 Special Arrangement for 
Butter and Cheese to U.K. 
Variable Levies 
Licensing 
Banned 
Quotas/LIPC* Control 
Quotas/LIPC* Control 
Restricted Import/Prior Deposit 
Imports Restricted to Bakery Demand 
Import Licensing 
Import Licensing 
Annual Quotas 
Import Licensing and Tariffs 
Quotas 
Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation - Semi Government 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 
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JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL POLICY ~ 
OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIONS 
BY: G.W. KITSON 
AGRICULTURAL ECON01ITCS RESEARCH UNIT 
LINCOLN COLLEGE 
CANTERBURY 

1. INTRODUCTION 
JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL POLICY -
OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIONS 
Before developing the discussion of Japanese Agricultural policy too far 
I think it is pertinent to ask the questions why is Japanese agricultural 
policy of particular concern to us in New Zealand and what, if anything, makes 
Japanese agricultural policy distinctive enough to warrant special attention. 
The first question is answered briefly by noting the growth in New 
Zealand's export trade with Japan and the future prospects for this growth. 
From about 2% of New Zealand exports going to Japan in 1958 this percentage 
has grown to about 14%. In quantitative forms this growth has obviously been 
much greater than implied. Vfuile much of this growth over recent years has 
been occurring in non agricultural commodities such as aluminium and iron sands, 
and the largest single component is forest products, a high proportion of this 
trade has been in agricultural commodities, but not unfortunately in some 
agricultural commodities for which New Zealand would like to see growth. This 
refers particularly to dairy products and to a lesser extent beef. Reasons for 
lack of growth in these commodities of course relate largely to questions of 
access and protection for Japan's domestic beef and dairy cattle industries. 
Another reason for New Zealand interest in Japanese agriculture and its policies 
is that the Japanese market for foqd has in the past, principally as a result 6f 
a very high rate of income growth from a low base in both income and food 
consumption, shown every indication of strong expansion. 
many of our more traditional markets. 
This contrasts with 
A number of people have made estimates of possible food import requirements 
based on projections of market expansion. Eric Saxon is one. Another is 
Professor Kenzo Hemmi whom many here will have met when he visited New Zealand last 
year. Appendix I to this paper indicates Professor Hemmi's view of prospects 
for imported livestock products and contrasts strongly with official projections 
especially in the areas of greatest interest to New Zealand. You'll note from this 
table that Professor Hemmi's estimates indicate imports of milk and milk products 
of ],142,000 metric tons in 1985 against official projections of only 462,000 
metric tons the latter being a decrease from 1972 import level of 775,000 metric 
tons. For beef the story is similar although not quite so dramatic in its 
contrast. Professor Hemmi estimates 770,000 metric tons of beef imports in 1985 
against official projections of 117,000 metric tons. This in turn compares with 
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maximum beef imports of about 120,000 metric tons in 1973. You'll also 
note that the differences between estimated import requirements from these 
two sources for milk and milk products are made up entirely of differences 
in estimates of supply capacity. For beef Professor Hemmi expects as well 
as difficulties in supply that consumption will be considerably above 
that shown in official estimates. 
Professor Hemmi's estimates diverge considerably with UAFF and others 
who see considerable potential for improvement in land productivity in 
particular. One such person is Mr Hotairocho Takeda of the New Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute. In a recently published book }Ar Takeda noted in 
particular differences between present crop yields and potential yields. His 
view is that with sufficient research and farm scale increases actual yields could 
much more nearly approach potential yields. This would mean roughly a 2 - 3 fold 
production increase and a very small import requirement. Some details of 
differences between actual and potential yields for specific crops are shown 
in Appendix II. 
Most observers however, even those close to the sources of official 
projections of food supply and consumption in Japan, are agreed that these are 
overly ambitious with regard to Japan's capacity to supply and that supply 
projections should be viewed essentially as "targets" and targets which are 
subject to considerable political manipulation. More realistic assessment of 
these targets indicates that resource limitations will make the possibility of 
their achievement very small. I would refer you to work done by Eric Saxon for 
more detail on this. l 
Principal resource limitation's relate to land and labour (note Appendices 
III and IV) but include substantial bottlenecks such as effluent disposal 
problems and feedstuff supplies. 
Despite Japan's resource supply problems in the longer term the fact 
remains that agricultural policy is still geared towards achieving the production 
targets set for agriculture. The most obvious manifestations of this from the 
New Zealand point of view are of course the trade restrictive policies which apply 
to beef, butter and skim milk powder. These give rise to official concern in 
New Zealand that Japan 1ft,ill merely becomE~ EDother EEC with a highly protectej 
domestic agriculture which will continue to build up huge production surpluses 
at great economic cost, principally for reasons of political expediency. This 
view, while understandable does, I think, underestimate the severity of Japan's 
resource shortage and the fact that unlike most EEC countries price elasticities 
l. Saxon, E.A., Recent Developments in Good Consumption and Farm Production 
in Japan. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra, Occasional Paper 
No. 43, 1978. 
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are quite high (see Appendix V). 
A further point that makes Japanese agricultural policy unique from 
New Zealandrs point of view is that its livestock industry is based predominantly 
on imports of animal feedstuffs. \Vhile this has resulted in substantial 
benefits to other temperate agricultural producers such as Canada, U.S.A. and 
Australia, it has not been advantageous for New Zealand which is endowed with 
factors which favour a grassland rather than a grain producing agricultural 
economy. Consequently it is much more clearly in the interests of New Zealand 
than other suppliers of temperate agricultural commodities to Japan that Japan 
be supplied not so much in the form of animal feedstuffs as inputs for her 
livestock industry but in the form of finished livestock products. Thus any 
element of Japanese agricultural policy which promotes the importation of dairy 
products and beef rather than maize and grain sorghum etc. is of vital interest 
to New Zealand. 
Consequently there is a need in New Zealand to be much more sensitive to 
the objectives of Japanese agricultural policy and the way in which this policy 
is determined. If we are to have any influence in the direction this policy 
will take we must be well informed about it. 
2. JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Japanese agricultural policy has two principal objectives. The first is 
ensurance of adequate levels of income for farmers and farm families. The second 
is to promote self sufficiency in food supply in Japan. 
Current agricultural policy is based on the Basic Agricultural Law of 1961 
and amended policy guidelines of 1970. The most interesting of the latter 
amendments was that the objective of enabling farmers to raise incomes to achieve 
parity in standard of living with non farm people laid down in 1961 became watered 
down somewhat so that it provided for an ensurance that the total of farm and nqn 
farm income, earned by farmers be comparable with incomes of non farm families. 
With a high prqportion of the income of farm families being earned off the farm 
this is a considerable concession and in 1976 the annual income per member of 
farm households substantially exceeded that of nonagricultural wage earning 
households. This part-icular amendment was also an admission of course of the 
need to transfer resources out of agriculture. This was also spelt out as an aim 
of the 1970 policy guidelines. Both the 1961 Basic Law and 1970 guidelines 
stressed the need for modernisatio~ rationalisation and increased agricultural 
productivity with the 1970 guidelines being more specific in noting the need to 
promote the creation of large scale viable farms. This again implies that a 
shift of labour resources in particular is desirable. 
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In fact some agricultural policy researchers see the movement of labour 
resources out of agriculture and the increasing average age of those remaining 
in agriculture as Japan's opportunity to restructure agriculture in such a way 
as to create large farming units. I would refer you to Appendix VI to examine 
this further. This shows that the number of young people entering the farming 
industry each year has fallen dramatically from 420,000 in 1930 to only 18,000 
in 1973 thus increasing agricultural land available per person and allowing 
greater opportunity for larger scale farming especially when older farmers move 
out of agriculture. 
The impact of larger scale farming on self'sufficiency is difficult to 
assess with any accuracy although logic would suggest that the principal impact 
might be to improve farmers income rather than boost total production so that 
the policy objective of income sufficiency might be achieved at lower cost to the 
tax payer without necessarily improving food self sufficiency. 
The principal instrument for implementation of agricultural policy is 
through national budgetary appropriations for agriculture. Reference to 
Appendix VII provides some indication as to the form of assistance provided. 
This table indicates that price stabilisation measures, in fact production 
subsidies, provided nearly 47 per cent of budget appropriations in 1976 and of 
this cereals, mainly rice, received nearly 84 per cent. This has the effect of 
making rice subsidies the pivotal and most politically sensitive element in the 
execution of Japanese agricultural policy so that despite the greater subsidies 
offered to other crops such as wheat, barley and soyabeans over recent years 
there has been a general reluctance to move out of rice production. In fact 
rice crop areas actually increased between 1973 and 1976 although production 
declined in the latter year mainly because of poor yields resulting from a very 
cool summer. This adherence to rice production is indicative of the strong 
preference of Japanese farmers to growing this crop and perhaps the inconvenience 
of changing to other crops. There is in fact now an expectation that farm 
income sufficiency policies will be administered mainly through the medium of rice 
subsidies and attempts to reduce support via this mechanism have brought swift and 
vehement action from rice producers. Furthermore rice production fits in better 
with the winter off farm emplqrment of a good deal of the farm labour force than 
many of the alternative crops some of which could be grown in the winter. 
Although production subsidies from the national budget are the largest single 
element of farm support much of the budget is devoted to other production measures. 
This refers particularly to agricultural infrastructure activities such as 
irrigation, drainage, etc. and selective expansion of particular types of 
agricultural activity. 
Nor is the general budget the only means of support for agriculture. Funds 
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are also channelled into agriculture via Prefectural governments, through 
profits on LIPC Import purchases including butter, @AP and beef which are 
resold at domestic wholesale prices, and also via the administration of 
special accounts such as the Foodstuffs Control Special Account. 
3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOOD SELF SUFFICIENCY 
Japan's aspirations for food self sufficiency continue to attract 
great attention from outside of Japan. Appendix VIII provides details of 
trends in self sufficiency and targets. It is ~robably true to say that 
a good deal of the thinking with regard to this policy and indeed resource 
policy in total can be linked to the xenophobia many observers assign to the 
Japanese. They suggest that a fundamental distrust of foreigners has lead to 
the adoption of resource policies which are unique. Certainly national 
concern in Japan over resource access and indeed over national well-being 
reaches levels which seem to be unparalelled in western societies. Predict-
ions of imminent doom as a result of a number of recent events illustrate 
this sensitivity. For example the American devaluation of 1971, the oil 
crisis of 1973 and more recently the growing strength of the yen on the 
World currency market have all resulted in national soul searching which 
involves Japanese at all levels. The involvement of all Japanese of course 
is the great strength of Japan in resolution of problems of the sort 
outlined. 
National concern about food supplies and the drive for self sufficiency 
in food received a great boost in 1972 when President Nixon announced an embargo 
on the exports of soya beans, a crop of great dietary significance to Japan, 
90% of which came from the United States. Although the embargo did not reduce 
Japan's soya beans imports greatly its psychological affect was enormous. 
"Foreigners", even close friends, ltcould not be relied upon". The self 
sufficiency lobby has received further support from subsequent events such as 
the world food scare, the oil crisis and more recently the worldwide 
annexation of territorial waters by coastal states. These measures, although 
they apparently increase Japanese reliance on food imports also appear to do a 
great deal to stimulate other avenues of production. For example, it has been 
estimated that activities such as fish farming; more efficient utilisation of 
fish in processing and development of new resources, even apart from antarctic 
krill development, could increase fish available for consumption by considerably 
more than potential losses from loss of access to the World's 200 mile economic 
zones. In exploring such alternatives cost factors are appClrently less 
important than sensitivity about heavy reliance on foreign suppliers. 
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It is interesting also to reflect upon the origins of the Japanese 
xenophobia and the history of Japanese attitudes towards food. Professor 
Hemmi has outlined the background to Japanese anxiety about food supplies. 
This is reproduced in graphic form in Appendix IX. This chart indicates 
clearly that Japan's food history is distinguished principally by long 
periods of food supply pressure with only between about 1960 and 1972 being 
a period of relative food security. Even the slack provided by rapid 
increases in rice yields in the period from 1867 to 1918 was quickly taken up 
by growth in per capita consumption and population and this period culminated 
in rice riots in 1918. Against this background and given the strong 
inclination of Japanese to identify themselves as a race completely distinct 
from others, a characteristic reinforced by a long period in Japanese history 
of complete isolation from the rest of the world, national preoccupation with 
food and other resource security is not surprising. 
Furthermore when this preoccupation becomes institutionalised with the 
bulk of political muscle lying with the rural sector despite the dominance of 
city dwellers in Japan, and where consumers for national security reasons, 
appear willing to accept the high cost of supporting a viable agricultural 
industry the problem of market access for agricultural commodities is not likely 
to have an easy solution. Against this background the principal of comparative 
advantage in negotiating access for agricultural commodities is not likely to 
have a great deal of appeal. New Zealand's access plans have to provide 
answers to Japanese concern about income sufficiency for farmers and to Japan's 
concern about access to food supplies for strategic reasons. To some extent it 
is possible that the income sufficiency question will resolve itself as the 
opportunity for Japanese agriculture to restructure into larger scale operations 
grows. This will not however be achieved in the short term and in the meantime 
new constraints to New Zealand's access may emerge. 
On the question of strategic self sufficiency New Zealand's best hopes 
seem to lie in a change in form of Japan's current import dependence. That is 
lessening Japanese dependence on imported feedstuffs and increasing her 
dependence on finished livestock products, or at least achieving a better 
balance to Japan's imports of these alternatives. For New Zealand this requires 
a much closer consideration of the relationship ,within Japanese agriculture 
between the livestock industry and the imported feedstuffs industry. To what 
extent for example does an increase in livestock product production imply 
greater reliance on imported animal feedstuffs? How do Japanese agricultural 
policy makers and food strat.egists view the livestock product feedstuff 
relationship? 
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Professor Hemmi provides some clues by observing that 68 per cent of 
the 15 million tonnes increase in annual grain imports between 1960 and 1973 
was in feed grains and that 91 per cent of this increase was due to increased 
consumption and only 9 per cent due to decreases in domestic production. 
In the beef and dairy sectors more detail is shown in Appendix X. This table 
shows trends in the reliance of each sector on animal feedstuffs as inputs. 
For milk production this reliance increased steadily until 1972 and since then 
has fallen slowly probably largely as a result of expanded pasture production 
in Hokkaido. For beef the picture is one of substantially greater reliance 
on feedstuffs per tonne of beef production and even greater reliance per 
animal. The latter is largely as a result of increased slaughter weights. 
These grew from 196 kg/animal to 278 kg per annum between 1967 and 1974. 
\Vhen we relate the ratios of feedstuffs input for output of milk and 
beef to official 1985 targets for domestic production of these commodities, 
feedstuffs requirements for dairy products increase from 1.960 million tonnes 
in 1976 to 2.803 million tonnes in 1985 and for beef from 2.004 million tonnes 
in 1976 to 2.743 million tonnes in 1985. This represents a total increase of 
1.582 million tonnes per annum. This also means that feedgrains use in the 
beef and dairy sectors would increase from 29.3 per cent of total feedgrain 
use in 1976 to 32.7 per cent of projected feedgrain use in 1985. It is also 
of interest that the increased feedgrain requirement in 1985 calculated for 
beef and dairy of 1.582 million tonnes is very similar in total to Japan's 
total increase in feedgrain imports indicated by official projections for 
1985. 
Put in its simplest terms one alternative Japan has then is to import 
an additional 1.582 million tonnes of grain per annum for feeding beef and 
dairy cattle, or a total of 2.310 million tonnes of milk equivalents per annum 
of dairy products and 198,000 tonnes per annum of beef. Viewed in terms of 
the relative cost of importing the two alternatives the finished product 
imports would be around 3~ times more expensive (¥284 billion vs ¥79 billion). 
Viewed however, in terms of the cost involved in distortions resulting from 
sub optimal allocation of resources and the welfare losses suffered by consumers 
having to pay inflated prices for beef and dairy products the solution would 
just as clearly favour the importation of the beef and dairy products in 
finished form. 
To elaborate on this latter point I would like to refer you to a 
recent article by two American economists Bale and Greenshields who have 
estimated the welfare costs associated with current, and future agricultural 
trade and production policies relating to eight major cereal and livestock 
commodities in Japan. 2They estimate that the total loss (1975/6) to consumers 
2. Bale, M.D. and B.L. Greenshields, "Japanese Agricultural Distortions and 
their Welfare Value". Am. Jnl of Ag. Econ., Feb. 1978, pp.5~-64. 
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through price distortions was $276 million, the greatest loss being for 
dairy products at $104 million. For beef the estimate was $41 million. 
On the production side total losses based on the 1975/76 situation were $110 
million (dairy $34 million and beef $6 million). However, if 1985 production 
targets were to be achieved the losses incurred by distortions in resources 
being used in domestic production compared with importing would increase 
no less than 68 times according to this study. The total cost in this case 
would be $7.6 billion. For dairy products this would be $585 million and for 
beef $1.21 billion. The highest cost in 1985 would be for pork ($3.70 billion). 
This study effectively provides a measure of the current and future cost of 
the level of protection Japanese farmers enjoy. 
These costs both in consumption and production are greatest for dairy 
products and for beef. In spite of the enormous costs it is significant 
howev~r that Japanese policy makers seem willing to bear them. If New Zealand 
is to, find a way to establish a stronger presence in the Japanese market for 
livestock products or even decide on alternative policies it needs a very clear 
understanding of how the Japanese really perceive their own food supply status. Dr 
Yuize in a recent discussion on Japanese agriculture and food policies notes the 
objective of Japanese agricultural policy of raising the income of Japanese 
farmers but considers an additional objective of providing low price food to 
consumers. 3 He suggests while these goals seem incompatible, in the longer 
term, given time to develop large scale farming, costs can be reduced sufficiently 
to render these objectives complementary. In the short term however, some 
compromise in these objectives has been necessary. This has taken the form of 
selection of particular products to provide income sufficiency for Japanese 
farmers and others to provide relatively low cost food to Japanese consumers. 
In the former category are rice, vegetables, fruit, eggs, dairy products and meat. 
Policies which promote high self sufficiency rates for these products have 
therefore been followed. In addition, all products in this list are well 
suited to the Japanese climate and, except for beef and dairy products, can be 
produced reasonably economically. It is notable that beef and dairy products 
were also included in this high self sufficiency farmer income promotion category 
"in order to supplement farm income". 
The other group of low self sufficiency items chosen principally with 
the consumer in mind includes wheat, barley, coarse grain cereals, beans and 
sugar. 
it is notable that the planned reconstruction of Japanese agriculture 
into larger scale economic units envisaged in the Basic Law on Agriculture in 
3. Dr Yuize, Japanese Agriculture for Japan Advisory Committee, December 1978. 
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1961 has met with very limited success and the significance of this should not 
escape us. The expectation that the introduction of mechanisation into farming 
would release labour and allow for property amalgamation and larger scale 
farming operations backfired. Effectively all it did was to release labour 
from existing small holdings to work for a good part of the year in non 
agricultural activities. Much of the machinery developed was especially 
adapted to small scale farming so that farming activities could be continued by 
female and older family labour. The result has not been a reduction in 
agricultural production costs through larger scale farming as was originally 
envisaged_, but merely a situation where part time farming households which earn 
more from non agricultural activities than agricultural activities, represent 
62 per cent of total farm households and occupy about 40 per cent of total land 
under cUltivation. In 1960 winter crops were produced on 34.4 per cent of 
paddies but by 1975 this had fallen to only 8.7 per cent. 
It is interesting to reflect at this point on the history of New 
Zealand's discussions of agricultural trade with Japan. The essential thread 
of these discussions, beginning with Prime Minister Ikeda in 1963, was that 
New Zealand would have good market prospects in Japan when Japanese farming 
became sufficiently competitive. This presumably meant when the scale of 
farming was increased sufficiently to lower Japanese farmers' production costs. 
This also raises the question of whether or not New Zealand for its part was 
sufficiently well informed or perceptive to observe that scale was not increasing 
significantly and the implications of this for trade prospects and relationships 
with Japan. 
4. FUTURE COURSE OF JAPANESE AGRICULTURE 
Given the relative failure of efforts to enlarge the scale of Japanese 
farming, the question of what course agriculture is likely to take in the future 
becomes particularly pertinent. The possible future courses of Japanese 
agriculture can probably best be seen lying on a continuum between attempts to 
achieve greater self sufficiency given the existing structure of agriculture, and 
rationalisation of agriculture to meet objectives dictated by present day 
constraints. The course of Japanese agriculture within the existing structure will 
attempt to meet targets of the sort laid down in official 1985 projections but will 
almost certainly fall short of these because of resource constraints. Results may 
possibly be of the type that Professor Hemmi has suggested with substantial gaps 
for importation of beef and diary products although imports are more likely to 
continue to be limited by the various non tariff barriers of the sort that we 
are currently familiar with, in order to protect an increasingly inefficient 
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livestock industry. The result in this case would be a EEC type of situation. 
At the other end of this continuum, future courses will be decided by reassess-
ment of the realities of present day food strategy options and would require 
substantial change. The likelihood of a course based on wholesale libera1isation 
of imports of agricultural products is very small. 
Future courses will also be influenced by various pressure groups, 
especially the farmers themselves and agricultural co-operatives. It is clearly 
not in the interests of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to see a reduction in 
the numbers of part-time farming households in order to enlarge the scale of 
farming in Japan. This party draws about 60 per cent of its voting support from 
people in agriculture, forestry and fishing. Nevertheless there is a strong 
feeling in Japan that rationalisation of Japanese food and agricultural policies 
is overdue and a future course for Japanese agriculture which involves this 
rationalisation is a strong possibility. In most policy reassessments the 
dominant objective still seems to be the question of food security. As pointed 
out earlier there is great sensitivity to the fact that, despite officially quoted 
food self sufficiency figures of a little over 70 per cent, about 1000 of Japan's 
daily per capita calorie consumption of 2500 originates outside of Japan. 
Of interest from New Zealand's point of view is the emerging body of 
opinion that the pattern of Japanese food production should be improved. This 
essentially means a better balance in Japanese agriculture between animal feedstuff 
production and livestock production, and therefore a lower reliance on imported 
feedstuffs as inputs for the livestock industry. A strong livestock industry in 
Japan has appeal because of its strategic flexibility. Food resources can be 
stockpiled for example through animals on the hoof, through the grain the animals 
use, and through land fertility storage with excrement return to pastures. 
Dr Yuize has suggested that the way to achieve better balance between 
livestock production and animal feed production might be to establish an integrated 
system ranging from feed production to livestock production linked within 
a crop rotation which would include rice in the summer time. He has estimated that 
about 6 million tonnes of barley could be produced from suitable paddy fields 
in the winter, that better use could be made of rice straw for cattle roughage and 
that grass varieties suitable for Japan's climatic extremes could be developed. 
Such a system would require the solution of a number of technical problems and 
would still have to be supported by a more active programme for developing 
large scale management systems. This would in turn require a solution to the 
political difficulties noted before which have inhibited the development of large 
scale management systems. 
If rationalisation of Japanese agriculture along these lines were to occur 
what would this mean for New Zealand? In fact greater imports of livestock 
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products is seen to perform useful functions for Japan. On the one hand, given 
a certain base level of domestic supply from the integrated system outlined, 
imports of livestock products provide additional calorie requirements at 
relatively high unit cost compared to feedstuffs (although at cheaper total 
cost than domestic production costs). This means that foreign exchange 
e~penditure per calorie would be greater for livestock products than animal feed-
stuffs. This would serve to run down Japan's exchange reserves and strengthen 
Japan's lagging competitiveness in manufactured products. Putting this another 
way import. of livestock products rather than animal feedstuffs uses exchange 
reserves while at the same time satisfying Japan's strategic objective of not 
being too reliant on foreign sources for tot.al calorie supply. Furt.hermore. 
the system outlined provides for balance in food supply further satisfying the 
strategic objective. 
New Zealand's interest of course lies in discovering exactly at what. 
level this balance is likely to be determined and for which livestock commodities 
will the balance be sensitive. For example what is the precise land use relation-
ship between feedstuff production and livestock production in Japan? It is 
probable that because of differences in management systems beef and dairy 
production would be depressed more by greater animal feedstuff production than 
pork and chicken production. The answers to questions such as these are critical 
for New Zealand in assessing its longer term agricultural relationship with Japan 
and indeed for the future of its own agriculture. The opportunity exists for New 
Zealand, through much closer and more permanent association with people in Japan 
who formulate agricultural and food policy to not only be better informed about 
this policy, but also make sure New Zealand's interests and her potential role 
as a reliable partner are borne in mind when this policy is being developed. I 
would like to think that what New Zealand may lack in economic clout she may be 
able to make up for in the vision of her decision makers and the quality of her 
people who can take advantage of these opportunities. 
38. 
APPENDIX I 
SUPPLY AND DEl-lAND OF SELECTED FOODSTUFFS IN JAPAN (1972 and 1985) 
A. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE FORESTRY AND FISHERIES PROJECTING AND TARGETS 
(units 1000 M.T.) 
1972 1985 
Con- Pro- Con- Pro-
sumption duction Imports sumption duction Ir:1ports 
Wheat 5,372 284 5,088 5,899 553 5,346 
Milk and Milk Products 5,719 4,944 775 8,142 7,680 462 
Beef 367 290 77 625 508 117 
Pork 883 793 90 1,335 1,325 10 
Chicken Meats 668 640 28 915 914 1 
Eggs 1,848 1,811 37 2,206 2,205 1 
Concentrated Feeds 15,516 5,628 9,888 20,609 5,837 ltt,772 
Sugar 3,052 621 2,431 3,821 1,064 2,757 
B. PROFESSOR ~~I'S REVISION (units 1000 M.T.) 
1972 1985 
(B) / (A) 
Imports Consumption Production Imports x 100 (A) (B) 
Wheat 5,088 5,899 180 5,719 112.6 
Milk &. Milk Products 775 8,142 5,000 3,142 405.4 
Beef 77 1,005 235 770 1,000.0 
Pork 90 1,585 800 785 722.2 
Chicken Meats 28 1,085 1,085 
° 
0.0 
Eggs 37 2,206 2,205 1 2.7 
Concentrated Feeds 9,888 15,609 5,437 10,172 102.9 
Sugar 2,431 3,390 700 2,690 110.7 
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APPENDIX II 
POSSIBLE YIELD INCREASES IN JAPANESE AGRICULTURE 
Units % KgIlO Aru 
Rice Wheat Soya Potatoes Sugar Cabbage Mikan Pasture 
Beans Beet 
Present 470 270 140 2,500 3,000 3,500 3,000 5,000 
Yields 
Possible 900 900 500 S,OOO S,OOO S,OOO R,060. 15,006 
Yields 
30,000 
Source: Shokuryo Kiki to Nippon Nogyo No Tenpo (The Food Crisis and the 
Outlook for Japanese Agriculture) Takeda Hotairochi 
APPENDIX III 
AREA OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 
As at 1 August 
Item 1965 1973 (a) (a) 1974 1975 1976 
'000 '000 '000 '000 '000 
ha ha ha ha ha 
Paddy Fields 3391 3274 3209 3170 3144 
Upland fields 
-.orchards, etc. (b) 526 632 637 62S 615 
- grass 140 431 457 4SB 506 
- other 1945 1310 1312 l2S9 1271 
Total Agricultural Land 6005 5647 5615 5572 5536 
19S5 
Target 
'000 
ha 
5S46 
Total area planted 7342 5663 5752 5755 5750 (e) 66S4 
% of' % % % % /0 
Cropping ratio (c) l23.S 100.3 102.4 103.3 103.S(e) 114.3 
Agricul tural land as 
proportion of a111and 16.2 15.:3 15.1 15.0 14.9 15.5 
(a) Excluding Okinawa. (b) Includes tea and mulberry plantations. 
( c ) Planted area as percentage of agricultural land. (e) Estimated. 
SOURCE: Recent Developments in Food Consumption and Farm Production in Japan. 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics-Occasional Paper No 43, E.A. Saxon, 1978. 
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APPENDIX IV 
WORK FORCE IN AGRICULTURE 
(Calendar Years- 12 Month Average) 
Item Unit 
Persons Working in Agriculture 
and Forestry (b) 
Self -employed 
Family helpers 
Employees 
Total 
Persons working in 
forestry 
Persons working in 
agriculture 
Total Work Force 
At Work 
Unemployed 
Total 
Million 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
Percentage ·6f Employed Work Force 
In agriculture & forestry % 
In agriculture % 
Annual Labour Input per Farm (c) 
1965 
(a) 
3.94 
5.93 
0.59 
10.46 
0.37 
10.09 
47.30 
0.57 
47:87 
22.1 
21.3 
Man Hours 2987 
1973 
3.13 
3.14 
0.30 
6.57 
0.21 
6.36 
52.59 
0.67 
53.26 
12.5 
12.1 
2323 
1974 
3.10 
2.90 
0.30 
6.30 
0.20 
6.10 
52.37 
0.74 
53.11 
12.1 
11.6 
2276 
1975 
3.02 
2.86 
0.30 
6.18 
0.22 
5.96 
52.23 
1.00 
52.23 
11.8 
11.4 
2239 
1976 
6.01 
52.71 
1.08 
53.79 
11.4 
11.0 
(a) Excluding Okinawa. (b) Data from Labour Survey covering persons 15 years and 
above. (c) Data from annual farm surveys. 
SOURCE: Recent Developments in FOod Consumption and Farm Production in Japan. 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics Occasional Paper No 43. E..A. Saxon, 1978.. 
BEEF 
PORK 
CHICKEN 
HAM 
SAUSAGE 
MILK 
BUTTER 
CHEESE 
EGGS 
SOURCE: 
41. 
APPEND:j:X.V 
PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR SELECTED LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS 
IN JAPAN 
INCOME ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY 
CROSS SECTION (1976) TIME SERIES (1963-76) (TIME SERIES (1963-76) 
0.91 1.36 -1.69 
0.48 1. 52 -1. 51 
0.52 0.84 -1.15 
0.56 0.97 -0.84 
0.60 0.99 -2.50 
0.40 (R) 0.58 -0.88 
1.28 -0.53 
-0.58 
1.02 0.49 (T) -2.99 
0.20 0.30 -0.15 
Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, TOKYO. 
NOTE: R sign - R Value ,0.8 
T sign - T Value ~1.0 
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APPENDIX VI 
NUMBERS OF NEW GRADUATES ENTERING FARMING IN JAPAN 
YEAR UMBER 
1930 42800 
1935 41000 
1950 44000 
1955 26400 
1960 12700 
1965 5900 
1970 3700 
1972 2200 
1973 1800 
SOURCE: Shokuryo Kiki to Nippon Nogvo No Tenbo (The Food Crisis and Japan's 
Agricultural Outlook). Takeda Hotairocho. 
APPENDIX VII 
BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE (Billion Yen) 
Item 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Rationalisation of rice and cereals 0.7 1.0 83.2 186.1 205.1 2ll.8 202.2 126.3 113.1 
Promotion of livestock output 1.9 5.5 13.8 18.4 23.0 27.9 39.6 40.0 50.0 
Promotion of horticulture and silk 0.7 1.4 4.3 7.5 10.3 13.2 13.0 18.1 '20.3 
Total selective expansion 3.3 7.9 101.3 212.0 238.4 252.9 254.8 184.4 183.9 
Measures to raise productivity 46.2 106.3 212.2 271.7 349.3 370.9 384.0 454.4 489.9 
Natural disaster assistance 35.0 48.0 62.8 73.7 105.3 120.2 140.8 157.6 170.9 
84.5 162.2 376.3 557.4 693.0 744.0 779.6 796.4 844.7 
Price stabilisation, marketing, income 
- cereals 29.0 120.5 374.6 292.4 327.4 613.3 870.3 811.4 823.0 
- livestock products 0.4 4.1 15.6 12.4 13.8 14.0 25.1 31.8 35.5 
- other farm products 2.3 4.0 4.1 6.0 12.7 17.0 16.6 18.0 32.4 
- farm inputs 1.0 4.4 4.0 7.0 7.6 64.5 88.9 84.1 54.$ 
- other measures 3.5 6.6 18.6 23.6 27.6 28.3 31.1 36.2 37.7 
Total stabilisation measures 36.2 139.6 416.9 341.4 389.1 737.1 1032.0 981.5 983.4 
Structural improvement 4.0 20.1 34.4 40.3 49.7 62.6 64.6 77.1 95.3 
Farm welfare 0.5 1.3 5.7 7.4 9.1 10.3 14.0 19.1 23.2 
Agricultural co-ops and other 13~4 22.7 51.8 61.8 75.8 90.8 ll8.6 125.9 152.6 
17.9 44.1 91.9 109.5 134.6 163.7 197.2 222.1 271.1 
Grand Total 138.6 345.9 885.1 1008.3 1216.7 1644.8 2008.8 2000.0 2099.2 
Proportion of nation budget (%) 7.9 9.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 10.8 10.5 9.6 8.6 
SOURCE: Recent Developments in Food Consumption & Farm Production in Japan. Bureau of Agricultural Economics Occasional Paper No 43. 
E.A. Saxon .. 1978. 
Rice 
Wheat 
Barley 
Soyabeans 
Vegetables 
Fruit 
Sugar (incl. Okinawa) 
Meat (excl. whale) 
Milk and Milk Products 
Eggs 
Total Agricultural Foods 
Beef 
Pigr.leat 
Chicken 
Fodder (TDN basis) 
Feed concentrates (TDN basis) 
APPENDIX VIII 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATIOS 
COMPARISON OF PROJECTIONS WITH BASE YEARS AND 1974 
(Percentages) 
Base Years Actual 
1959 1966 1970 1972 1974 
101 101 106 100 102 
37 21 9 5 l .. 
92 65 34 18 II 
28 9 4 4(b) 4 
100 100 99 99 98 
100 89 84 81 83 
18( d) 27 23 20 14 
97 89 84 81 84 
94 80 89 86 83 
101 100 97 98 98 
90( d) 80 76 73 72 
1971 
(a) 
107 
34 
100 
16 
100 
87 
na 
80 
72 
105 
na 
SUPPLEMENJ'ARY DATA 
96( d) 92 89 79 85 na 
96( d) 106 98 90 93 na 
100( d) 97 98 96 97 na 
82( d) 62 55 51 47(r) 80 
67( d) 40 33 36 30( g) 60 
Projections 
1977 1982 
(a) (a) 
100 100 
14 8 
44 24 
3 12 
100 100 
87 84 
27 27 
89 89 
92 92 
99 100 
na 75 
na 83( e) 
na 97( e) 
na 98( e) 
55 43 
29 21 
Source: Japanese Long Term Projections Relating to Food and Agriculture. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
Occasional Paper No 38. E.A. Saxon, 1978. 
1985 
100 
9 
36 
9( e) 
100 
84 
28 
86 
94 
100 
75 
81 
99 
100 
51 
28 
45. 
APPENDIX IX 
HISTORY OF JAPAN'S FOOD STATUS 
YEAR 
1700 
1783 Famine 
1867 Meiji Restoration 
1883 Famine 
1918 Rice Riots 
1946 War Lost. Loss of 
access to food from colonies 
1960 
1972 
PHASES IN FOOD STATUS 
PHASE I 
1) Fairly stable population 
2) Stable rice yields 
3) Food consumption at subsistence levels 
PHASE II 
1) Modern Industrial development 
2) Rapid increase in rice yield 
3) Increase in food consumption per head 
with growing affluence 
4) Rapid population growth 
PHASE III 
FOOD DEVELOPMENT PROG~lliS 
1)· Rice in Korea and Taiwan 
2 ) Sugar in Taiwan 
3) Soyabeans in Manchuria 
4) Fishing Industry Development 
PHASE IV 
1) Poor food supply situation 
2) Successful rice production 
programme begun 
3) Balance of payments difficulties 
PHASE V 
1) Declining rice consumption 
2) Increase in non rice food consumption 
3) Increased imports esp. feed grains, 
meats, & oil seeds 
4) Declining food self sufficiency 
5 ) Expanding economy - abundant food 
PHASE VI 
1) World food scare 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Nixon soya bean export embargo 
200 mile EEZ era begun 
Drive to increased self sufficiency 
APPENDIX X 
FEEDSTUFFS AND END PRODUCT PRODUCTION RELATIONSHIPS IN JAPAN FOR 
BEEF AND DAIRY INDUSTRIES Units: 200 Tonnes: 000 Head 
Year Feedstuffs Production Feedstuffs Feedstuffs Total Total Feedstuffs Feedstuffs 
Used In Used Per Used in Beef Beef Used Per Used Per 
Dairy Industry Tonne Milk Beef Prod. Prod. Cattle No. Tonne Beef Animal 
1967 1067 3566 0.299 234 146 1551 1.60 0.151 
1968 1301 4016 0.324 448 160 1666 2.80 0.269 
1969 1521 4509 0.337 600 216 1795 2.78 0.334 
1970 1741 4762 0.365 876 260 1789 3.37 0.490 
1971 1812 4820 0.376 276 4.36 0.684 +'-1203 1759 0" 
. 
1972 1945 4939 0.394 1453 317 1749 4.58 0.831 
1973 1907 4896 00389 1835 246 1818 7.46 1.009 
1974 1792 4876 0.368 1665 321 1893 5.19 0.879 
1975 1833 5008 0.366 1544 349 1859 4.42 0.831 
1976 1960 5370 0.365 2004 295 1819 6.79 1.101 
1985 projecting 2803 7680 2743 508 
Note: 1985 projections are based on MAFF official projections of beef and milk production in Japan and 1976 feed to product 
output for dairy products and a weighted average of these ratios for 1974, 1975 and 1976 for beef. 
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JAPANESE AGRICULTURE 
1. A CONTRASTING PICTURE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
By some strange circumstance Japanese agricultural products would appear 
to fall into two distinct categories (see Table 1). The first group includes rice, 
vegetables, fruit, eggs and dairy products, and some type::; of meats. In these 
items Japan enjoys nearly 80 percent self-sufficiency and in some cases more. 
Wheat, barley, beans and sugar form the opposite category. For these products 
Japan depends more than 80 percent on foreign sources of supply. Japan produces 
a mere three percent of the soybeans and four percent of the wheat consumed by her 
population. Self-sufficiency figures for concentrated animal feeds are also 
extremely low with those for corn, milo and other coarse cereals being below two 
percent. Domestic production statistics on bran and oil cake, ingredients in the 
manufacture of concentrated feeds, would appear to indicate a large degree of 
self-sufficiency, however, both items are byproducts of wheat and oilseed, neither 
of which are grown in large quantities in Japan. 
The major reason for the existenee of these two contrasting groups of 
agricultural products is climatic. The Japanese archipelago, located on the 
fringes of the Asian monsoon region, is admirably suited to the wet paddy 
cultivation of rice. Japan's temperate climate also allows for the easy 
CUltivation of fruits and vegetables. 
A secondary reason for the discrepancy between high and low self-
sufficiency agricultural products is an economic one. The growing of products in 
climates for which they are suited is usually inexpensive and this fact 
contributes to the above items being in plentiful supply. 
Animal husbandry in Japan depends heavily on foreign imports of 
concentrated feed or raw materials for feed. As long as Japanese farmers can 
obtain .cereal feed inexpensively, however, they find that they can make good 
profi ts raising variou8'kincs of livestock. Pigs, broilers, and egg-laying 
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hens can be kept on Japanese farms on feed lots and· do not take up space. 
When such agricultural product export nations as the United States 
were suffering from an oversupply of agricultural products, the import of low 
priced feed for Japan's livestock production was a prudent method. Particularly 
in the raising of pigs and chickens in which only a small amount of space is 
necessary, this method met with great success. Operations producing more than 
300 head of pigs make up 36 percent of the total pig production, arid those 
producing more than 10,000 egg-laying hens make up 53 percent of the total 
hen production and those producing more than 10,000 broiler chickens make 
up 43 percent of the total chicken production. The larger scale of these 
operations has made Japanese prices more competitive in international markets. 
However, due to the unusual weather conditions since 1972, as soon 
as there is turbulence on the international agriculture produce market, 
especially in prices, Japan's livestock industry is immediately endangered. 
Also as the urbanization of Japan progresses, city people and farm people find 
themselves in closer contact than ever before,with "livestock pollution",such 
as contamination from livestock excreta, disagreeable smells and noises,becoming 
a problem. 
2. AGRICULTUnAL IMPORT POLICY 
There is another re.ason for the discrepancy between high and low rates 
of self-sufficiency in Japanese farm products. This factor is one of policy. 
Japan's postwar agricultural policy has had two major objectives, one of which 
was to raise the income of farming families to levels in other sectors;. the 
other was to provide food at low prices to Japanese consumers. 
These two goals do not have to be mutualiy incompatible in the short 
period. A compromise solution resulted in creating two distinct categories of 
farm products, one to provide cash for the farmer and the other to make sure 
consumers have inexpensive food to eat. In order to increase farm income it 
is necessary to raise the price of agricultural goods, however, to provide 
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consumers with cheap food. prices must be lowered. Consequently any attempt 
to achieve the two objectives in the short run is bound to result in certain 
inconsistencies. 
The items chosen to bolster the standard of living of farming families 
were rice, vegetables, fruit, eggs, dairy and meat products. With the exception 
of rice, it was felt that demand would increase with diversification in the 
diet and therefore these products are the ones most encouraged under JapanTs 
basic law on agriculture. Most of the items above are suited to the Japanese 
climate and can be produced economically. Thus self-sufficiency can be reached 
with no great difficulty. Dairy and beef, however, are exceptions, but it was 
considered that these should be supported in order to supplement farm income. 
For these reasons the self-suffciency rate was kept high in these products 
as well as in rice. 
The second group of farm products have been chosen with the consumer in 
mind. These are wheat, barley, coarse grain cereals. beans and sugar. Self-
sufficiency rates in these commodities are low and it is far cheaper to import 
them than to attempt to meet local demand through domestic production. The 
consumer is the chief beneficiary of this policy. 
To go one step further, one· can say that the unit price of high self'-
sufficiency farm produce tends to be high, whereas the opposite is true of low 
self-sufficiency items. 
Subsidies have resulted in making Japanese rice very expensive, and 
inasmuch as this particular type (Japonica) of rice enjoys limited appeal overseas 
its market price is high in comparison to other cereals as well. Fruit and 
vegetables rely on labour-intensive means of production in order to be marke,ted 
fresh. Thus they can become very expensive. In the case of fruit, long periods 
may be required before trees actually begin to produce and the cost of this 
initial investment raises the cost of production. With livestock, it is necessary 
to produce feed and then raise the animals. This roundabout method tends to 
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increase the cost of production.. (Table 2 shows import prices in Japan for 
1972 prior to runaway inflation. ) 
When foreign exchange reserves remain constant, one can import a 
greater numerical quantity of an item by aiming at low unit prices. Common 
sense would dictate that cheap imports both please the greatest number of 
people, and foster a healthy domestic economy. Until recently Japan has 
suffered from current accounts deficits causing importers to aim for low-price 
items. At the moment, Japan is suffering from exactly the opposite conditions 
and this has resulted in a necessity to aim for higher price imports. 
J. RESTRICTIONS ON RAISING CATTLE IN JAPAN 
Dairy cows and beef cattle cannot be maintained in Japan in great 
numbers because of the lack of grazing land. One would have thought that an 
increase in Japan's dairy cattle numbers might have been impossible but thanks 
to a decrease in the number of horses on Japanese farms, dairy cows increased 
from 824,000 head in 1960 to 1,888,000 in 1977. Horses were used either as 
draft animals on the farms or by the military, however, with the advent of 
mechanisation there was no longer any need to keep the animals, which have been 
replaced with dairy cows. Beef cattle too, whose number in 1977 stood at 
1,987,000 were required for work on the farm and numbers have declined because 
of mechanisation. 
The Japanese traditionally consider beef that has pure white fat 
here and there throughout the red lean meat to be of the highest quality. In 
order to get this mea:t, the weight of the cattle must be increased to 650 kg, with 
the result that 50% more feed than that required for the normal raising is said 
to be necessary. This special beef was produced by using the cattle in 
agricultural work for several Ye'ars and then keeping them completely still for 
six months to a year to fatten before butchering. But with the introduction of 
cultivators and tractors, the function of these cattle as farm animals was 
completely lost. Around 1965, the number of cultivators and tractors exceeded 
53'. 
the 2,000,000 mark, and a great number of farm cattle were slaughtered. 
The number of work cattle decreased!from 2,337,000 in 1963 to 1,457,000 
in 1967. In a mere four years, an actual 920,000 head of cattle 
disappeared and Japan's beef source literally dried up. This is the 
reason for today's high beef prices. It is only natural that the raising of 
beef cattle over a long period of time without utilizing them as work animals 
results in higher production costs under small scale management. 
Due to the influence of Buddhism and for other historical reasons, 
Japan's livestock market has a very special social character. The complex 
distribution structure caused by this situation and the shortage of beef 
together make it difficult to lower Japan's beef prices. 
The great slaughter of work cattle due to the spread of the use of 
cultivators and tractors seems to have been in direct opposition to government 
policies which have since 1961 been directed towards promoting the productio? 
of livestock. 
4. COUNTERMEASURES FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE 200 :MILE SEA LunT 
In 1976, 79.4 grs.ms of protein per capita per day was consumed in 
Japan. Of this figure, 45.7 percent was animal protein, and a breakdown of 
this percentage shows that 23.2 percent was livestock products and 22.5 
percent was fishery products. The livestock products include eggs, dairy 
products, and meat. Considering the fact that from 1934-1938, livestock 
products represented only 3.6 percent and from 1956-1960 only 7.9 percent of 
the total protein consumption, the 1976 ratio of livestock product consumption 
shows an outstanding increase. But the consumption of fishery products still 
maintains approximately the same standard as livestock products. The ratio of 
fishery products in the overall protein consumption level averaged 20.5 percent 
between 1934 and 1938, which is only slightly different from the present day 
ratio. Of course, the per capita daily consumption of protein in general shows 
an :increasing tendency, so that the amount of fishery products consumed has 
54. 
also increased, but the importance of fishery :rroducts in the Japanese diet 
has changed very little over the years. 
However, if the protein that the Japanese people are at present 
obtaining from fishery products were to be produced from livestock products, 
it would require all the agricultural land at present in use in Japan to 
produce the feed necessary to raise that livestock. 
Japan's production of fishery products was 10,545,000 tons in 1975 
15 percent of the total world production for the same year. And of this 
amount, 39.1 percent was taken from seas within the 200 mile sea limit 
of foreign countries. Therefore, as the restrictions on the 200 mile sea 
limit of foreign countries are intensified, the Japanese people will find i~ 
progressively difficult to obtain their traditional source of protein. 
Various countermeasures could be utilized to solve this problem. 
The first would be the maintenance. of the fishing grounds in the northern seas 
that have been developed by Japanese fishermen. But due to the strong 
insistence of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada that these 
resources must be preserved, there is a limit to the effectiveness of this 
countermeasure. The second is to develop new fishing grounds in New Zealand 
and Patagonia. However, the problem here is complicated by the demand of New 
Zealand that Japan reciprocate by importing livestock products as a condition 
of granting permission for use of their waters. The third is the importation 
of fishery products, but Japan is already the second largest importer of 
fishery products in the entire world, and this tendency will more than likely 
continue in future. Also there is a problem in the fact that imported products 
may involve far higher costs than those of catching fish with domestic fishing 
vessels. 
As a fourth· countermeasure, the utilization of Antarctic krill and 
other deep sea fish has been proposed, but aside from production expenses and 
transport expenses, there is the further problem of publicity expenses necessary 
to introduce these as yet untried resources. As a fifth countermeasure, there 
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is the promotion of cultured fish. This method could produce as much as 10 
2 2 to 20 tons per one km of sea area, and Japan has more than 120,000 km of 
available sea area that could be thus utilized. However, this would entail 
great amounts of money for artificial incubation, for construction of man-made 
gathering places for fish, for the making of artificial bait, and for the 
technical development to carry out these various projects. The sixth 
countermeasure is to utilize fishery products, that have hitherto been used 
as animal feed, as food for human beings, and to improve the consumption 
system by reclaiming the waste fluids from ground fish products, which would 
result in an increase in the utilization of the effective protein content of 
fishery products from the present figure of only 9.3 percent to 12.5 percent. 
However, for this purpose, developnent of techniques for processing and 
preparation would become necessary. 
5. SPOTTY PROSPERITY OF THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY 
Since only a short time has passed since the 200 mile sea limit has 
become a problem, countermeasures have not yet become stabilized. However, 
no matter which countermeasure is taken, the rising tendency of supply costs 
for fishery products will be the same, and the Japanese people will not be 
able to continue to increase their consumption of fishery products as they 
have in the past. Thus the possibility of turning part of the demand for 
fishery products towards utilization of livestock products and processed 
vegetable protein products will appear. Also, since the Second World War, the 
younger generation is taking over a larger ratio of the total social structure, 
therefore it is expected that the consumption of livestock products will 
increase in Japan. 
Of course, since the per capita consumption of eggs, one of the livestock 
products, was approximately 16 kg per year in 1976 in Japan, a figure which is 
within the highest world standard along with Israel, New Zealand, West Germany, 
and the United States, there will more than likely be no further increase in 
this particular field (see Table 4). Converting the consumption of dairy 
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products to the milk ratio, we find that an annual 54.6 Kg per capita is 
consumed in Japan. This ratio is a little less than 1/5 of that of the 
United States. less than 1/7 of that of Sweden, and only 1/4 of that of 
'-
Italy which is considered particularly low among the countries of Europe. 
Because the Japanese traditionally did not use dairy products in cooking, dairy 
products were always nothing more than luxury items on the tables of Japan. 
Since about 1970 when dairy products began to be more widely used, consumption 
ratios for dairy products began to decline with the exception of drinking 
milk and cheese, the former of which has become competitive to other beverages. 
However, if dairy product prices are lowered, the younger generation may begin 
to use dairy products in Europe and American style cooking and this may result 
in a raising of the rate of consumption in the future. Intake of several kinds 
of vitamins and minerals in the Western countries has relied heavily on dairy 
products (Table 5). It is worth noting that the Japanese have been using 
dairy products to supply an increasing share of the abovementioned nutrients' 
with the result that consumption of cereals, potatoes, beans and fish has 
decreased (Table 6). 
Among livestock products, the demand is strongest for meats, and since 
the annual per capita meat consumption volume in Japan is only 26.3 Kg, the 
standard still stands at a low of only 1/4 of that of the United States, and 
less than 1/3 of that of West Germany. However, when me~ts and fishery 
products are totalled together, the annual per capita consumption volume in 
Japan is 61.1 Kg, which is not so very low when compared with Italy's 75.7 Kg. 
But, as mentioned earlier, the supply rate of fishery products cannot be 
expected to increase in the future. Thus there will more than likely come 
to be a greater demand for meats. A breakdown of the meat consumption shows 
pork is highest with 41.3 percent, followed by chicken at 31.2 percent, and 
beef at 14.6 percent, and all others including mutton at 12.9 percent. In 
spite of the fact that the retail price of beef is five times that in the United 
States, the demand for beef in Japan is strong. 
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The total amount of beef o~ the dressed carcass weight in Japan in 
1977 was 450,000 tons, of which 134,000 tons were imported. The beef 
production volume for the same year was 306,000 tons, but 57 percent of this 
figure was the raising of milk cow bulls and the slaughtering of milk cows that 
no longer produce milk. The Japanese consider both milk cow beef and imported 
beef to be of inferior quality, but in actual fact, over half of the beef 
consumed in Japan is from these sources. If the supply of low-fa~ high-
protein fishery products is suppressed, imported 'beef may come to be used in 
its place. 
6. DIVERSIFICATION OF THE DIET 
Generally speaking as economic development advances and per capita 
real income increases, there occurs a modernization of all aspects of daily 
life and dietary habits.also are not immune to change. Changes in this area 
seem to fall into three categories. Firstly, there is a diversification of raw 
materials. Diets which heretofore have depended on a few staples for their 
bulk begin to include larger numbers of basic materials. Secondly, there is 
a diversification of secondary products; the diet begins to include numbers 
of newly developed products made from the same traditional basic materials. 
Finally there is a diversification of consumption habits; accompanying the 
diversification of living patterns, there is a diversification and liberalization 
of eating habits, whether in terms of mealtimes, eating places, or the 
composition of the party; the tradition of always eating at home begins to 
break down. 
As life styles chffi1ge, the Japanese have more opportunities to eat 
out, not only for entertainment, but also for meais, such as in the office, 
meeting, school, hospital, sports, theatre, travel and the like. Frequency 
of eating at home is gradually declining, while households, particularly the 
so-called two income families, are becoming less able to supply meals. This 
stimulates the development of the food service industry and the institutional 
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food industry, which in turn increases the use of processed and semi-
processed foods from the view point of labour-saving. Therefore, the 
processing food industry is prosperous in Japan, as long as stable economic 
growth is kept constant. 
Moreover, economies of scale are no longer working in Japanese households, 
because the family size is becoming smaller than before. In 1975 an average 
family consisted of 3.4 persQns, the number of families under four persons 
accountinefor about 80 percent of the total families in Japan. Such nuclear 
families do not have the advantage of reducing diet expenditure by bulk 
purchase, mass cooking and waste reduction. Their eating at home has 
resulted in the need for cooked and semi-cooked foods, which the processing 
food industry can provide with large scale economy. Urbanization is now 
penetrating all the rural areas in Japan. It may be considered as a symbol of 
this phenomena that about 90 percent of the members in farm households have 
been able to find part-time jobs. Thus urbanized society itself seems to 
be transforming the fundamentals of our dietary habits so that dining 
both at home and at eating places will be supported by the processing food 
industry. 
The economics of the processing food industry depends on the costs, 
that is, wages and prices of foodstuffs. Since the yen has been highly 
valued, labours and materials in Japan have become internationally very 
expensive. It is no doubt to be more profitable that the food service industry 
uses various kinds of imported processed foods while in the processing food 
industry capital is flowed out to seek for cheaper labour and cheaper foodstuffs 
in foreign countries. This will surely put serious pressures on Japanese 
agriculture, because most processed foods are liberalised in trade. For 
instance, the rice cake and the biscuit have been freely imported, in spite 
of the restrictions on the trades of rice and wheat. Again,though importing 
skimmed milk powder and butter is strictly controlled, trading of the cocoa 
preparation and the oil preparation has been liberalised; so you can export 
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skimmed milk powder and butter to Japan, only if you add a little bit of 
cocoa and vegetable oil. To help improve the balance of payments the 
inflow of processed foods (to the Japanese diet) and outflow of capital 
from the Japanese food industry will be encouraged. 
7. PROBLDJ~ IN LIBERALIZING TRADE 
It has been suggested both at home and abroad that Japan buy even 
more so as to compensate for her exports of manufactured goods. Japan's 
agricultural policies, however, have so far been predicated upon the above 
mentioned complementary relationship between high and low self-sufficiency 
products. As Japan already imports great quantities of agricultural goods 
which fall into the low self-sufficiency category, the only way this country 
can satisfy such demands is to start importing products which farmers already 
produce in great quantities. 
rhe share of agricultural products - excluding cotton, wool and 
natural rubber - in Japan's imports has been decreasing over the years. 
Vfuile in 1965 the figure was 23.7 percent, in 1970 it was 17.2 percent, and 
by 1976, it had declined to 15.1 percent. To put an end to this trend and 
ameliorate Japan's accounts surplus, it might be desirable to promote imports 
of high unit price agricultural commodities. 
A problem that arises in this connection is one that concerns changes 
in the elements of production. For example, as a result of cheap agricultural 
imports local production suffers and farm income declines. Workers move 
away from farms to more profitable industries thus making it possible to 
reorganize agriculture along more efficient lines. A realistic examination 
of the problem will show though, that a shift of labourers from farms to 
other industries is not likely to take place smoothly. Labourers who remain 
on the farms to eke out a living will have to be supported with social welfare 
outlays. 
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There is great danger o~ environmental damage if Japan's farms are 
allowed to deteriorate. 1fun came to till the soil at a very early stage 
in his development, and, inasmuch as agriculture is his first industry, it 
is the one that exists in the closest harmony with nature. The experiences 
of farmers through thousands of years of cultivating the soil are contained 
in modern agriculture 
In this sense, farming does play an important role in preserving the 
environment. Although it may be true that Japan must make industry the 
backbone of her economy, this is not to say agriculture must be driven from 
these islands. Were one to compensate with tax revenues agriculture's 
beneficial effects to the environment, the bill would come to a colossal 
figure. 
~fuen fluctuations in world prices occur, producers cannot respond 
quickly to sudden changes. Japanese especially remember 1973, when in the 
wake of the oil crisis the United States and other producing nations placed 
limitations on agricultural exports. At the same time the distribution costs 
of agricultural commodities skyrocketed. The experience has served to make 
Japanese wary of relying too much on international markets, lest important 
sources of supply dry up in an emer~ency. 
It is frightening to consider just what would happen if Japan was unable 
to obtain food from abroad. At present the average daily per capita calorie 
intake in Japan is 2,500, of which 1,000 calories are obtained from food that in 
some way originates from a foreign area - that is to say, the commodity is 
imported directly, or it may be meat fed on grain bought overseas, or else 
fish caught by Japanese or other fishing vessels operating in the 200 mile 
zones of foreign countries. Japan can provide a mere 1,500 calories per day 
for each of her population, and, considering that the human body uses exactly 
1,500 calories when it is in a state of rest, should Japan's foreign sources of 
food be cut off, the Japanese people will have no other choice but to lie down 
and sleep. 
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Even though the likelihood of all Japan's food imports being cut off 
is somewhat remote, the Japanese people are beginning to feel a sense of" crisiS 
concerning the present situation. On the other hand, there is little doubt 
that Japan's international standing would improve with wise purchases of 
agricultural products from abroad. The question confronting Japan today is 
how to revamp the nation's agriculture while maintaining both bargaining 
edge and secure sources of foreign food supplies 
8. THEORETICAL IMPROVEMENT MEASURES 
In the past, Japan's food policy has been operating on the presumed 
basis of a balance of interests among the farmer, the consumer and the 
taxpayer. However, Japan's strenghtening of international trading capacity 
and the guaranteeing of security in food supply for the nation have become 
major factors in policy determination, as a result of a sharp spiralling of 
international prices of farm products and the oil crisis that Japan has 
experienced in recent years. These factors will vary in significance, 
depending on how one assesses the outlook for the world food supply-demand 
situation and for international relations. As long as such an assessment is 
uncertain, meanwhile, Japan's food policy should be so steered as to strengthen 
its international trading capacity in normal times and to guarantee the security 
of the nation's food consuming pattern in abnormal times so as to provide 
against the worst situation. 
From this point of view, livestock raising has at least three stock-
piling functions. Firstly, unlike the case of crop growing, livestock can 
be slaughtered at any time to produce meat for food. Accordingly, stock 
raising has the function of stockpiling meat. Secondly, stock raising requires 
constant amounts of feed, including grain which can also be consumed by human 
beings; so feed stocks also represent stockpiles of grain for food. Thirdly, 
land fertility is maintained in pastures by excrement of livestock: hence 
stock raising also has the function of stockpiling land for tilling through 
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grazing. 
On the other hand, the total calorie content of feed required for 
stock raising is said to be seven times that of livestock products on 
average. Therefore, as long as Japan's stock raising continues to rely on 
imported feed, there is a possibility of Japan's share of the world feed 
market expanding rapidly with its feed import volume assuming enormous 
proportions (Figure 1). This would increasingly expose Japan's livestock 
industry to the trends of overseas markets and at the same time increase 
the incidence of "livestock pollution" (due to excrement, smells, noise, 
etc.) in Japan. As a result, Japan would have to spend huge sums of money 
in coping with such pollution. 
A conceivable solution would be to establish an integrated system 
ranging from feed production to final production of livestock food and to 
link it with an agricultural crop rotation system including rice. Of 
course, such an integrated system alone would not suffice to support the 
stock raising industry as a whole, in view of the limited land area of Japan. 
Even so, it is worth striving for,at least to some extent. For instance, 
there are about 2,000,000 hectares of paddy fields free of snow or limited 
in snowfall during winter. If barley for feed was grown on this land, 
approximately 6,000,000 tons of grain would be available: equi valent to 
about half of the feed grain now being bought from abroad. Moreover,Japan's 
annual rice crop totalling 12,000,000 tons also produces much the same 
volume of straw, which could conceivably be used as raw feed for cattle. 
And excrement of livestock could be used to fertilize farmland naturally. 
In this way, if Japan's livestock indust~y shifts emphasis from feed 
import to feed self-sufficiency, farmland in Japan will be put to better use 
and the costs of coping with "livestock pollution" will be reduced. This 
shift would not only protect domestic stock raisers from fluctuations in the 
international prices of animal feed, but also would help to guarantee the 
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security of food supply for the nation. 
IJ1eanwhile, the demand for livestock feed which exceeds dOI!lestic 
production could be met appropriately through the further import of 
livestock products. Since the unit prices of livestock products are higher 
than those of feed, their import value would come out favourably in terms of 
their quantity. This would reduce the surplus of foreign exchanges and 
serve to strengthen the international trading capacity of Japan in manufacturing 
goods. 
If imports of those farm products for which Japan has high self-
sufficiency ratios have to be increased due to strong international pressures, 
in addition to increases of imports of those for which Japan's self-sufficiency 
ratios are low, Japan's agriculture might go to ruin unless appropriate counter-
measures are taken. Thus the self-sufficiency ratios of farm products that 
have dropped sharply should now be raised to some extent. And one of the 
possible means to that end would be such a change of direction as I have 
suggested above. Of course, I am not arguing for complete self-sufficiency 
in animal feed. 
Japan's grain self-sufficiency ratio in 1976 was 34 percent as against 
64 percent for Britain and 80 perce~t for West Germany in 1975. In particular 
Japan's ratio for coarse grain was a mere two percent in contrast to Britain's 
71 percent and West Germany's 74 percent. 
and Japan must do something to correct it. 
This is abnormal by any standard, 
Assuminff the policy I suggested is taken, consideration should be given 
to at least the following three points. 
To start with, the underground water level of paddy fields must be 
adjusted freely so that they can be used not only for rice growing but also 
for dry field farming. For this purpose, land improvement through culvert 
drainage will be necessary. Noreover, in the case of grazing in mountainous 
areas, measures must be taken to prevent soil erosion from the heavy annual 
rainfall in Japan. 
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Secondly, assuming that the abovementioned foundation of production 
is established, it will be necessary to develop a new system of crop 
rotation. Such a system would vary from region to region, but a common 
characteristic would likely be inclusion of paddy rice. Also, grass for 
grazing suitable for Japan's climate would have to be developed. 
Thirdly, on the basis of the abovementioned production foundation 
and technical systems, it is imperative to set up a new form of diversified 
management. But since this will be economically impossible in the case of 
present small-scale management (Figures 2 and 3), farms of individual farm 
households must be merged for large-scale management. 
At present the farming population accounts for 11 percent of Japan's 
total working population. But it includes a large proportion of older people 
(Table 7), raising the possibility that it might plummet to only about four 
percent by the end of the 20th century due to retirement and death. In that 
case it will become relatively easy to enlarge the scale of agricultural 
management. In the meantime, however, the retirement and death of old 
farmers could result in a diversion of farmland to other purposes and slaughter 
of livestock, eventually bringing about a collapse of the foUndation of 
agricultural production. 
Accordingly it is necessary to embark on proper countermeasures without 
delay. Any effort to overcome the current difficulties by pursuing "macro-
economic rationality" probably would conflict with farmers' desire to protect 
their "mircoeconomic rationality" and consequently would produce an impasse 
politically. Nevertheless, a policy of maintaining the status quo would 
isolate Japan from the international community and antagonize domestic consumers 
and taxpayers as well. If Japan continues to take only temporizing measures 
to stave off pressures from abroad, Japanese agriculture will not be able to 
achieve sound growth. 
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APPENDIX I 
EMERGENCE OF MANY PART-TIME FARMING HOUSEHOLDS 
Japan's farming population, which stood at 11,960,000 in 1960, 
plunged to only about half, or 5,720,000 in 1976. However, the number of 
farming households dwindled by only 18 percent, from 6,057,000 to 4,95J,000 
during the same period. This was due to the emergence of many part-time 
farming households. Since farmland showed a slight decrease in the period, 
the average farmland per household displayed little change, rising from one 
hectare to 1.1 hectares. 
In 1975, part-time farming households accounted for 87.6 percent of 
the total farming households. The dai-nishu (Category II) part-time farming 
households which earn more from nonagricultural jobs than from agriculture 
represented 62.1 percent of the total, tilling about 40 percent of the 
total land under cUltivation. Nowadays Category II part-time farming 
households can cover most of their living expenses with non agricultural 
income (Figure 2 and J). 
Since small agricultural machines usable for small-scale management 
have been developed, farmers have saved labour by purchasing them and have 
diverted the surplus labour to nonagricultural sectors. If only agricultural 
income is taken into consideration, investment in agricultural machinery 
usually does not pay in Japan. But if nonagricultural income and the 
increasing value of assets (land and houses) which can be maintained through 
continued farming are taken into account, the investment is economically 
reasonable. Horeover, manual labour of women and old men, which cannot 
become the core of industrial labour in urban areas, is fully used in 
Japanese agriculture. This is a sort of advantage from a technical point of 
view, but is unreasonable economically in that production cost cannot be 
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lowered while the use 0:(' small machines makes the benefits of large-
scale mechanisation impossible. 
So as to take nonagricultural jobs, farmers have naturally chosen 
paddy rice growine for technological reasons. And this is also natural due 
to the fact that the most suitable kind of production for Japan's climate 
is paddy fields. Although the Government has encouraged output of livestock 
products, fruit and vegetables in view of the increasingly diversified 
eating habits of the Japanese people, most farmers have not given up paddy 
rice growing. Hence when an income gap has emerged between agricultural 
and non-agricultural workers, making it politically necessary to prop up 
farmers' income, the Government has done so by means of price support for 
rice. This has resulted in deepening the farmers' attachment to paddy rice 
growing, leading the Government to be harassed by an overproduction of 
rice. Thus the emergence of part-time farming households has had an 
economically unreasonable result in the crop planting pattern as well. 
In 1976, disposable annual inco:rre per member of farming households stood at 
¥849,000 as against ¥756,700 for nonagricultural wage-earning households; 
that is, farmers earned a bigger income. This tendency became evident 
from around 1971 or at about the same time that the proportion of agricultural 
income in farm households' income began to fall below 30 percent. When the 
Basic Law on Agriculture was enacted, it was anticipated that agriculture 
would supply labour to other industries. But few people expected that 
such supply would be through part-time farming households, and that this would 
serve to close the income gap between farming households and nonfarming 
hO).lseholds. 
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APPENDIX II: TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Srlf-Sufficicncy· Rates in Various 
Edible Agricultural Products 
(unit: %) 
1960 119~5 1970 1976 
Rice 102 95 106 100 
Vegetables 100 100 99 98 
Fruit 100 90 84 82 
Eggs 101 100 97 97 
Dairy Products 89 86 89 85 
Meats 91 90 89 76 
Wheat 39 28 9 4 
Barley & Rye ]07 73 34 9 
Beans 44 25 13 8 
(Soybeans) 28 11 4 3 
Sugar 18 30 23 19 
Concentrated Feed 67 44 33 28 
(Coarse Grains) 50 19 9 2 
Source: Agriculture and Forestry hlinistry "Sup-
ply and Demand of Food." . 
Table 2. Import Prices of Main Agricultural 
Products 
(unit: yen per kg) 
Price Price 
Polished Rice 50 Wheat 24 
Peas 94 Barley & Rye 19 
Oranges 119 Soybeans 41 
Beef 162 Raw Sugar 38 
Eggs 181 Corn 24 
Butter 222 I 
.. Source: Fmance MinIstry "Annual Statistics of 
Foreign Trade." 
68. 
Tabl') 3. Per Capita Land Area of Major Nation~: 
-~ Tot;;il;J-;'ct! T 
Nation Population 
_ Total exclusive of : 
Ian_d,. per forests, p"r I a 
capIta carJita I 
--.-- '-,------'---T------
L..und llsed . i for CultIvated I Grassland, 
griculture, land,. per per 
per capita capna i capita 
thousand are are 
--, 
I are are are 
China 800,708 119.9 107.9 I 36.0 13.9 22.1 
India 562,995 _ 58.1 47.0 31.7 29.3 2.5 
USSR 247,345 905.9 537.8 245.6 94.1 151.5 
United States 209,170 447.7 301.4 
Indonesia 129,752 146.8 52.9 I 
Japa.n 107,055 34.8 10.8 
, 
Brazil- 98,444 _ 864.7 338.<i I 
Bangladesh 80,339 ; 17.8 15.0 I 
Pakistan 66,220 121.4 118.6 I West Germany 61,290 40.4 28.7 
208.8 92.0 i I i6.8 
21.6 13.9 7.7 
6.0 5.1 0.9 
139.2 30.3 109.0 
12.1 11.3 0.8 
36.6 29.1 7.6 
22.1 13.2 8.9 
United Kingdom 56,122 43.5 40.0 33.6 12.9 20.7 
Italy 54,489 55.3 44.0 32.4 22.8 9.7 
Mexico 54,336 363.1 282.7 189.4 43.9 145.6 
France 51,721 105.8 78.7 63.9 37.0 27.0 
Canada 22,135 4,507.0 2,505.2 310.2 197.8 112.5 
Netherlands 13,3.'59 27.5 25.3 16.0 6.4 9.6 
Australia 13,031 5,898.9 5,631.4 3,796.3 342.4 3,453.9 
Belgium 9,770 31.3 25.1 16.3 8.7 7.6 
Sweden 8,170 550.5 272.5 46.0 37.4 8.7 
Switzerland 6,367 64.9 49.5 34.2 6.1 28.2 
Denmark 4,998 86.2 76.8 69.1 53.3 5.S 
World total 3,760,745 356.2 248.7 118.2 38.8 79.5 
Source: FAO "Production Yearbook 1972." 
Notes: 1. Population figures are mainly for 1972 and land figures for 1ll7L 
2. National land figures include inland wat;;rs. 
3. Land used for agriculture includes orchards and fields in cultivated land and long·term 
plant fields and grazing lands are included in grasslands. (In the case of Japan, 
cultivated land' and fixed land figures have different values in land statistics.) 
Table 4. Annual Per Capita Food Supply (Kg) 
I 
Potatoes and Sugars I Beans Year Grains Vegetables Fruits Meats Starch I 
I United States '75 61.8 47.9 50.1 8.1 94.7 ·72.3 110.1 
I Sweden '75 61.2 81.0 42.5 2.4 ~2.0 81.1 60.5 
Canada '74 68.5 60.4 46.7 9.4 68.3 79.7 76.6 
West Germany '75 64.2 90.1 38.0 3.3 68.5 110.9 82.2 
Denmark ~74 64.8 76.5 51;0 2.0 48.4 52.0 64.0 
France ;75 76.1 90.8 35.6 1.3 118.6 74.2 95.5 
Switzerland '75 70.1 48.6 39.7 5.1 84.4 121.8 74.4 
1':l!therlands '75 65.7 76.6 42.8 11.1 80.1 110.8 72.5 
New Zealand '75 76.2 51.8 36.0 3.2 128.0 73.3 116.8 
United Kingaom '75 74.6 90.4 48.9 4.9 60.5 47.1 73.5 
Japan '76 120.5 26.4 25.3 10.8 127.3 55.2 26.3 
Italy '75 167.0 36.7 30.5 8.1 155.7 100.8 65.2 
Arg~ntina '69 94.5 108.8 35.4 3.3 79.2 96.4 122.3 
Brazil '70 99.3 196.0 46.7 29.6 14.6 54.8 30.7 
Philippines '69 132.1 "32.1 18.3 6.6 28.8 47.8 16.1 
Korea, Rep. of '73 221.0 37.8 7.6 8.4 67.7 15.3 9.2 
Pakistan '69/'70 181.0 17.2 18.3 5.8 18.6 29.2 4.0 
I India '69/'70 140.2 17.5 17.9 9.3 3.7 17.5 1.5 
Source: OECD -(materials), FAO "Production Yearbook 1971" and other materials from abroad 
(Korea). However, in the case of Japan, "1976 Food Supply and Demand Chart" was used. 
I Fishery I 
Milk and Oil and 
Eggs Milk Products Products Fats 
16.0 I 6.9 247.5 22.5 12.7 21.7 358.5 13.4 
12.9 6.2 307.6 18.4 
17.2 9.0 270.3 19.2 
10.9 34.5 335.0 17.8 
12.9 18.8 321.6 19.1 
11.3 4.6 372.2 16.1 
... 11.7 265.2 25.1 
17.1 4.7 402.9 6.7 
13.8 7.9 344.6 15.1 
16.0 34.8 54.6 11.7 
11.3 10.3 204.4 21.9 
6.6 2.2 123.4 18.6 
4.0 2.6 71.2 6.6 
3.7 19.7 19.7 2.9 
4.0 27.6 3.3 2.1 
-
0.4 1.8 75.9 5.1 
0.4. 1.1 42.3 3.7 
-
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TABLE 5 
PERCENTAGES OF CALCIUM AND SOME VITAMINS BY ITEMS IN USA (1970) 
Calcium 
Dairy Products 75'.9 
Butter 0.1 
Other Oil and Fat 0 . .3 
Meat and Fish 3~.6 
Eggs 2.6 
Fruit 2.1 
Vegetables 6.4 
Potatoes 1.0 
Pulses 2.5 
Cereals .3.4 
Sugar 1.1 
Others 1.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Vitamin 
A 
12.8 
2.6 
5.5 
21.9 
6.5 
7;4 
.35.2 
5.4 
0.4 
2 . .3 
100.0 
Vitamin 
Bl 
9.2 
28~5 
2.4 
40.3 
7.6 
6.2 
5.0 
.36.6 
0.1 
100.0 
Vitamin 
B2 
40.9 
24.6 
5.7 
2.0 
5.5 
1.7 
1.7 
17 . .3 
0.7 
100.0 
Vitamin 
C 
4.2 
1.1 
.36.2 
.35.9 
.3.6 
.3.6 
100.0 
Dairy Products 
1955 
1971-72 
Meat 
1955 
1971-72 
Eggs 
1955 
1971-72 
Fish 
1955 
1972-72 
Fruit 
1955 
1971-72 
Vegetables 
1955 
1971-72 
Potatoes 
1955 
1971-72 
Pulses 
1955 
1971-72 
Cereal 
1955 
1971-72 
Sugar 
1955 
1971-72 
Oils 
1955 
1971-72 
TOTAL 1955 
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TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGES OF CALCIT.IM: AND SOME VITA1vITNS 
BY ITEMS IN JAPAN (1955, 1961-72) 
Calcium Vitamin Vitamin 
A B1 
13.9 10.5 14.6 
38.1 21.5 38.8 
0.1 0.8 0.7 
0.3 0.9 4.9 
1.9 15.4 0.7 
5.0 26.2 2.0 
14.0 8.5 4.4 
9.5 4.3 5.7 
1.0 5.1 1.4 
2.2 4.3 2.8 
24.0 58.6 8.3 
21.5 42.0 9.2 
6.7 0.4 10.4 
2.3 3.3 
23.4 0.4 16.6 
14.0 0.2 10.5 
12.7 44.4 
6.4 22.8 
2.3 
0.7 
0.3 
0.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
1971-72 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Vitamin Vitamin 
B2 C 
5.6 0.9 
22.6 2.6 
0.5 
10.6 
0.2 
0.2 
10.2 1.1 
10.8 1.1 
0.5 7.5 
1.2 21.0 
11. 7 50.6 
19.4 67.3 
29.2 29.9 
8.1 8.0 
28.9 
20.2 
13.2 
6.9 
100.0 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
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TABLE 7 
PERSONS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 
(1000 ) 
Age. Group TOTAL MALE FEMALE 
1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
15~19 200 60 140. 40 60 20 
20~24 400 200 230 120 170 80 
25~29 480 320 200 150 280 170 
30~34 700 370 280 150 420 220 
35~39 1000 550 420 220 580 330 
40~54 3010 2500 1260 1080 1750 1410 
55-64 1600 1350 830 660 770 680 
65- 1030 820 660 520 370 300 
TOTAL $420 6010 4010 2950 4420 3230 
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Figure 1: Imports of Grains by Malor Natiorm 
(l,oooton.) 
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Figure 2: Proportion of Full- ana Part-time Farming Household,> as Classified by Size of Farm-
land (excl. Hokbido) 
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Figure 3: Numbers of Full- and Part-time 
Farming Households (unit 1,000 house-
holds. excl. Hokkaido) 
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DAIRYING IN JAPAN 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE GROWTH IN THE JAPANESE DAIRY INDUSTRY 
AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO DAIRY POLICIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 
1. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS 
To understand Japanese agricultural policies, whether they relate to 
domestic production, to imports or to both, it is necessary to be acquainted 
both with the basic situation of Japanese agriculture and the problems it 
faces, and with the political and institutional environment in which policy 
makers as well as farmers, consumers and other interest groups have become 
conditioned to operate. 
To help achieve such an understanding, this paper aims 
a. to look briefly at the growth of the dairy industry 
b. to trace the origin of various problems in agriculture (including 
the dairy industry) 
c. to note the responses to these problems by producers, consumers and 
the Government. 
d. to examine the nature of farm pressure groups in general and dairy 
groups in particular 
e. to discuss the influence of these pressure groups on policies relating to 
dairy products and the ways in which these policies are implemented 
f. to consider the implications of these pOlicies for exporting 
countries and to assess possibilities of modification 
The actual policy measures which affect trade in dairy products will be 
known to most participants. This paper will therefore not discuss these in full 
detail but will concentrate more on the origins and rationale of policies, and 
the interaction of interested bodies in the process of policy formulation. 
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2. GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE DAIRY INDUSTRY 
In Europe, the keeping of cows for milk production has a history of 
many centuries. In Japan a dairy industry worthy of the name is scarcely one 
century old. In 1920 milk production was little more than one litre per head 
of the population from a mere 50,000 cows. Production expanded slowly up tq 
the time of World War II and in 1948 there were some 171,000 dairy cows, 
production being 2.3 litres per person for all end uses. 
Subsequently production rose steadily to reach 5.7 million tonnes in 1977, 
(50 litres per person) from a national herd containing almost 1.9 million cows, 
1.3 million being two years of age or more. Milk used for drinking has increased 
more than milk used in manufacture, and now accounts for more than 60% of the 
total. During the 1970s, consumption of milk in the form of manufactured 
products has stagnated, but consumption of fresh milk has continued to increase, 
though at a diminishing rate. 
Thus the Japanese dairy industry is substantially a post-war development 
which has no parallel in other industrialised countries. The only parallels in 
the Japanese farm sector itself are in the pig and poultry industries. 
The rapid growth of milk production in Japan was accompanied by some 
important changes in the structure and location of the industry. In the early 
post-war years, a large number of farmers decided to keep one or mOIeCOWS for 
milk production. The number of such farmers grew from some 50,000 in 1946 to 
280,000 in 1956, reaching a peak of nearly 420,000 in 1963. In more recent 
years dairying (like other livestock industries) has become increasingly a 
matter for specialists, and the number of farmers keeping a cow or two as a 
sideline has fallen considerably, the total number of farms with dairy cows in 
1977 being 136,000. As a result, average herd size rose from 1.5 in 1949 to 
nearly 14 in 1977. This trend towards fewer and larger herds is likely to 
continue. 
The relative importance of the principal dairy regions has also 
changed. Around 1960, about half total milk production was in areas close to 
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the principal cities. Output in these areas continued to grow up to around 
1970 since when growth has stagnated and in some cases declined. However, 
output has continued to rise steadily in some of the more remote areas, 
especially Hokkaido, Kyushu and to a lesser extent Tohoku. Production in 
Hokkaido is now almost five times that in 1960; in Kyushu it is almost 
three times as great. Hokkaido now produces 30% of all milk compared with 
less than 19% in 1960. While most of the milk in Hokkaido is used for 
processing, in recent years increasing quantities have been shipped as fresh 
milk (in concentrated form) to large population centres to the south. The 
relative position of Hokkaido as a milk producing area is likely to continue 
growing in the future owing to the economies of scale possible on the larger 
farms where average herd size is more than twice the national average. 
3. REASONS FOR GROWTH 
When World War II ended, Japan was confronted by serious food shortages 
and considerable nutritional deficiencies. The U.S. Government assisted the 
Japanese to increase supplies of protein, calcium and other nutrients by making 
available quantities of milk powder, more especially for vulnerable groups 
such as children and mothers. This action established a taste for milk among 
school children and an appreciation of its nutritional value among parents. 
The return of peace also initiated a widespread trend towards emulating 
western lifestyles and food consumption patterns, and this did much to reinforce 
the growing demand for milk products. At the same time the Japanese Government 
encouraged the expansion of existing industries and the development of new ones 
to meet the changes in demand. \~en U.S. food aid ceased, the Japanese continued 
to use scarce foreign exchange to import protective foods such as milk powder, so 
that both the growing domestic dairy industry and imported products contributed 
towards increased availability which nevertheless lagged behind demand for some 
years, causing relatively high prices for dairy products and the proliferation of 
farms keeping one or two cows mentioned earlier. Needless to say, these farms 
82. 
tended to have high costs per unit of output. 
A further factor helping to encourage the growth of the dairy industry 
in Japan was an increasing demand for beef coupled with the decline in the 
number of cattle kept for draught purposes which resulted from the spread 
of farm mechanisation. These draught animals were often dual purpose, being 
used for beef after a period behind the plough. Increasing demand for beef 
and reduced supplies from this source encouraged the development of a small 
specialised beef cattle industry. It also led to the development of a dairy 
beef industry which grew from a negligible size around 1950 to parity with 
beef herds in 1972, going on to produce 60% of total beef output in 1977. 
4. ORIGINS OF F~A PROBLEMS 
Japan is similar to other industrial countries in that its post-war 
development has been accompanied by an intensification of basic problems 
relating to agriculture. 
One reason for this lies in the extremely small size of Japanese farms 
and the scattered nature of their component plots. This limits the scale of 
farm operations and inhibits increases in the productivity of labour and 
capital. Productivity of land is now among the highest in the world, so 
that the scope for further increases is limited, while increases in the 
productivity of all inputs taken together slowed to a halt about 1967.1 
By contrast, productivity in most other sectors, especially in 
manufacturing, rose continually and rapidly in conformity with the outstanding 
economic growth achieved by the Japanese economy in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This facilitated both increased investment and rising real incomes. However, 
as incomes rose, the Engel coefficient fell from over 50% in 1951 to 30% in 
1977. This means that consumers spent a declining proportion of their income 
on farm products. In fact, real expenditure per person on farm products in 
the nation as a whole declined slightly in 1974. It has since recovered 
approximately to the 1973 level, but increases in demand for some commodities 
1 E.A. Saxon: Farm Production in Japan, BAE Occasional Paper No. 35, 
19'76, pp 52-54. 
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(especially livestock products) have been accompanied by corresponding 
declines in demand for others.2 
These developments prevented farm income in aggregate from rising in 
proportion to national income, but the discrepancy was further increased by 
the fact that food demand increased beyond the ability of Japanese farmer to 
supply, so that a rising proportion of national expenditure on food was 
directly or indirectly attributable to imported products. As a result, 
despite some increases in population, the absolute amount of purchasing power 
in real terms surrendered by consumers in exchange for the output of Japanese 
farms has tended to fall. 
Thus the small size of farms and the limited scope for increases in 
productivity and output in the early post-war years created a situation which, 
in a rapidly expanding free market economy, would have led to a drastic 
decline in the relative incomes of farmers and hence to a massive exodus from 
farming. This would have meant lower output, at least until agriculture had 
been completely restructured. Such an outcome was obviously unacceptable to 
the nation as it would threaten its post-war recovery by undermining its food 
security, its recently adopted democratic principles of equal opportunity, and 
the social stability which was an essential ingredient of the Japanese "economic 
miracle". Anything resembling a free market economy in agriculture was 
therefore clearly out of the question. 
5. REACTIONS TO PROBL~~ 
a. By Farm People 
Faced with this situation, farm people themselves adopted several courses 
of action. Some left farming altogether, enabling their land to be absorbed 
by other farmers. However, the number taking this course was very few. Having 
achieved land ownership as a result of the land reforms of 1945 and 1946, few 
wished to forego the security which this land offered them. 
A much more widespread reaction was to undertake off-farm employment. 
Rapid economic development created many opportunities for one or more farm 
2 E.A. Saxon: Recent Development in Food Consumption and Farm Production 
In Japan, BAE Occasional Paper No 43, 1978. 
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family members to obtain employment within commuting distance of the farm. 
A smaller number took seasonal employment in more distant centres. Farm 
operations were often carried on undiminished by other family members, females 
and sometimes children. In other instances, farm activities were reduced, 
e.g. by elimination of double-cropping. 
The extent of reliance on off-farm work is illustrated by the fact that 
in 1977 only 13.3% of farm households were classified as "full-time", while 
just under 30% of aggregate income of farm households came from the sale or 
household use of farm products. Since farmers' total returns from farming 
include a large component of government price support and other forms of 
assistance, the proportion of net farm income derived through the marketing 
chain from consumers of farm products is much below 30%, despite the fact that 
Japanese prices for many of these products are among the world's highest. 
A further reaction by farmers was to join forces to strengthen the 
agricultural co-operatives and to exert political pressure to raise income 
from farming. The co-operatives enabled farmers to achieve economies of 
scale in selling farm produce and in purchasing farm requisites. They also 
often enable farmers to operate as monopoly sellers in order to increase 
prices received for their products. The role of co-operatives and other 
pressure groups in securing government price support and similar assistance 
for farmers is described in more detail later. 
b. By the Government 
Immediately after the war, the principal problem facing Japan was a 
widespread shortage of food. Thus the land reforms and other early post-war 
policy measures were designed to encourage farmers to increase output as 
rapidly as possible with little regard to cost. 
By the latter half of the 1950s, the immediate post-war problems of 
food shortage and farm deterioration had been overcome and farm modernisation 
was well under way. However, the above-mentioned fall in relative incomes 
of farmers and changes in the commodity composition of the demand for food 
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were among the new problems which were emerging - problems which led to 
pressures for new directions in farm policies culminating in the enactment 
of the Agricultural Basic Law in 1961.3 
This Law became the !!chapter of agriculture!! and has provided the 
backocop to most subsequent policy measures. Space limitations preclude any 
detailed examination of the Law here, but the guidelines which it provided 
for policy formulation appear worth summarising. The preamble stresses the 
need to modernise agriculture to raise productivity and the need to give farm 
people the opportunity to obtain incomes comparable with those earned in 
other economic sectors. The main body of the Law contains provisions for: 
(i) selective expansion of production (i.e. of commodities 
increasing in demand) 
(if ) 
(iii) 
improvements in productivity and structure of agriculture 
rationalisation of distribution of farm products and farm 
requisites 
(iv) improved rural welfare and training of farm operators 
(v) price stabilisation and income support 
(vi) control of imports where these threaten domestic prices and 
production. 
Although there is some flexibility in interpreting the provisions of the 
Law, it has provided effective guidelines to policy makers since 1961 and has 
limited their freedom to adjust to changing circumstances. It is perhaps 
significant that the Japanese press in recent months has on several occasions 
published hints that the Law is currently under review.4 Further, in the 
light of surpluses of rice and some other commodities, the basis for agricultural 
policies is being reviewed within the l~YF. However, there is considerable 
doubt that any basically new guidelines will emerge, as both bureaucrats 
3 In addition, there was other more specialised legislation such as the 
Manufacturing Milk Producers l Deficiency Payments Law, 1965. The general 
effect of the legislation is to place severe limits on the Governmentls 
freedom of Bction relating to a~riculture. 
4 See, for example, Japan Economic Journal, October 10, 1978. !!Agriculture 
Ministry sees urgency to revamp farming!!. 
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and politicians would prefer to continue using the current Law, making full 
use of the flexibility with which its provisions can be interpreted, rather 
than face a possible repetition of the political battles associated with the 
passage of the 1961 Law. 
Two further interesting provisions of the Law are those which require 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). 
(i) to prepare long-term projections relating to the demand 
and supply of farm products. 
(ii) to submit an annual report to the Diet (Japanese Parliament) 
on the farm situation and measures taken or to be taken in 
relation thereto (including measures to achieve supply 
projections). 
In recent years, the supply projections have assumed the nature of 
production targets, and various special incentives have been introduced to 
5 
encourage farmers to meet these targets. In addition, prices of a number' 
of commodities have been supported in various ways and to differing degrees 
by government measures which have the twin objectives of stabilising consumer 
prices at a "reasonable" level and enabling an average farmer to recover his 
production costs plus a reward for his labour equivalent to that earned by 
industrial workers (the so-called cost and income compensation approach). 
Given the problems and reactions outlined above, the political strength 
of the farm sector ensured the passing of the legislation already mentioned 
and the adoption of policy aims to which all or most political parties subscribed. 
These general aims, which are clearly reflected in policies currently pursued 
or proposed, include ( in addition to or in elaboration of what is included 
in the Agricultural Basic Law). 
(i) maintenance of, and where possible, increase in farm output 
(ii) opportunities for farm people to earn incomes comparable with 
5 These projections and targets are discussed in E.A. Saxon: Japanese Long-Term 
Projections Relating to Food and Agriculture, BAE Occasional Paper No . .38, 
1976. Price and other incentives relative to dairying are dealt with later in 
this paper. 
(iii ) 
(iv) 
(v) 
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those of non-farm people. 
some improvement, but no radical change in farm structure 
preservRtion of family farms and individual ownership 
preservation and improvement of the rural environment and 
rural welfare 
These aims leave aside the question of increased self-sufficiency about 
which there are great differences of opinion, although at present the most 
influential groups, including the Federation of Economic Organisations 
(Keidanren), appear in favour of same, despite the acknowledged cost. The self-
sufficiency aim provides an ideological justification for protectionist 
policies by blurring the distinction between the "national interest" of food 
security and the objective of protecting farmers. Self-sufficiency as a 
policy aim will be referred to again later in this paper. 
Thus law, custom and the need to ensure that farmers are not disadvantaged 
by economic change have combined to subject Japanese agriculture to a large 
measure of government intervention and administrative control. As in other 
countries the electoral prospects of a democratically elected government 
would be seriously reduced if it failed to deal adequately with the needs of the 
farm sector. 
6. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BODIES ACTIVE IN 
POLICY FORMULATION 
The preceeding sections have discussed some aspects of the Japanese 
farm situation, rural problems, and the policy goals which have been set in 
response to those problems. While the policy goals themselves are accepted 
without question by most Japanese and certainly are not amenable to pressures 
for change from outside, there have been some differences of opinion among 
Japanese as to the most appropriate means of achieving them. 
This section will look at the political and institutional environment 
surrounding the Japanese farm sector in general and the dairy industry in 
particular. tracing the way in which different authorities and interest groups 
88. 
interact in formulating measures designed to achieve agreed aims. 
In the period since the end of World War II, policy decisions have 
generally been made within the framework of a triangular relationship between 
farmers' groups, the bureaucracy and the politicians. It therefore appears 
appropriate to consider each of these in turn, bearing in mind that the roles 
played by the bureaucracy and Diet members bverlap toa considerable extent. 
a. Farmers' groups 
By far the most influential rural interest groups are the agricultural 
co-operatives. These are closely integrated through their national apex bodies 
and can for most purposes be con.sidered as one powerful organisation, the Japanese 
name of which is abbreviated to nokyo. Practically every farm family is a member 
of at least one co-operative. Total membership is about 7.7 million, including 
1.9 million associate members. Farm households number 4.8 million. 
The nokyo organisation is arranged in three tiers - the local (or unit) 
co-operatives (tankyo), prefectural federations and national bodies. In 
addition, co-operatives are classified into two groups according to function -
general or multi-purpose and specialist. 
The general co-operatives have a wide range of functions, e.g. buying, 
selling, finance, insurance, processing These cater for producers of farm 
products in general. The specialist co-operatives cater for the requirements 
of those producing specific commodities (e.g. milk, poultry) and those with 
some other common interest (e.g. settlers' co-operatives). They provide 
specialised technical, advisory and marketing services, but not credit and 
insurance. Many farmers join both a general and a specialist co-operative to 
take advantage of a wider range of services. 
The number of co-operatives expanded rapidly after the war, rising to 
a maximum of over 35 000 in the mid-1950s. Amalgamation and rationalisation 
have since reduced the number to just over 10 000. The specialist co-operatives 
make up rather more than half the total number, but in terms of employment 
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and business activities the general co-operatives are by far the most 
important. 
In addition to the business functions mentioned above, the l:okyo 
organisation provides a mechanism whereby farmers can focus their economic 
and political power in areas where they are likely to have the greatest 
impact on national policies. This mechanism is found in the central 
national bodies which are in fact federations of prefectural bodies and 
hence encompass local co-operatives also. The apex body is the National 
Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (abbreviated to Zenchu in 
Japanese). Zenchu provides leadership organisation and serves as the central 
guiding body for all agriculturql co-operatives which it represents in 
negotiations with the Governm~nt on national policy matters of concern to 
farmers. 
The National Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Associations 
(abbreviation; Zenno or Zen-noh) is the big business organisation of the 
co-operatives. The main functions of Zen-noh (and its component co-operatives) 
are marketing of farm products and provision of farm requisites. Other 
activities include overseas trading, research and extension, supply of living 
necessities (including housing) and processing of farm products. 
Zen-noh is one of the largest trading organisations in Japan and is able 
to extend to farm people substantial economies of scale, providing highly 
organised collection and distribution channels and supplying through import, 
local purchase and manufacture, a wide range of goods for farm production and 
family living at highly competitive prices. For instance, it imports, processes 
and distributes some 60% of feed supplies (by far the major purchased input of 
Japanese farms) and operates eight special bulk carriers to import raw 
materials. 
Other national co-operative bodies which provide services to farmers in 
general include Zenkyoren, the central insurance body which is the largest 
insurance group in Japan, and the Central Bank of Agriculture and Forestry 
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(Norin Chukin) which is one of Japan's largest banks. 
While all these bodies provide services to dairy farmers, there are also 
some smaller organisations under the no kyo umbrella which are specifically 
designed for livestock producers in general or dairy farmers in particular. 
These include the National Federation of Dairy Co-operatives (Zenrakuren), 
the National Dairy Association, the Central Livestock Association and the 
National Federation of Livestock Co-operatives (Zenchikuren). 
The principal specialist organisation for dairymen at the national level 
is Zenrakuren which is a marketing, purchasing and guidance organisation. Its 
activities include sale of fluid milk, manufacture and sale of dairy products 
and supply of feedstuffs to farmers. It also is involved in political lobbying 
on dairy issues. 
The National Dairy Association is not a political organisation. It 
provided technical guidance to farmers in collaboration with Zenrakuren. 
The Central Livestock Association comprises Diet members and represent-
atives of producer organisation. It provides a channel whereby producers 
can petition Diet members on livestock policy issues. 
Dairy farmers' interests are also promoted by several bodies which are 
strictly outside the nokyo organisation, although they preserve connections 
with it. These include the Central Dairy Council, the Japan Dairy Farmers' 
Political League and the Central Livestock Association. 
The Central Dairy Council (Japanese abbreviation: Churaku) is made up of 
respresentatives of six central nokyo bodies and 46 regional federations. The 
Council has a legal entity and is able to undertake commercial activities. The 
'designated groups' which comprise its members handle more than 92% of all 
milk sales. It is recognised as a nokyo-connected body, and many of its 
personnel also hold office in the nokyo organisation. 
Activities of the Council include price negotiations for drinking milk, 
co-operation with Zenchu and other groups in pressing for higher prices for 
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manufacturing milk, measures to balance regional supply and demand, beef price 
stabilisation (as it affects producers of dairy beef) and promotion of demand 
for milk. 
The Japan Dairy Farmers' Political League is the only nokyo-related 
body to include a reference to its political nature in its title. Most of its 
members are farm people who also belong to local specialist dairy co-operatives 
which are members of Zenrakuren. The League endorses candidates in national 
elections and acts as a political arm for these specialist co-operatives. 
The Central Livestock Association is also an important political 
pressure group. Its membership includes all prefectural livestock associations 
as well as Diet members, some of whom have in the past been chairmen of the 
prefectural bodies and/or the Central Association. It is therefore able to 
maintain close links between the Government and producer organisations, and to 
petition Diet members on livestock policy issues. An important function of the 
prefectural livestock associations is the provision of extension services. 
These services are heavily subsidised by both the MAFF and prefectural 
governments. 
Zenchikuren is important in that it concentrates on issues relating to 
production and marketing of meat, but. it is of less relevance to dairying. 
h. Bureaucracy and Government 
While the political forces facing farmers may be thought of simply as 
'the Government', it is necessary to distinguish the Diet which is nominally 
responsible for final political decisions and the bureaucracy which is required 
to implement these decisions. However, there is considerable interaction between 
politicians and bureaucrats before policy decisions are reached, while both are 
subject to pressures from the farmers' groups already mentioned. 
To the dairy farmer, the bureaucracy means primarily the }finistry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), which has a separate }filk and 
Dairy Products Division within its Livestock Industry Bureau. In some instances, 
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other ministries such as Finance, International Trade and Industry or the 
Prime Minister's Office may be relevant. In addition, there are extra-
departmental bodies, especially the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation 
(LIPC), which is responsible for administration and which also provides 
information and makes recommendations. 
The various ministries exercise considerably more power in Japan than 
in Australia or New Zealand, especially in the wide-spread application of the 
administrative guidance system under which industry leaders are advised and 
encouraged to pursue courses of action which are in accordance with government 
policy objectives. Although different ministries may not initially agree on 
an issue, proposals are discussed and amended until a consensus emerges. In 
this way, importaht decisions may be made by bureaucrats rather than legislators. 
Further, the interpretation and administration of government decisions are in 
the hands of the appropriate ministries, hence pressure groups put their cases 
to bureaucrats as well as to those involved directly in the legislative processes. 
The LIPC was created in 1961 to administer a price stabilisation scheme, 
but its functions have since been extended. More than 90% of its capital funds 
were provided by the government, but there is some private investment. For 
example, a milk processor wishing to take advantage of its guaranteed provisions 
must invest in it. The directors comprise mainly former officials of the MAFF 
together with representatives of the co-operatives, milk processors and other 
livestock interests. The structure of the LIPC is such that livestock interests 
have a further avenue which facilitates access to centres where policy measures 
are formulated. 
Functions of the LIPC include: 
( i ) 
(ii ) 
(iii ) 
purchase, sale and storage of designated milk products and meat 
import of designated milk products 
payment of government subsidy (deficiency payment) to farmers 
for manufacturing milk 
(iv) payment of government subsidy on milk for the school lunch 
programme 
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( v ) promotion of demand for Ii vesto\!k products 
The governing political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is 
scarcely an independent force in the government-farmer relationship. Many 
former MAFF officials have secured seats in the Diet as LDP members, while 
other Diet members, both LDP and opposition parties, owe their election to 
the support of the co-operatives and th~ farmers. 
It has been estimated by independent research workers that at least 
three-quarters of LDP Diet members come from rural electorates, and that the 
proportion of all members which nokyo can rely on for support in the Diet is 
6 as high as 40%. At the same time it is well known that the number of 
voters enrolled in rural electorates is often much smaller than in urban 
electorates. Thus rural voters have a say in government proportionally 
greater than their numbers, as they do in many other countries. 
7. INTERACTION OF BODIES IN POLICY FOIDIDLATION 
Linking the bureaucrats, politicians and farmers' groups are several 
important consultative bodies and committies. Some are formally set up by 
the Diet, others are quite informal. As some detailed studies of the 
composition and operation of these committies have been undertaken by other 
research workers7 , this paper will limit itself to a brief listing of 
the more important. 
The body most directly involved in policy making is the Agriculture 
and Forestry Division (Norin Bukai) of the Policy Affairs Research Council 
of the LDP which has a sub~committee on livestock prices chaired by a 
livestock Dietman. It has between 150 and 200 members representing rural 
or semi-'rural electorates, most of whom hold joint membership of this and 
of the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (Sogo Nosei 
6 Aurel.iaGeorge:The Japanese Beef Import Controversy, N. Z. International 
Review, March-April 1978. 
7 Ibid. 
Aurelia George: Nokyo as a Pressure Group - The Strategies of Influence. 
Paper presented to a Seminar of the Committee for Japanese Studies, ANU, 
Canberra, October 1975. 
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Chosakai) which is concerned with the broader problems of agriculture, 
particularly rice. The leaders of these LDP agricultural committees are the 
most influential men in the party on matters of agricultural policy.8 
Among the other bodies, the following are relevant to the dairy industry: 
a. The Livestock Industry Promotion Council (Chikusan Shinko 
Shingikai). This is distinct from the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation 
(LIPC) discussed earlier. It is one of 15 advisory councils associated with 
the MAFF. It has up to 25 part-time members representing major producer and 
manufacturing groups, unions, consumers, journalists and academics. 9 Its 
business is normally handled by sub-councils or sub-committies, one of which is 
concerned with dairying. The M[nister refers questions relating to livestock 
to this Council, and these are discussed by the relevant sub-committee and 
MAFF officials. A final recommendation to the M[nister is made by the full 
Council. The Council provides a focus for discussion of matters such as the 
guaranteed price for manufacturing milk.10 
b. The Agricultural Policy Research Committee. This consists of top 
nokyo officials together with over 90 Dietm~mbers, two-thirds of whom are from 
the LDP and the remainder from opposition parties. The Diet members in turn are 
mainly former officialS of the MAFF or the·co-operatives. 
c. The Agricultural Policy Council (Nosei Shingikai). This 
Council was established by the Agricultural Basic Law. It is an advisory body 
within the Prime Ministers' Office which is required to report to cabinet 
members on policy matters referred to it. It has up to 15 members appointed by 
the Prime Jvlinister from among limen of learning and experience II in relation 
to the policy issues in question. 
8. For further details of personalities involved in livestock policy formulation 
s~e Aurelia George: The Japanese Beef Import Controversy.op. cit. 
9. This appears to be the only formal recognition of consumer interests in farm 
price formulation. The influence of consumer representation is minimal. 
10. For further details see John W. Longworth: Institutions and·P6liCies Influencing 
Japanese Beef Imports, University of Queensland, June 1976. 
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d. Nokyo committees, especially the Livestock and Dairy Policy 
CentTal Headauarters Committee which is a central policy-making body of 
Zenchu and which decides on demands relating to livestock products to be 
presented to the Government. 
e. The Diet Standing Committees on Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries. It is not uncommon for former }~F officials to serve on these 
committees. 
f. Informal groupings of Diet members, e.g. "rice Dietmen", 
"livestock Dietmen" (chikusan giin). This latter group devotes its 
energies to issues affecting livestock industries. There are sub-groups 
specially interested in beef, dairying, etc. 
The activities of these committees and groups are too complex to 
examine in any detail here, although some further reference will be made 
when dealing with the mechanics of price determination. Other workers have 
examined these at greater length. ll What has been said shows how strong 
pressure can be applied at many sensitive points at the same time by a highly 
organised farm lobby. 
8. DAIRY POLICIES AND THEIR DETERlvITNATION 
Having considered the institutional and political framework within 
which policy decisions are made, it seems appropriate to consider in more 
detail the major policy measures which apply specifically to milk and dairy 
products and the mechanism of price determination. 
a. General Dairy Policy 
In view of the rapid expansion of demand for milk and dairy products 
in the 1950s and 1960s (see Section 2), the gover.nment encouraged milk 
production by various means as part of its policy of 'selective expansion'. 
Research and extension were used to upgrade herd quality, investment was 
subsidised and a wide range of advice and assistance was made available to 
farmers through the co-operatives and through government financed extension 
11 See Aurelia George, John W. Longworth, op.cit. 
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services (mainly prefectural). As a further spur to production, returns 
to farmers for milk were maintained at levels far above those in the world's 
leading dairy countries. 
The official MAFF policy has been to raise Japan's self-sufficiency in 
dairy products as well as in many other foodstuffs, despite the fact that dairy 
production depends to an important degree on imported feed. Therefore increases 
in dairy self-sufficiency should be discounted to the extent that they are due 
to greater feed imports. This implies that for exporting countries as a whole, 
incremental exports of dairy products and dairy feedstuffs to Japan will tend 
to vary inversely. 
b. Price Policies 
(i) Drinking Milk 
Fresh milk for direct consumption enjoys natural protection, and the 
Government does not intervene in price determination, although in 1975 the 
Nokyo Livestock and Dairy Central Headquarters unsuccessfully included a 
deficiency payment system for drinking milk among its demands on the Government. 
The price is decided in negotiations between the producers' representatives and 
the major milk bottling, packaging and distributing complexes. The producers' 
case is argued by the Central Dairy Council in collaboration with Zenchu and the 
National Designated Groups 1lilk Price Policy Cornrni.ttee. 
Returns to farmers for bottled milk in 1977 (including costs of bottling) 
were around ¥160 per litre and the retail price ¥260 This is two to three 
times the corresponding prices in Australia and some four times the New Zealand 
price (excluding subsidy). Consumption per person has continued to increase but 
appears likely to stabilise soon, given these prices, at a level much below 
that in other countries of comparable income. 
( ii ) Milk for manufacture 
Japanese milk production costs are among the world's highest, and the 
Government is required by the provisions of the Agricultural Basic Law to protect 
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producers if threatened by imports. Legal and other widely accepted policy 
provisions require the Government to enable producers to obtain a return for 
their milk which covers, on average, their cash costs plus an agreed reward 
for their labour, capital and land. If the manufacturers who buy the milk had 
to pay prices based on these costs, they could sell their products profitably 
only at prices very much above the c.i.f. prices of comparable imports. In 
this situation, the Government meets its obligations to protect producers in 
several ways: 
(a) It guarantees farmers a price for raw milk which is related to 
average production costs. This price is somewhat lower than 
the average price received by farmers for drinking milk. 
(See Table 1). 
(b) It provides a subsidy or deficiency payment to enable 
manufacturers to purchase raw milk at a price currently 
equivalent to about ten cents a litre below the price 
received by the farmer. Despite this subsidy, wholesale 
prices for dairy products in Japan are from about 1.5 to 
three times the corresponding c.i.f. prices. 
(c) It imposes customs duties and quotas on imports of dairy 
products (see later). 
The subsidy was introduced in 1965 by the :Manufacturing Milk Deficiency 
Payment Law, and the amount of subsidy since has been progressively increased. 
This Law is administered by the LIPC which buys milk up to the'maximum quantity' 
each year at the guaranteed price and resells to manufacturers at a 'standard 
selling price' (kijun torihiki kakaku). 
The maximum quantity upon which the guaranteed price is payable is 
determined each year during the price negotiations. In practice the quantity 
of milk sold to the LIPC has rarely exceeded this quantity and then only 
marginally. A much lower price is payable on excess milk. Some relevant data 
Table 1 
IvITLK AND DAIRY PRODUCTS PJUCES, COSTS AND SUBSIDIES JAPAN 
Cost of Production 
(raw milk) (a) 
Return to Producer: 
Milk for Drinking (b) 
Milk for Manufacture 
Guaranteed producer price 
Standard Selling price 
Deficiency Payment 
Stabilisation Indicative Prices 
Butter (kg) 
Skim Milk Powder (25 kg) 
Sweetened condensed whole milk 
(24.5 kg) 
Sweetened connensed skim milk 
( 25 . 5 kg) 
Maximum quantity (e) 
Total deficiency payments 
Unit 
Yen/Kg 
Yen/Kg 
Yen/kg 
11 
II 
Yen 
II 
II 
II 
1966 
35.7 
44.0 
37.03 
31.81 
5022 
573 
8458 
4677 
4204 
Tormes 993 
Billion Yen 3.85 
1970 
40.6 
53.6 
43.73 
37.10 
6063 
647 
9711 
5292 
4756 
1455 
9.49 
1973 
41.0 
82.1 
48.51 
40.49 
8.02 
698 
9711 
5521 
4756 
1501 
to.69 
1974 
55.3 
98.1 
70.02 
53.41 
16.61 
914 
11540 
7730 
6600 
1380 
22.16 
1975 
71.2 
103.1 
80.29 
57.57 
22.72 
999 
11540 
8018 
6600 
1380 
30.25 
1976 1977 1978 
82.3 85.8 
112.5 112.5 
84.41(c) 88.87(d) 88.87 
62.34 64.29 64.29 
24.07 24.58 24.58 
1160 
12660 
9463 
8437 
1380 
33.22 
1253 
12660 
8620 
7610 
1580 
38.06 
1253 
12530 
8620 
7610 
1830 
44.06(f) 
(a) Assessed armually from a sample of about 1000 farms. Includes imputed cost of labour, rent and interest on capital. 
(b) Kanto area only. (c) Increased to 87041 by addition of quality incentive of 1.00. (d) Increased to 90.62 
by addition of quality incentive of 1.75. (e) The maximum quantity on which guaranteed price is payable. The 
actual quantity on which subsidy has been paid has generally been below this figure. (f) Preliminary estimate. 
Sources: MAFF: Poketto Norinsuisan Tokei; Nogyo Hakusho; Rakuno Kankei Shiryo 
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are given in Tables 1 and 2. 
(iii) Dairy products 
The Minister of Agric11lture, Forestry and Fisheries is required to 
determine each year a "stabilisation indicative price tr (antei shihyo kakaku,) 
for "desi~nated milk products" (shitei nyuseihin).l2 These prices are 
designed to be "reasonable" for consumers13 and to ensure that manufacturers 
can pay the standard selling price to the LIPe (and hence the guaranteed price 
can be paid to producers). If the price for anyone of these products appears 
likely to fall below 90% of the stabilisation indicative price (s.i.p.) the 
LIPe is required to purchase at 90% of this price. If the price appears likely 
to exceed 104% of the s.i.p., the LIPe is required to sell sufficient stocks 
to keep the price below this level. Where stocks are inadequate, the LIPe, 
which has a monopoly over the import of designated milk products14 calls 
tenders for imports. Although imports of dairy products are subject to quota 
restrictions, no actual quota is announced15 so that importers or potential 
exporters cannot plan in advance. 
Even if one ~ccepts that in the Japanese situation this method of price 
stabilisation is reasonable in principle, the way it works in practice can 
pose problems for overseas suppliers.. Owing to the perishable nature of milk 
12 For the purpose of the s.i.p. these comprise butter, skim milk powder, 
sweetened condensed whole milk and sweetened condensed skim milk. 
13 The deficiency payment system has enabled dairy products to be sold at 
prices lower than would have otherwise been possible, given existing 
legislation. Increased productivity and efficiency on farms and in 
factories have also contributed to a restraint in price increases, so 
that prices of the principal dairy products, although still much higher 
than in most other developed countries, fell appreciably in the 1960s in 
relation to Japanese food prices in general. (See Table 3). Despite 
these price trends, consumption per person of milk products except 
cheese and skim milk powder has declined duri~g the 1970s, consumption 
per person of all milk products in terms of whole milk increasing only 
slowly. 
14 For the purpose of imports, whole milk powder, butter milk powder and 
whey powder are included, but skim milk powder for stock feed and for 
the school lunch programme is excluded. It should be noted that cheese 
and casein are not designated milk products and therefore are not 
controlled by the LIPe. 
15 See K. Geard: Japanese Imports : The Dairy System : NZ International 
Review, Jan-Feb 1978. 
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Table 2 
PRICES FOR :MILK FOR MANUFACTURE 
Fiscal Years 
1974 1975 1976 
Price demanded by Nokyo 88.43 102.93 105.86 
Government calculated 
price 67.57 77.38 85.17 
Political addition 2 .45( a) 2.91 1.?Lr 
Guaranteed producer price 70.02 80.29 86~4l 
Quality incentive 1.00 
Total producer price 70.02 80.29 87.41 
Deduct: deficiency payment 16.61 22.72 24.07 
quality incentive 1.00 
Standard selling price 53.41 57.57 62.34 
Assessed cost of 
production 55.28 71.16 82.34 
(a) Described as being for "collection and despatch". (b) Payment 
for above-quota milk to be 25.07 yen per kg, including 1.00 yen 
quality incentive. 
Source: Zenchu: Nokyo Nenkan (various issues). 
1977 
106.11 
88.37 
0.50 
88.87 
1. 75 
90.62(b) 
24.58 
1. 75 
64.29 
85.80 
101. 
products~ the LIPC is reluctant to hold large stocks and rarely has more than 
a few weeks' supplies. A shortfall in-local production or a surge in demand 
can therefore rapidly erode .stocks and cause prices to approach or exceed 104% 
of the s.i.p. well before the LIPC can hope to land imported supplies under its 
cumbersome and time-consuming procedures. Thus consumers can be denied supplies 
and exporters can be denied access to markets which exist despite the official 
Japanese policy of stabilising prices well above import parity. 
c. Non-price Incentives 
VJhile the price paid to producers is the principal incentive to expand output, 
the Government also uses several other kinds of incentives to achieve "selected 
expansion" of products for which demand has been rising. These inc1ude investment 
subsidies and other measures to reduce production costs, incentive payments to 
raise herd quality,expapsion of area of fodder crops, training of farm operators, 
general research and extension, and encouragement of .joint farming arrangements 
(eino danchi) and other measures to enlarge the scale of management. These 
arrangements are usually operated by local co-operatives with government subsidies. 
d. Import Policies 
It has already been noted that Japan uses strict controls on imports as one 
means of supporting prices to milk producers. In effect, imports are only 
permi tted ,'as a means of preventing "undesirable" price rises ,... i.e. above the 
alread~ very high prices by world. standards which the Japanese seem to accept as 
16 
"normal". 
The LIPC is the so],e importer of qairy products except cheese, casein, skim 
~lk for the schoollilllC;h programme, skim mi·lk for feeding purposes and some very 
minor products. Cheese has recently accounted for more than 40% of value of all 
imports of dairy products, while if casein and skim milk powder for feed and 
s·chool lunches are added, around 70% of dairy imports are not handled by LIPC .. 
16 There is general agreement that these import controls and price measures 
are essential in terms of the Agricultural Basic Law and other policy 
principles to which the Government is committed. 
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In addition to import quotas, most milk products are subject to customs 
tariffs, and natural cheese is su~ect to mixing regulations. A consolidated 
list of meaSures applied to imports is given in the Appendix. 
e. Mechanics of Price Determination 
All authorities and interest groups agree in principle that prices to 
producers should be based on the production cost and income compensation 
approach, although there is some flexibility in determining what is to be 
included and how costs etc. are to be defined. Any major differences that 
arisEF relate not to principlEFs but to how they should be applied in determining 
pric~s for various categories of milk and milk products. 
Relevant cost information is collected by the MAFF as part of its annual 
farm c survey of a sample of nearly 1000 dairy farms .17 This information 
is used to assess dairy costs per farm, per tan (O.lha) and per 100 kg of 
milk. Since the survey results become available only some time after the end 
of the period to which they refer, the l~F prepares preliminary estimates for 
the purpose of each year's price negotiations. In recent years these estimates 
have exceeded the costs subsequently derived from survey data. At the same time, 
h0kyo does its own calculations which not surprisingly have consistently 
produced a "demanded" price higher than that calculated by the MAFF. 
Negotiations relating to all government-administered prices (i.e. for milk 
for manufacture and for designated milk products) take place in March each year 
and the new prices operate as from April. 
The prices which nokyo demands are worked out within Zenchu by representatives 
of the various nokyo-related bodies such as its Livestock and Dairy Policy Central 
Headquarters Committee, the Central Dairy Council and Zenrakuren. These price 
demands are then presented to the headquarters of each political party, to members 
of both houses and to the relevant 1MFF officials. Meetings are then arranged of 
all political parties. 
17 The size of the sample has been falling in line with the number of dairy 
farms. 
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A week or two later, a large convention of representatives of the 
various co~operative organisations is called, and the Zenchu demands are 
presented for formal ratification. 
Concurrently, the }~F prepares its preliminary price calculations 
which are submitted to the Livestock Industry Promotion Council for consider-
ation by its dairy sub-committee. Officials of ~F and the Minister 
attend the meeting of this sub-committee where the price calculations are 
discussed. The Council can express views, but cannot alter the calculations. 
A third series of concurrent meetings takes place within the LDP 
Agriculture and Forestry Division's sub-committee on livestock prices. This 
committee may make its own recommendations. 
The final decisive negotiations take place between the 1linister, ~F 
officials and leaders of the LDP Agriculture and Forestry Division, particularly 
its dairy ,sub-committee; 
In several recent years the guaranteed price for manufacturing milk 
finally accepted has been a little above that based on the MAFF preliminary 
calculations. This additional amount has come to be known as the "political 
addition" (seiji kasan). For presentational purposes, no kyo has sought to 
attach a reasonably sounding label to this addition (e.g. "collection and 
despatch"). More recently it has also negotiated an addition to the 
guaranteed price itself, referred to in the Nokyo Annual Report as a 
"quali. ty incentive". This enables l.ffi.FF, for a given standard selling price 
and a given actual price to the producer, to record a lower deficiency payment. 
The deficiency payment appears in the ~F budget under the heading "Price, 
Marketing and Income Measures", while incentives to increase output, quality 
etc. appear under the heading "Production Measures", and are hence politically 
more acceptable than a subsidy. Table 2 shows how these elements are reflected 
in the total price received by farmers. 
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The standard indica,tive'prices for designated. milk products are linked 
to the standard.· selling price for milk (which is in turn linked to the 
guaranteed price through the deficiency payment and quality incentive as 
indicated above) and are determined at the same time. Details are given in 
Table 1. 
The nokyo demands usua,lly include elements other than price, and these 
are dealt with in the same series of negotiations. These include demands for 
raising or removing the quantity limit on the guaranteed price, feed price 
stabilisation, increased school lunch milk subsidy, import restrictions and 
targets for greater self-sufficiency. 
It is worth noting that the guaranteed price for manufacturing milk has 
not been increased in 1978, while producer prices for some milk products have 
been reduced'since 1976 despite increases in prices of most inputs. The full 
storY"behirrd this price freeze is not yet clear, but ,it seems to be related to 
declines in consumption which policy makers feel could be linked with past price 
increases and also related to pressure on producers to share some of the fruits 
of increased productivity with consumers. A further possible reason is the 
build-up of stocks of butter and skim milk powder which has arisen this year, 
suggesting that no further production increases are desirable for the time 
being, despite the general policy of selective expansion. 
9. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPORTS FROM OCEANIA 
a. Summary of the Current Situation 
Having looked briefly at the Japanese dairy industry and the political 
enVlronment in which it operates, it seems fair to ask "what does all this mean 
for us?" 
Sefore attempting to answer this question, it seems ~ppropriate to 
summarise some of what has already been said and perhaJ?s introduce a few 
additional points relevant to thlS question. 
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Some key facts in the political and economic environment are: 
(i) All political parties are committed to the support of 
agriculture and to the concept of income parity. Commit-
ment to means of achieving this aim is not so absolute. 
( ii ) Means used at present are principally high domestic prices 
and subsidies, reinforced by import controls. 
(iii ) There is a widespread national concern about food security 
not limited to the governing party. Greater self-sufficiency 
in food is a widely accepted goal. In general, the nation 
has been induced to accept dear food as the price it must pay 
for this security. 
(iv) The budget cost of farm price supports is high and there is 
strong pressure to reduce this cost. The only way this can be 
done within the constraints of the income objective is to reduce 
farm costs and/or increase product prices. 
The power of the farm lobby as exercised through Dietman from rural 
electorates and through the tremendously powerful nokyo organisation cannot be 
overemphasised,. In this situation, pressures from countries such as Australia 
and New Zealand for greater access to the Japanese market are likely to be 
successful only when Japanese producers and bodies concerned with producer 
interests can be convinced that such access will not adversely affect their 
returns. 
Recent experience suggests that "resource diplomacy" is likely to achieve 
a significant increase in access to Japanese markets only where no legislative 
changes are involved. An example is the import of dairy products for re-export 
as foreign aid. The power of the farm lobby was demonstrated early this year in 
the vociferous opposition to u.S. demands (voiced by Robert Strauss) for greater 
access for beef and oranges. Some concessions were made, for example, a small 
share of the high quality beef market and an increase of 27,000 tonnes in the 
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fresh orange import quota. However, the impact of these on Japanese farmers 
would be very minor. 
A study of trade statistics suggests that no individual country has 
been able to gain any substantially greater access to the Japanese market 
for farm products in'exchange for concessions in other areas. Whatever has 
been gained has been very smallrelati vee totcita:1 trade although any 
Japanese concessions have been regarded as moral or political victories by 
their trading partners. 
The relatively weak bargaining power'of'individual countries could 
theoretically be strengthened if several countries combined to present a 
united front. However, even if by so doing they could induce the Japanese 
Government to introduce new farm legislation more favourable to their interest 
as exporters of farm products, there ,is a possibility that the Government 
would'be defeated in the Diet, and a new government would be elected on 
promises of more support for farmers, and/or greater self-sufficiency. Such 
an outcome would certainly not be in the interests of exporting countries who 
could perhaps lose markets they now take for granted. 
b. Possibilities within the Present Leg!islative Framework 
Given the existing political and legal restraints, the 'room for 
manoeuvre is limited but some possibilities do exist. 
As mentioned earlier, Geard pointed to some of these.18 Even 
within the existing control system, more dairy products and meat could enter 
Japan if the LIFe used less restraint in calling tenders for imports when 
pr::i.ces were tending to rfse. The fact that the Japanese market for natural 
cheese, which is not controlled by LIPC, is much 'more readily accessible to 
exporters supports this view. 
18 K. Geard Jap,anese Imports The Dairy System, op. cit. 
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The present LIPC control system permits imports of designated dairy 
products only if demand exceeds supply at the administered prices. Thus 
imports are unpredictable and tend to yarlf widely. At present, imports 
provide a cushion between supply and demand. If the system were modified to 
the extent of announcing regular import quotas, this role would have to be 
g'iven to Btocks. Theoretically, sto'cks would ·provide a good (mshioH Gut. 
since storage facilities are limited, any regular quotas announced would 
take this into account and tend to be conservative, thus conferring little 
if any benefit on exporters. The Japanese would probably agree to 
transferring the equalising role from imports to stocks only if exporters 
carried the related costs, in which case some additional quantities would 
probably be imported but the extra revenue earned might be insufficient to 
cover the costs. 
The most likely prospect for increased exports of dairy products to 
Japan under existing arrangements is as a result of a further widening of the 
gap between demand and domestic production. This is essentially a long-term 
prospect. 
Demand for food in aggregate is likely to continue to grow, but at a 
rate much lower than in the past two decades. 19 Further changes in 
dietary patterns are also likely, with the result that consumption of some 
foods will increase at the expense of others. 
Growth prospects for livestock products generally appear better than 
average, but growth in consumption of some dairy products has recently been 
very slow or even negative despite increases in incomes and falls in relative 
prices. (See Table J). In the case of butter, consumption has declined, no 
doubt partly on account of the availability of margarine at a considerably 
lower price. Nevertheless consumption per person of all dairy products in 
terms of whole milk has continued to rise slowly except in 1974. Official 
projections. 8:SSWlle some acceleration in this trend, but the reeent slow-down 
in growth of milk usage casts doubts on these projections. 
19 See E.A. Saxon: Recent Developments in Food Consumption and Farm Production 
in Japan, op.cit. pp2J-JO. 
Calendar 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Source: 
108. 
Table 3 
RELATIVE MOVEMENTS IN AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES 
OF DAIRY PRODUCTS AND MARGARINE : JAPAN 
Fluid Powdered Cheese Butter Margarine Milk lvlilk 
a. Index Numbers 1975 = 100 
72 94 n.a. 90 n.a. 
100 100 100 '100 100 
124 106 97 100 127 
144 113 99 105 135 
144 116 106 110 142 
159 123 113 116 145 
193 153 136 133 190 
207 174 151 160 239 
218 185 154 177 223 
221 190 155 182 210 
b. Index Numbers divided by C.P.I. 
97 127 n.a. 122 n.a. 
100 100 100 100 100 
96 82 75 77 98 
104 82 71 76 98 
99 80 73 76 98 
98 76 70 72 90 
96 76 68 66 95 
92 77 67 71 106 
88 75 63 72 90 
83 71 58 68 79 
Derived from Bureau of Statistics Annual Report on the Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey. 
C.P.I. 
74 
100 
130 
138 
145 
162 
201 
225 
24'1 
266 
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The last published ~!AFFproduction targets call for a rather quickly 
rising trend in output sufficient to raise the self-sufficiency ratio from 
83% in 1974 to 94% in 1985. 20 Actual self-sufficiency ratios since 1960 
are shown in Table 4. Hemmi dismisses these targest as unrealistic although 
d . t" 21 he does not query the deman proJec lons. A study by the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics reaches a similar conclusion relating to 
22 
the production targets while some other Japanese also regard the targets 
t · . t" 23 as op lmlS lC. Hemmi's production projections indicated a fall in milk 
output, leading to substantially increased imports. In view of recent upward 
trends in output, such a fall seems unlikely. Also, if the demand projections 
prove to be too high, the scope for imports will fall even further below Hemmi's 
figures. It is felt that import requirements in 1985 may exceed those in the 
~F projections, but by a margin very much smaller than suggested by Hemmi. 
An external avenue of approach which could increase the revenue of 
exporters even if not the quantity exported is the negotiation of a minimum 
price agreement through the multilateral trade negotiations. Such an 
agreement would not involve legislative change in Japan and would probably 
not be opposed officially. 
c. Possibilities Involvi4g Legislative Changes 
While there seems to be little prospect of changes in farm legislation 
being forced upon Japan by outside pressures, this does not mean that legislation 
could not be amended in response to internal pressures. There are already 
20 E.A. Saxon: Japanese Long-term Projections Relating to Food and Agriculture, 
BAE Occasional Paper No. 38, 1976. 
21 Kenzo Hemmi: Japanese ~Aarket - Hope or Illusion. Paper prepared for the 
International Seminar on the Role of Australia and New Zealand in World 
Agricultural Trade held at ~ssey University in February 1978. 
22 E.A. Saxon: Japanese Long-Term Projections Relating to Food and Agriculture, 
op. cit. 
23 For other views on the optimistic nature of the production targets see: 
Ogura: The Food Problem and Agricultural Structure in Japan, Japan FAO 
Association, 1977, p22. 
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Table 4 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATIOS 
MILK AND DAIRY PRODUCTS : JAPAN 
Percentages 
All milk Milk for Skim milk Full cream 
and milk manufacture powder Cheese Butter powdered milk 
products (a) (b) (c) 
1960 89.1 76.5 24 80 92 100 
1965 85.7 69.7 31 35 92 100 
1970 89.4 77.6 82 19 100 100 
1971 88.2 75.6 86 19 85 100 
1972 86.4 71.6 76 21 80 100 
1973 83.0 64.3 87 18 67 103 
1974 83.0 63.6 72 16 79 93 
1975 81.8 60.5 69 17 72 83 
1976 84.8 66.3 91 15 83 104 
(a) Imports of dairy products included at whole milk equivalent. 
(bj For human consumption. Imports of S.M.P. for stock feed have recently 
exceeded imports for human consumption. 
(c) Other milk products show similar trends. Japan is virtually self-
sufficient, consumption and production being equalised by changes in 
stocks. 
Source: Shokuryo JukyUhyo (1976). (MAFF) 
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pressures for change, for example by consumer interests and other non-farm 
groups. However, these are still relatively weak. If exporting countries 
cannot merely wait for a larger supply deficiency to arise through the 
passage of time, the only way in which they are likely to increase access to 
any appreciable extent is through identification and collaboration with 
domestic interests. 
To identify with domestic interests is no easy task. To begin with, it 
would require a comprehensive understanding of Japanese politics and farm 
policies far in excess of that revealed by this paper. Such an understanding 
could be achieved only by a person or persons with the necessary industry 
experience stationed in Japan on a long-term basis. 
The domestic interests to be studied would include consumers, academics, 
industrialists, government ministers and farm organisations. The line of 
approach would need to contain at least three elements - (i) no reduction in 
income or other benefits accruing to farmers; (ii) no significant increase in 
budget costs, and (iii) a substantial reduction in prices to consumers. 
This may seem a tall order, but studies along these lines have already 
been initiated in Japan. For instance, the Forum for Policy Innovation, 
established in 1976, published in April 1978 "A Plan for Beef Import Liberal-
isation" (Policy Proposal No 5). The Forum consists mainly of leading 
academics, with a sprinkling of industrialists, bankers and government planners. 
The basis of its proposal is to support beef prices by deficiency payments 
financed by customs tariffs and levies and to reduce retail prices, thereby 
increasing demand and imports (and hence revenue for deficiency payments). 
The Forum claims that this alternative scheme would not involve additional cost 
to the Government in the form of price support, but it does appear that revenue 
from tariffs would be channelled to farmers rather than to the Treasury. 
Vfuile this proposal suggests a possible line of approach for dairy 
products also, it needs to be remembered that price elasticities for dairy 
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products in Japan are lower than those for beef. This could mean that the 
extra revenue derived this way from increased imports might be insufficient 
to make it a viable alternative as it stands. However, such possible 
alternatives deserve careful study in collaboration with sympathetic 
Japanese groups. The major task would be to convince the farmers' groups 
that any proposal would not be to their disadvantage, but would be t·o the 
advantage of the nation as a whole. An acceptable scheme could perhaps be 
worked out in collaboration with the nokyo organisation and with MAFF 
officials. Most Japanese farmers realise, (though they may be reluctant to 
admit it) that, despite their high output in relation to land, they cannot 
hope to feed the nation unaided. 24 Assistance from producers in other 
countries is therefore essential unless Japanese farmers are to dictate to 
the nation what it mayor may not consume and in what quantities. 
It will need something of a revolution in thinking before farmers and 
their government supporters will agree to major policy changes; yet such a 
revolution is not impossible. Some domestic interests are already moving in 
that direction, and it seems logical for exporting countries to join them. 
However, an intimate understanding of the Japanese scene would be an essential 
prerequisite, and to be successful, any plan would need to be seen as originating 
within Japan rather than outside. Collaboration rather than confrontation is 
required, and given the will to collaborate, farmers in both Japan and Oceania 
could perhaps be convinced, in due course, that the things they have in common 
outweigh those wherein their interests conflict. If so, it should be possible to 
work out solutions to their problems which are mutually acceptable and beneficial. 
24 This theme is developed in E.A. Saxon: Farm Production in Japan and Australia: 
Are Producers Partners or Rivals? Paper presented to Japan Agricultural 
Economics Society Conference, Sendai, April 1977. 
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Appendix 
MEASURES TO CONTROL IMPORTS OF DAIRY 
PRODUCTS : JAPAN 
Corrrrnodity Tariff( a) 
Fresh milk and cream Free 
Condensed skim milk 
- sweetened 30% 
- unsweetened 25% 
Condensed whole milk 
- sweetened 30% 
- unsweetened 25% (30%) 
Skim milk powder 
- sweetened 35% (45%) 
- unsweetened 25% (45%) 
- for school lunch Free 
- for stock feed Fee (45%) 
IVhole milk powder 30% (40%) 
Whey powder 
- sweetened 35% 
- unsweetened 25% 
Butter 35% (45%) 
Cheese - processed 35% (45%) 
- natural for use in processing Free (35% ) 
- natural, other 35% 
Casein Free 
Casein derivatives and glues 8% 
Miscellaneous processed milk products 25% 
Non-tariff 
Heasures( b) 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q S 
Q 
M 
0 
(a) Three rates of duty are shown for dairy products - general (or nominal), 
GATT and temporary. The rate shown here is that applicable to imports 
from Oceania. The rate in brackets is the nominal rate where this differs 
from that actually applicable. 
(b) Q - Import quota applies 
S - State trading applies (i.e. LIPC handles the imports) 
T.~ - Mixing regulations apply. At present, manufacturers of processed 
cheese may import 2kg of natural cheese free of duty for each kg 
of domestic cheese they mix with the imported cheese. 
In addition, all dairy products must comply with the Food Sanitation Law. 
Source: Japan Tariff Association: Customs Tariff Schedules of Japan. 
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JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AND TRADE IN 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS BETWEEN NEVtJ ZEALAND AND JAPAN 
In the light of what has been said by previous spea:i\:8rs and what I 
expect will be said by other speakers on this panel, I am not at all sure 
that there is anything left for me to say. I have therefore decided to 
comment in fairly general terms on the effects, of Japanese support 
policies on New Zealand's trade in livestock products, and leave it to 
Messrs Blackmore < and Calder to fill in the details on dairy products and 
meat. 
It is sometimes claimed by critics of New Zealand's trade and 
marketing policies that we spend too much of our time and efforts in 
complaining ~bout lack of access - in trying to secure improved terms of 
access - instead of concentrating more on improved marketing techniques to 
enable greater penetration of our products into chosen markets. In its 
most simplistic form, the advice is to research what the customer wants, 
produce to meet that specific requirement and employ modern marketing and 
promotion methods to ensure a satisfactory result. This is sound enough 
advice in theory and, in some cases, also in practice. For a high 
proportion of our export trade in livestock products it is, unfortunately, 
not a practicable proposition. 
In general terms, the answ~r to the question "access or penetration" 
has to be "it all depends" - i.e. it all depends upon which product we are 
talking about. And I mean "product", not category of produce, such as dairy 
or meat. The situation varies quite markedly from dairy product to dairy 
product, meat product to meat product. 
Stated simply, Japanese policy towards foreign livestock products is 
to allow them to be imported to the extent that, and only to that extent, 
they do not prejudice - or indeed, threaten to prejudice - the objectives of 
domestic agricultural support policies. In effect, imports are regarded as 
a necessary evil, to be tolerated o;lly to the extent required to fill an 
estimated gap between domestic production and consumption of the product 
concerned. This, one might observe, is in marked contrast to the policy 
3apan expects other countries to follow in respect of Japanese manufactured 
goods! I am aware that it is regarded in some circles as rather old fashioned 
or naive to talk in terms of comparative advantage and international 
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specialisation when discussing the problems of access for New Zealand's 
pastoral products. I would certainly agree that such arguments, in 
themselves, will not open many doors and, in practice, we have always been 
prepared in trade negotiations to adopt a much more pragmatic approach than 
is implied by the principle of comparative advantage. 
Nevertheless, I believe that it does no harm to remind our trading 
partners from time to time that the concept does have a basic validity in 
terms of making efficient use of the world's resources. It is, I suggest, 
particularly relevant in the case of a country ,such as Japan whose incredible 
economic growth over the past few decades has depended so heavily on the 
application of the concept of comparative advantage in international trade 
in industrial products. It does no harm to remind our Japanese friends 
that they have a role to playas responsible members of the international 
trading community - particularly when one considers the respective balance 
of payments positions of our two countries. (There are, of course, different 
views on the terms in which such reminders might be expressed!) 
In conformity with the general Japanese approach to agricultural 
imports that I have outlined, we find that for products which are - or given 
the chance, would be - directly competitive with Japanese production, access 
is very tightly controlled. This is particularly so for products where one 
of the declared objectives of agricultural policy is to attain a higher 
degree of self sufficiency. Beef and most dairy products are prime examples 
of this. As one who has been closely involved in discussions with the 
Japanese authorities over the past two years, I have no hesitation in saying 
that as far as butter and skim milk powder are concerned, the major problem 
we face is unquestionably one of access - or, rather, lack of it. No amount 
of market developmental effort is going to produce results if we cannot get 
the product across the frontier. That is not to say that improved access 
would, in itself, provide all the answers to expanding sales of these 
products on the Japanese market, but it is an essential first requirement. 
Much the same situation exists with beef except that the greater shortfall in 
domestic production does provide greater opportunities for imports than in 
the case of butter and milk powder. There are other factors affecting the 
level of New Zealand beef exports to Japan which, no doubt, Mr Calder will 
enlarge upon. 
On the other hand, for products such as lamb and mutton and, of course, 
wool, where in contrast to butter and beef domestic production is not a 
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factor, access is no problem. Promotion and market development are the 
main requirements. Even within the dairy sector, products other than 
butter and skim milk powder face fewer access problems - although again, 
there are other problems which I assume Mr Blackmore will enlarge upon. 
I have referred to the underlying Japanese policy objective of 
increased self suff~ciency in the supply of food and particularly livestock 
products. This is part of a more fundamental objective of ensuring adequate 
food supplies - an objective which no-one can quarrel with. We can and do 
question the means by which this policy objective is persued and the way in 
which its pursuit affects the import opportunities for different agricultural 
products. 
In the first place, for Japan, self-sufficiency for its livestock 
industries is really an illusion. The production of beef and dairy products, 
as well as pork and poultry, is very heavily dependent upon imported feed-
stuffs - notably maize and soyabean from the U.S.A. To illustrate the point, 
between 1960 and 1975 imports of feedgrains increased by 560% from 1.4 million 
tonnes to 9.3 million tonnes; and imports of soyabean cake and meal by over 
2,000% from 790 million to 17,630 million tonnes. As New Zealand has found 
in a different context, the more a country attempts to reduce its dependence 
upon imports by switching from the finished product to the raw materials, the 
more vulnerable it becomes to constraints on the flow of such materials, 
whether of a physical or financial nature. At least, in the case of New 
Zealand, we can point to chronic balance of payments problems in justification 
for import substitution policies, whatever reservations might be held about 
the wisdom of particular aspects or instances of such policies in practice. 
This claim can scarcely be made by Japan and, in any event, it is doubtful 
whether in the case of beef and manufactured dairy products, there is much 
net saving of foreign exchange in importing feed-stuffs rather than the 
finished product. 
Our second criticism of the Japanese pursuit of increased self-
sufficiency for meat and dairy products is that it is being approached from 
both ends - high prices to the producer to encourage increased production, 
and high prices to the consumer to discourage increased consumption. Clearly, 
self-sufficiency is a much more attainable goal in any situation if demand is 
suppressed by pricing the product beyond the reach of most consumers. (Under 
such a policy, one could imagine New Zealand becoming self-sufficient even in 
such exotic foodstuffs as pineapples.) A major element in our approach to 
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the Japanese authorities has been to urge that the Japanese consumer be given 
a better deal - be given the opportunity to buy meat and dairy products at 
more reasonable prices. It is, I believe, well enough known that the Japanese 
import system - and internal distribution system - deny the consumer the 
advantage he might otherwise secure from such supplies of lower priced imports 
of, for example, beef and butter, as are allowed into the country. From the 
New Zealand exporters' point of view, it is additionally galling to know that 
the substantial profits made by the LIPC - which has a virtual monopoly on 
beef and butter imports - are used primarily to assist Japanese agriculture. 
In its effects, the Japanese system is therefo~e very much the same as the 
EEC's. And both systems are justified on the same grounds - the need for 
domestic, political and social reasons, to provide incomes for farmers 
and rural workers at levels similar to those earned by urban dwellers. Both 
systems pay lip service - but little else - to the interests of the consumer. 
Both have, so far, largely rejected the alternative of more direct support 
for the farmer instead of relying on a manipulated price mechanism. Both lead 
to the accumulation of surpluses although, so far, these have been of a 
temporary nature only in Japan. And so far, in the case of Japan, for livestock 
products, there has been no resort to the infuriating business of subsidised 
exports or surpluses to the detriment of exporting countries like New Zealand. 
It should be noted, however, that Japan has had to adopt special measures to 
reduce or dispose of rice surpluses, partly by aid and other external operations. 
Unfortunately for us, actions to deal with rice surpluses have also included 
incentives for farmers to switch from rice to livestock production. 
The practical consequences for New Zealand of the Japanese support 
policies I have outlined are that the trading opportunities for several major 
New Zealand export products are not only severely restricted, but are 
spasmodic, largely unpredictable, and have been subject to large fluctuations. 
This is particularly so for butter and skim milk powder for human consumption. 
Our ability to gauge the prospects for imports of these products has been 
improved somewhat over the last year with the holding at approximately six 
monthly intervals of working level discussions on the Japanese supply/demand 
situation and prospects. But we have so far failed to persuade the Japanese 
authorities to acknowledge a continuing place .for imports and establish on a 
regular basis even minimum quota levels. Fortunately, there are more 
encouraging developments in the case of beef where quotas are now announced 
on a six monthly basis and there are signs that the Japanese might screw 
up their courage to the point of setting an annual minimum quota before too 
121. 
long. In this context, the term "quota" means "global quota" or, in effect, 
an announced intention to import from somewhere a certain quantity. The 
allocation of that quantity among supplying countries is another matter 
currently decided piecemeal at a later stage. I should perhaps make it 
clear that contrary to the impression that sometimes seems to be held, New 
Zealand has not been seeking discriminatory quotas for its own beef or dairy 
products. We have sought the establishment of global quotas within which we 
would compete with other suppliers. This is probably also the appropriate 
place to emphasise that we do not expect, nor have we asked, for unlimited 
access. Our requests have been, in our view, very modest and realistic. 
We have never asked or implied that Japanese farmers should be "thrown 
to the wolves" - nor do we believe that our requests would have this effect. 
What we do not accept is that the present method of supporting Japanese 
farmers and the present pricing procedures for both domestic and imported 
farm products are immutable. The concept of deficiency payments is not a 
new one in Japanese agriculture; nor is the concept of using imports along 
with domestic product to benefit the consumer while protecting producer 
interests. The Japanese Government has acknowledged that in the case of 
beef, for example, consumption can be boosted and imports expanded by stream-
lining the distribution system - by reducing some of the "fat" taken by the 
middlemen. No doubt there are other possibilities. \Vhat is needed is the 
political will, ingenuity and organising ability. The Japanese are 
certainly not lacking in the latter two qualities. 
As far as the third is concerned, we can find some encouragement in 
the increasing attention being focussed in Japan upon consumer interest, and 
the lessening general political influence of the rural sector over time. It 
is also a fact that a progressive restructuring in the rural sector has been 
under way for some years with a steep reduction in the number of farms, 
particularly the smallest and least viable. Policies to further this 
development which should lead to lower real unit costs of production and 
facilitate more moderate pricing policies, are being advocated in some 
quarters in Japan. An~ of course, the Japanese Government is being subjected 
to a good deal of political pressure from outside to adopt more liberal trading 
policies. New Zealand is not alone in banging on the Japanese door! The Tokyo 
round of GATT trade negotiations is in its final stages and, it must be hoped, 
will reach a successful conclusion which will include some substantive 
improvement in our prospects in the Japanese market. The extent of the 
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improvement remains to be seen, but I have little doubt that we shall 
still need to keep pressing the Japanese Government with every means at our 
disposal to do even better. Equally, we must be prepared to make even 
greater efforts to take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the 
Japanese market, particularly for products which are less politically 
sensitive and which accordingly face fewer barriers. 
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JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AND TRADE IN 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN 
DAIRY PRODUCTS: 
New Zealand is a major exporter of dairy products to the Japanese 
market, and as a major supplier we are both deeply interested in, and 
concerned to improve the level of consumption of milk and dairy products 
in Japan. 
Although Japanese consumption has steadily expanded over the last 
two decades, consumption per head currently remains at levels which, by 
international standards, are exceptionally low. The attached table 
shows that the annual consumption of drinking milk in Japan in 1976 was 
under 32 kg. per person. This compares with 118 ke. in the United States 
of America; 165 kg. in New Zealand; and around 130 kg. in the USSR, and 
18 kg. in India. 
Butter and cheese consumption per head in Japan is well under 1 kg. 
per annum. 
Undoubtedly traditional dietary habits have been a factor in 
restricting the growth in consumption, but the extremely high retail price 
level has also been a major contributing factor. The current retail price 
levels of over US$7/kg. for butter; US$5.40 for cheese; and over US$l/litre 
for milk (see attached table) are the highest in the world, and would place 
these nutritional products in the luxury class for consumers, both in Japan 
and in any other country around the world. 
The basic cause for these high consumer prices in Japan is the 
relatively high cost of milk production which, in turn, is maintained and 
protected by Government intervention and price support. Japan is not 
alone in using Government intervention to support high cost dairy industries, 
but the level of the supported milk producer price in Japan is considerably 
higher than anywhere else in the world, and much higher than in the EEC or 
the United States of America. 
On the other hand, there exists in Japan strong social, political, 
and even strategic reasons for maintaining dairy farm income and dairy 
production. We accept these reasons, both as a political fact of life in 
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Japan, and as a fellow dairy industry, even though we do not have such 
Government support in New Zealand. What we are concerned to achieve is 
not a decline in the Japanese dairy industry, but an expansion in the 
Japanese consumption of dairy products which would be, in our view, to 
the benefit of both New Zealand's and Japan's dairy industries. 
Having analysed the Japanese support system for the local production 
of milk for processing into dairy products, we have concluded that there 
is scope under the existing arrangements to achieve a better stabilisation 
of the consumer price in Japan, while at the same time maintain the real 
value of the current milk price to ,.Japanese producers. 
Mechanisms exist under the present law that could be used more 
effectively to stabilize both the market price for dairy products and milk 
production in Japan. These existing mechanisms include: 
(a) The LIPe's function of importing and releasing 
designated dairy products on to the Japanese 
market to stabilize the market price, and the 
LIPe's function of purchasing dairy products to 
support the producer price on the market. 
(b) Government subsidies to producers on milk for pro-
cessing which makes up the difference between the 
guaranteed price to farmers and the price paid by 
processors of dairy products, which in turn 
determines the price to consumers. 
(c) The quantitative ceiling, fixed by the Government 
each year, on the total quantity of milk that 
receives this producer subsidy. 
Our analysis of the use of the stock release, or "buying in" function 
of the LIPe over the last six years, shows that the stock release of some 
dairy products has often been quite inadequate to stabilize the market 
price; and the gap between this and the equivalent of the producer price 
has been reduced by lifting that producer price, rather than reducing 
the wholesale market price. As a result the average wholesale price of 
butter, for example, rose from ¥670/kg. in 1971 to ¥12JJ/kg. in 1977. 
Over this period, the rise in the guaranteed price to producers for 
milk for processing was, by and large, justified by farm cost increases. 
But, over the period, more and more of the increase has been loaded directly 
on to the market price, rather than being absorbed by appropriate increases 
in the producer milk subsidy. Between 1972 and 1977 the guaranteed price to 
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farmers rose from ¥45.48/kg. to ¥88.87/kg., an increase of 95%. In the 
same period the subsidy rose by ¥16.88/kg., or by only 69%; and as a 
result the price of milk to processors rose by 132%, and this price hike 
was, in turn, transmitted on to the market for dairy products. 
It could be argued that increasing the subsidy, as suggested above, 
would be too costly to Government and would not expand consumption 
significantly. 
However, if over the next five years farm costs increased at 3.5% 
per annum (the average for the last three years), the cost to Government 
of matching the increase via the subsidy would be relatively small, both 
in absolute terms and relative to the size of the total agricultural budget. 
We calculate that in order to stabilize the price of milk to processors at 
the current level of ¥64.30/kg., over the next five years, the milk 
subsidy would need to rise from ¥24.57/kg. in 1978 to ¥4l.25/kg. by 1983. 
Assuming the 1978 quantitative ceiling for the subsidy of 1.83 million 
tonnes was maintained through to 1983, the total cost of the subsidy would 
rise from ¥44,963 million, or US$225 million in fiscal 1978, to ¥75,500 
million or US$377 million in 1983. This gradual and relatively small 
increase in expenditure on the producer subsidy could achieve a stabilization 
of the market price for dairy products at current levels, while at the same 
~ 
time maintaining the real value of farm incomes. 
In addi~ion, the very high retail price level and the relatively 
o 
high price elasticity of demand for dairy products in Japan, would indicate 
that even a small reduction in pri.ce, or at least a stabilization of price 
at current levels, could achieve a useful increase in consumption in dairy 
products over the next five years. 
The existing power of the Government to fix the limit on the quantity 
of milk for processing that receives the producer subsidy, gives the 
Government the ability to control and stabilize the amount of milk produced 
in Japan,and to match it with demand and import requirements. }filk 
production above the quantitative limit by not receiving the subsidy is 
severely penalized in terrns of return, and the Japanese authorities have 
in their hands a strong and effective method of preventing surplus 
production and influencing the level of production of milk for processing. 
Finally, there is an important relationship between all three 
mechanisms in terms of stabilizing price levels and balancing supply and 
demand. For example, the higher the unit value of the subsidy, the stronger 
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the effect of limiting the standard amount will be, on controlling the 
volume of production of milk for processing. Also, the stock release 
mechanism which has always been under pressure to favour and ensure 
increases in the equivalent producer price rather than to stabilize the 
consumer price, could be supported by a greater use of the subsidy in 
holding down the price of milk to processors. 
During the last two financial years, total milk production in Japan 
has increased heavily. Because the consumption of drinking milk has not 
absorbed this increase, supplies entering manufacturing have expanded. 
In the same period the quantitative ceiling for milk for processing 
receiving the subsidy rose from 1.33 million tonnes in 1975 to 1.53 million 
tonnes in 1976, and by 1977 was lifted, at the end of the financial year, 
to nearly match the total quantity of milk produced in Japan for processing. 
Also, in 1978, the quantitative ceiling was not used to contain production, 
and butter and skimmilk powder production expanded to the point where 
surpluses have been built up. As a result, imports of butter and skimmilk 
powder for human consumption have virtually ceased, and the immediate 
prospects for imports of these products are bleak indeed. 
This collapse in butter imports is of direct concern to New Zealand. 
If, into the 1980s, milk production continues to be stimulated while 
consumption remains relatively stagnant, our exports of cheese and casein 
could also come under threat. This would have serious implications for 
the New Zealand dairy industry. 
In our view, there is a direct link between the level of our dairy 
trade with Japan and the extent to·which existing mechanisms within the 
dairy support system are more effectively used to stabilize the price of 
dairy prodqcts to consumers and the level of local production. 
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C01v1PARATIVE RETAIL PRICES AND CONSUMPTION 
PER HEAD 
1978 Retail Prices (in US$) 
Butter Cheese Milk 
(kg) (kg) (kg) 
Tokyo 1 7.26 5.47 1.13 
Washington 2 3.42 5.38 0.56 
London 2 2.22 2.88 0.38 
Wellington 2 1.12 2.28 0.17 
Consumption per Head (per year)3 
Butter Cheese Milk 
(kg) (kg) (litre) 
Japan 0.6 0.5 31.4 
United States 2.0 9.4 117.9 
United Kingdom 7.6 6.1 144.2 
New Zealand 14.2 7.1 165.3 
Notes: 
1 July 1978 - Source: Japanese Prime !Mnister's Office. 
2 F.A.S. Survey of retail food prices - 5 July 1978. 
3 1976 for Japan, United States and United Kingdom - Source: I.D.F. 
1977/78 for New Zealand - Source: N.Z. Dairy Board. 
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JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT POLICIES AND TRADE 
IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN 
MEAT PRODUCTS 
Japan has long been considered as a potential alternative market for 
exports of New Zealand meats and efforts have been made to promote and develop 
sales of our main meat products to that market since the late 1950's. Some 
problems have been encountered with the volatility of the trade in mutton due 
to the nature of the product and its usage in Japan, while sales of lamb have 
improved as consumer prejudice against frozen productsand their lack of 
familiarity with lamb have been gradually overcome by promotion activities and 
the development of products to suit the particular market requirements. 
Sheepmeats though are not subject to significant import regulations so these 
problems have been relatively minor when compared with the difficulties that 
have been associated with the development of beef exports to Japan and it is 
this product which is the principal item of concern in the context of this' 
seminar. 
The difficulties with beef relate not only to the direct effects of 
Japanese support policies and the unique conditions of access for imports, but 
also to the way in which other suppliers, principally Australia, have reacted 
to these restrictions in conjunction with access restrictions that have been 
applied to beef exports to other markets in recent years. The result has. been 
that New Zealand exports of beef to Japan have not developed as consistently 
as could have been expected under the existing demand conditions; nor have the 
sales been improving as well as has been the case with lamb (see Table 1). 
The attraction of Japan as an outlet for New Zealand beef exports is 
due to the extremely high prices that are charged for beef at retail 
in that market which leads to the conclusion that there is a strong demand 
for beef that cannot be satisfied by supplies from domestic producers. 
This was evident in 1973 when regulations were· relaxed and beef imports 
increased by 120 per cent, to 181,OOOtonnes, while domestic beef prices 
continued to increase. Generally, though, beef imports are limited by a 
global quota which is mainly controlled by the Livestock Industry Promotion 
Corporation (L.I.P.C), though a small proportion is allocated to private trade. 
The L.I.P.C. was established in 1961 and is "authorised to perform various 
functions of the Government with its ultimate objective directed towarffithe 
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price stabilisation of livestock products and the protection of both farmers 
and consumers!!. As far as beef is concerned, its price stabilisation 
activities are related to the purchase, storage and sale of imported beef, 
with the aim of maintaining prices for the higher cost domestic product. 
These activities which maintain incomes of domestic producers through 
the market price support system are part of the overall policy on beef produc-
tion which has been aimed at increasing the level of self-sufficiency in 
Japan. Apart from occasional lapses in 1973 and again in 1976, it is evident 
that this policy has been reasonably successful, and the degree of self-
sufficiency has been relatively steady at around 80-85 percent (see Table 2). 
It is notable, though, that while the Japanese Government!s ltForecast 
of Demand For and Supply of Selected Agricultural Commodities for 1985!! (May 
1975) indicates a substantial increase in production with the maintenance of 
the high level of self-sufficiency at 81 percent, the latest projections on 
meat from the F.A.O. (!!Meat: Supply, Demand and Trade Projections 1985 lt June 
1978) are much less optimistic in forecasting a self-sufficiency ratio of 
69.5 percent. 
It is recognised that because of the socio-economic and political 
structure of the beef industry in Japan, there is a need to maintain incomes 
of be.ef producers. However, the system of price support that is used can be 
likened to a two-edged sword being wielded for the benefit of the producers 
to the disadvantage of both consumers! and importers! interests. Under this 
system there is an artificial raising of prices to producers which can, at 
timr=s and in certain circumstances, result in !!surplus!! production. This 
occurs maJnly because of the policy of passing on high prices to consumers 
and the effect this has of reducing consumer demand. Thus high levels of 
self-sufficiency can be achieved by forcing down domestic consumption while 
artificially stimulating production, and restricting imports. 
In addition, in aiming for a high level of self-sufficiency in beef 
production, great reliance has been placed on the need for imported feed stuffs, 
so in effect the high degree of self-sufficiency in beef has been won only at 
the expense of lower self-sufficiency in grain and feeding stuffs. In 1976, 
the self-sufficiency ratios for wheat, barley,' other cereals (except rice) and 
soya beans were all less than 10 percent, which indicates the highly vulnerable 
position of the Japanese livestock industry to changes in world animal feeding 
stuff prices. The degree of reliance on feeding stuffs has been emphasised 
recently by a newspaper advertisement in Japan in which beef producers opposed 
the liberation of beef imports. This indicated that Japan imported 20 million 
tonnes of animal feed grain annually and that imported grain accounted for 
about 70 percent of the feed given to Japanese beef cattle. 
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As far as imports of beef are concerned, the policy has been to 
restrict imports only to such a quantity as is necessary to cover short 
domestic supplies. Quotas are announced at six-monthly intervals for 
general beef imports and for imports for special purposes such as the 
school lunch programme. The general quota is further divided into the 
"one touch" system, usually for chilled beef, and imports by tender which 
applies mainly to frozen beef; it is this latter system that has caused 
some difficulties for New Zealand. 
The frozen beef imported under the quota is purchased by the L.I.P.C. 
from licensed importers by a tender system. These imports are subject to a 
25 per cent duty and in addition the L.I.P.C. makes an adjustment to prices 
up to the equivalent domestic level when these stocks are released onto the 
market. These adjustments to the L.I.P.C.'s selling price can more than 
double the original c.i.f. price plus duty that was paid. The stocks are 
released onto the market at determined intervals as a means of stabilising 
domestic wholesale prices. 
Tenders are announced at regular intervals (usually monthly), with 
the required tonnage being split into various specified items. The L.I.P.C. 
decides the successful tenders for each specified cut - usually by accepting 
the cheapest bids until the allocation for that particular cut is filled. 
There is, therefore, considerable advantage to importers to quote as cheaply 
as possible, and in these circumstances, in recent years at least, New Zealand 
exporters have faced considerable competition from low-priced offers from 
Australian suppliers. This partly reflecis the significant quantity of beef 
that has been available in Australia, and also the indirect effect of the 
Australian system of allocating quota tonnages for the North American market. 
In the past, these U.S. quota entitlements were made on the basis of the 
exporter's sales performance to markets other than the U.S.A. and, considering 
that prices in the U.S. were substantially better than in other markets, there 
was an incentive for Australian exporters to obtain maximum volume to alternative 
markets like Japan, even to the extent of discounting prices. Consequently, 
the proportion of the various Japanese tenders allotted to New Zealand has 
been rather low. The Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation has introduced 
some controls by allocating quota tonnages for Japan among Australian exporters, 
but competition has remained strong. In the 1977/78 Japanese fiscal year, 
New Zealand gained 8.4 per cent of the total beef tenders accepted while, for 
the first three tenders for the 1978/79 fiscal year, the NZ proportion was 
4.1 per cent, or 708 tonnes, out of a total of 17,100 tonnes. 
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In response to representations over the years, the Japanese have 
made some moves to improve the beef import system with a gradual increase 
in the quotas since their reintroduction in 1975/76 and an earlier announcement 
of the six-monthly quota tonnages which assists in exporters' planning to some 
extent. This year, t4ey have maintained their stabilisation prices for beef 
at las~ ye~r's levels which could mean some improvement in demand. There have 
also been some moves to rationalise and improve the fairly costly distribution 
system for beef in Japan. 
The policy on beef imports has been and still is being debated in 
Japan, this debate bei~g brought on by Japan's' current large trading surplus 
and rising consumer dissatisfaction with high retail beef prices. In addition, 
there has been a substantial lift in the earnings of the L.I.P.C. from 15.1 
billion yen in 1975 and 30.7 billion yen in 1976 to 40 billion yen in 1977 
(fiscal years), reflecting mainly the substantial difference between imported 
and domestic beef prices. 
Not unnaturally the policy has also been the subject of serious 
consideration in New Zealand, and it has been suggested that some alternatives 
to the current price support system and control of imports could be investigated. 
We consider that, as Japan has limited potential for increased beef production 
and a high income elasticity of demand, there is a requirement to develop a 
more consistent import policy which provides adequate assurance of long-term 
security of supplies. The prospect of lower supply availabilities of inter-
national markets in the next few years, coupled with the healthy state of the 
Japanese economy and the improving demand, particularly for protein foods, adds 
emphasis to this requirement. 
We consider that a greater use of the policy and its existing system 
of deficiency payments to producers would provide the necessary assurance of 
income, while liberalisation of the L.I.P.C. 's import purchasing and sales 
mechanism would benefit consumers through lower retail prices. It would also 
provide for the stimulation of trade and a better continuity of supplies. 
It is significant that not only exporters have been thinking of improved 
policies for imports. The influential group of economists in the Japanese 
Forum for Policy Innovation have stated that they consider that the dual goals 
of import liberalisation and the development of the domestic beef industry 
can be achieved simultaneously. They have suggested the abolition of the 
beef import quota to reduce wholesale and retail beef prices and expand 
consumption. The drop in income to domestic producers resulting from the 
decline in prices should be compensated by the use of deficiency payments as 
already practised in Japan for milk for processing. They have proposed that 
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this programme should be phased in over a transition period of 5 to 7 
years, to allow producers, consumers,and exporting countries to adjust 
to the changed conditions. 
We have also noted reports in the Japanese press that there has been 
some consideration of two alternative policies for beef imports. These 
are proposals for a stable expansion of beef imports or an expansion of 
imports as a percentage of increased demand. These proposals do not appear 
to be as attractiye though as the general principles put forward by the Forum 
for Policy Innovation. 
It is reGognised that any change will take some time, particularly as 
Japanese farmers are sensitive to imports of beef, but we consider that, in the 
long term, an expanded ma~ket and a rising demand for beef will be an 
advantage to local producers, as well as to importers and to exporters like New 
Zealand. 
As far as New Zealand is concerned, the maintenance of global quotas 
even if they are increased, will mean that we will continue to face competition, 
mainly from Australian supplies, in bidding for import tenders. 
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TABLE l. NEW ZEALAND MEAT EXPORTS TO JAPAN 
(September Years) 
Lamb Mutton Beef Other Total 
(tonnes) 
1965/66 1604 59746 3023 470 64843 
1966/67 1059 59690 3189 195 64136 
1967/68 3044 74465 3099 1069 81676 
1968/69 3864 64384 2224 1207 71678 
1969/70 5847 65289 2573 1989 76206 
1970/71 3060 60192 4197 2492 70390 
1971/72 5781 63511 3421 2930 75639 
1972/73 8153 64538 8355 2832 83878 
1973/74 5703 46870 2294 3372 58238 
1974/75 8214 46409 1097 3668 59390 
1975/76 10499 20986 3057 5163 39 705 
1976/77 14305 25592 2263 3857 46017 
1977/78 * 8544 9822 5543 3235 27144 
* 
9 months to June 
TABLE 2. JAPAN BEEF PRODUCTION, TRADE, CONSUMPTION JlJm SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
Calendar Production Net Imports Available for tlSe1f-Sufficiencytl 
Years (a) Consumption (a/b) % 
(b) 
1970 278010 33160 
(tonnes) 
311170 89.3 
1971 296173 59366 355539 83.3 
1972 317445 82275 399720 79.4 
1973 245769 181722 427491 57.5 
1974 321071 76566 397637 80.7 
1975 352664 64166 416830 84.6 
1976 297881 134608 432489 68.9 
1977 361213 120763 481976 74.9 
1985 (1) 508000 117000 625000 81.0 
Projections (2) 410000 180000 590000 69.5 
Source: (1 ) The 11eat Statistics in Japan (June 1, 1978) 
(2) F.A.O. - Meat: Supply and Demand Projections 1985. 
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